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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A vast amount of academic research focuses on how bond issuance impacts the firm. Most 
recent research focuses on investment grade bonds and ignores non-investment grade bonds. Chapter 1 
investigates firms issuing high-yield debt and the impact on their stock price by identifying determinants of 
the negative abnormal return that surrounds the announcement of an issue in the short-run. It is learned 
the length, coupon payment and amount of the issue are significant in explaining the CAR as is the age of 
the firm, first-time issuers and the marketplace where its stock trades. Firm performance ratios including 
the current and total-asset-turnover ratio also have explanatory power. These determinants of the CAR 
have an explanatory power approaching 55%. 
 
 Chapter 2 uses an ordinary least squares technique similar to Chapter 1 to capture determinants 
of the pricing decision for high-yield bond offerings. I find the coupon amount, the years to maturity, bonds 
issued for refinancing purposes and callable bonds are significant determinants in the spread at issuance. 
The exchange in where the firms stock trades and bullish market conditions are also of significance. It is 
determined these variables have roughly 52% explanatory power over the spread. 
 
 Chapter 3 looks at long-run stock underperformance of high-yield bond IBOs' in the 3-5 year post 
issuing period compared to firms that do not issue stock and\or bonds over the same 5-year post period. 
A second dataset featuring investment grade bond issuing firms is also compared to firms that do not 
issue stocks and\or bonds over the same 5-years post period.  It is determined that stock 
underperformance does exist following bond IBOs’ using both the Buy-and-Hold return and Fama-French 
Four-Factor models. The level of underperformance is found to be greatest for callable bonds issuers 
followed by straight bonds and convertible bond issuers. Additionally, it is learned that high-yield bond 
issuing firms experience a greater level of underperformance than their investment-grade counterparts. 
This line of research partially fills the gap in understanding how non-investment grade bonds impacts the 
firm in both stock performance and the pricing decision. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The intention of this dissertation is to partially fulfill the gap in the existing academic research that 
exists towards issuers of high-yield bonds. High-yield bonds are a debt instrument issued by firms looking 
to raise capital that do not have access to traditional capital markets. High-yield bonds have a credit 
rating of BBB and lower. Firms issuing high-yield bonds offer its investors higher yields to compensate for 
taking on the additional risk. While the investors into these high-yield bonds are compensated for their 
assumption of higher risk, the stockholders bear the effects of the increased leverage position of the firm. 
Capturing how stockholders react to announcements of high-yield bonds and how high-yield bonds are 
priced to compensate bondholders is the motivation for the dissertation.  
 
It is well published how stockholders react through abnormal returns to firms issuing new 
investment-grade bonds. Academic research has investigated stockholder reaction through abnormal 
returns in both the short-run and long-run. Event-study methodology is most frequently used to capture 
stockholder reaction. Event-study methodology is considered to be an accurate reflection of the abnormal 
stock returns that surround firm events in the short-run. Common short-run firm events measured include 
seasoned equity offerings, management changes, merger and acquisition activity and debt issuances.  
 
Accurately measuring long-run abnormal returns has sparked great academic debate, with two 
different methods for deriving the long-run abnormal stock return coming to the forefront. Both Buy-and-
Hold Return methodology and the Fama-French Four Factor model have its proponents as well as its 
critics. However, these two methods have risen to the forefront to measure a long-run abnormal stock 
return. Both of these methods have been used to determine long-run abnormal stock returns using firm 
events such as seasoned equity offerings, stock splits, management changes, new bond issuances and 
changing regulations over an industry. 
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 The decision how new bond issuances are priced has also been the subject of much academic 
debate, producing several pricing models. Currently, most of the existing research is focused on the 
pricing of investment-grade bonds. Research only focusing on investment-grade bonds excludes 1 out of 
every 7 new bond issuances which accounts for 1/12th of the total value of the bond market in the United 
States. Conducting research where the primary focus is of non-investment grade issues will partially fill 
the gap in the existing research and provide a better understanding over both stockholder reaction and 
the pricing decision.   
 
 Chapter 2 of the dissertation examines the short-run stockholder reaction that surrounds 
announcements of high-yield bonds being issued. First, it is determined whether significant cumulative 
abnormal returns exist surrounding an announcement of high-yield bonds over selected observation 
windows. These windows include looking at the day of the announcement to one day proceeding to the 
five days prior and preceding the announcement of an issuance. After the cumulative abnormal return is 
established at the 95% confidence level, bond and firm characteristic variables are used in a regression 
framework to partially explain the investor reaction. The bond characteristic variables include; length of 
the issue, rating of the issue, coupon type, use of proceeds, and whether the issue is callable or non-
callable. The firm characteristic variables include; age of the firm at issuance, exchange where the issuing 
firm’s equity trades, various finance ratios of firm performance and the firms’ industry classification. One 
final variable included is used to capture market conditions. I find several variables that reveal 
significance in explaining stockholder reaction. Just as important, the results of the regression also show 
what variables are not significant in explaining the abnormal return. 
 
 Chapter 3 of the dissertation continues by analyzing the pricing decision for new issuances of 
high-yield bonds. The spread above the prevailing long-term Treasury rate at issuance is evaluated in this 
chapter. A better understanding of how high-yield bonds are priced at issuance can be gained by 
evaluating various bond and firm characteristics and there impact on the spread. Chapter 3 uses the 
same firm and bond characteristic variables used in chapter 2. In this chapter, the variables are being 
used to identify any significant determinants of the spread against the prevailing long-term Treasury rate 
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at the time of issuance. Similar to chapter 2, the test results reveal both significant and non-significant 
determinants of the spread above the prevailing Treasury rate at issuance. Both Chapters 2 and 3 feature 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression techniques in identifying the determinants. 
 
 Chapter 4 attempts to identify the determinants of long-run abnormal stock returns using the 
announcement of a high-yield bond as the triggering event for high-yield initial bond offerings. I assess 
both investment and non-investment grade bonds in the chapter to determine whether the stock of a high-
yield bond issuing firm underperforms the stock of their investment-grade bond issuing counterparts.  In 
addition to being classified as investment or non-investment grade, I categorize bonds as callable, 
convertible or straight. Identifying underperformance is done through the use of Buy-and-Hold Returns 
methodology and the Fama-French Four Factor model. The Buy-and Hold method features matching 
event firms to a match firm that does not issue debt or equity over the estimation window. The Fama-
French Four-Factor model uses references portfolios and economic variables to capture any abnormal 
return. The economic variables used in the Fama-French Four Factor model include; market premium, 
size of the firm, the firm’s book-to-market value and a momentum factor. While both methods vary 
drastically, the end results reveal the same relationships using either method.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INVESTOR REACTION TO NEW ISSUANCES OF HIGH-YIELD DEBT 
 
2.1 Introduction  
  
Non-investment grade debt is an important financing option for many firms that do not have 
access to traditional capital.  This includes equity offerings and debt instruments such as bank loans or 
investment grade bond. While investors enjoy higher returns on HYD, the risk of default is also higher. 
During the period of 1997 – 2002, nearly $174 billion of new HYD was issued. This accounts for nearly 
1/7th of all new bond issuances in the United States1. During the period of 1992-2001, the average return 
on high-yield bonds issued with a maturity of 10 years and a rating of B was 9%-11%.  Its AAA-rated 
counter part of investment grade quality yielded a 6% return on average. This higher return does not 
come without added risk of default. Over the same period, Moody’s Investor Services reports that 1.45% 
of all bonds issued during that period have defaulted; with 4.29% of all HYD issued entered into default, 
while only 0.03% of investment grade bonds defaulted. In general, the lower the rating of the bond, the 
higher the potential for default. 
 
 The HYD market was born in the early 1980s to supply small and mid-sized firms that demanded 
capital.  The capital was used for acquisition, growth opportunities, and general spending when the firms’ 
balance sheets would not support traditional financing. Drexel Burnham Lambert (DBL) sought out these 
firms and created a new debt instrument in the non-investment grade bond. Issuers of this new type of 
investment included the communications and gaming sectors that experienced insurmountable growth in 
the early 1980s. Early investors (pre DBL) in the non-investment grade market primarily invested in bonds 
that had fallen from investment grade status to non-investment grade.  New issuers of HYD looked to the 
private placement market to secure financing. In the mid 1980s, DBL began issuing bonds with a credit  
                                                 
1 Private issues of debt are excluded from this estimate. Bond statistical information (pages 4-6) is from The Bond Market 
Association publication, “An Investors Guide to High-Yield Bonds” 2000. 
 5
rating below investment grade. Major investors in the market included insurance companies, saving and 
loan associations, and later, mutual funds. Since the mid 1980s, the high-yield marketplace has been 
comprised of both firms whose debt fell below investment grade and firms not capable of issuing debt at 
investment grade.  
 
Acquisitions funded with debt or leveraged buyouts (LBO's) using HYD emerged in the mid 
1980s. Nearly 1/3 of HYD IBOs (initial bond offerings) in 1985 were issued for LBO’s or other acquisition 
purposes. By 1989, this ratio increased to nearly 65%. The investment community became concerned 
with firms issuing HYD for acquisition purposes.  The investment community had increased their risk and 
possible unnecessary exposure to the firms in which they held bonds. Along with increased risk came 
compensation, and this meant higher anticipated returns. Successful LBO’s provided higher rates of 
return for high-yield bonds compared to other investment opportunities. The acquiring firms quickly 
streamlined operations after an LBO by rapidly paying down debt with the free cash flow generated by 
increased sales.  This led to better financial performance which increased the market price of the debt. 
However, many of the LBO HYD offerings never reached maturity. After the successful completion of the 
buyout, many firms would restructure and refinance their capital structure with a new issuance of equity 
and retire debt from the proceeds at a premium to the investors liking. 
 
Firm growth and LBO’s were the main forces driving the infant HYD market along with distress 
relief. Many firms experienced financial troubles in the 1980s and sought financing in the non-investment 
grade market when their financial obligations could not be met. These firms issued HYD to pay existing 
financial obligations in an attempt to ward off a financial distress event. HYD instruments generally have 
less restrictive covenants than traditional bank debt. Managers were issuing the new debt to pay off bank 
loans that restricted firm activities. This opened the door for management to partake in new projects that 
bank loans would not allow due to the distressed position of the firm, and the conditions set forth in the 
newly retired bank loans.  
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 The late 1980s brought a stalled economy, a federal investigation into DBL, and an increased 
leverage into the LBO’s that were issued earlier in the decade. The Bond Market Association reports the 
default rate of HYD peaked in 1990 and 1991 at 7.9% and 9.3%, respectively. With a tightening 
marketplace and a lack of liquidity, the average price of HYD was issued at 65.9% of face value for 1990. 
By the end of 1991, this downward trend had run full course with the average price of issuance reaching 
80% plus of face value. The HYD market also posted impressive returns in 1991 and 1992 of 44% and 
17%, respectively. This sparked new interest into the speculative grade market with insurance 
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds actively adding HYD to their portfolios. Along with this 
renewed interest, new issuances began to grow. $40 billion worth of new issuances entered the market in 
1992, with 1997 being the peak year for issuances with $135 billion. The underwriting community also 
played a large role in this trend. In the late 1980s, DBL controlled 60% of this market. After the demise of 
DBL in 1990, traditional underwriters began to offer non-investment grade IBOs. By 1997, this market had 
11 major underwriters offering IBOs, each with less than a 12% market share.  
  
The issuing trends in the 1990s were two-fold. In the early 1990s, firms were refinancing 
outstanding coupon debt issued at high rates for lower rates. By the mid 1990s, this trend had slowed and 
changes in technology and the telecommunications sector became the driving force for new issuances. 
The telecommunications sector went through a major revolution in the 1990s with advances in technology 
and deregulation. Technological advances in computers fueled the Internet and the birth of the electronic 
media; while deregulation allowed media outlets to own more broadcasting entities than previously 
allowed. The technology sector demanded an extraordinary amount of capital to keep up with 
technological advances.  At the same time, massive consolidation was triggered in the 
telecommunications sector. The first five years of the 21st century have continued on the path of the mid 
to late 1990s with technology firms driving new issuances. However, there has been a return of firms 
issuing non-investment grade debt for LBO’s and other acquisition activity. 
 
High-yield bonds in many cases offer greater yields to compensate for the significant increase in 
credit risk. Some investors place these types of bonds in their portfolio because of the higher rate of 
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income generation from the higher coupon payments. Bonds of this type offer the potential for capital 
appreciation if the borrower's debt rating is upgraded due to improved earnings, mergers or acquisitions, 
positive industry developments, etc. Gilson and Warner (1998) use event study methodology in an 
attempt to capture investor reaction to bond issuances by analyzing abnormal stock returns around 
announcements of HYD. Using a database of 164 stocks, they find a mean cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) of -0.8% for both the (-1,1) and the (0,+1) event date windows. While providing evidence 
stockholders foresee issuances as a negative event, they provide minimal justification for the negative 
abnormal returns by regressing selected firm specific variables and events against the abnormal return.  
 
In this chapter, I extend the current research by examining abnormal returns that surround an 
issuance of HYD, and identify firm specific variables and events that are determinants in explaining 
negative reactions to new issuances of HYD. The intention of this chapter is to investigate into the world 
of high-yield bonds by analyzing investor reaction to new issuances of HYD. Section 2 is the literature 
review over abnormal returns and investor reaction to announcements of HYD. Section 3 looks at the 
short run determinants of a CAR, while Section 4 employs a variety of testing methods to determine if a 
significant abnormal return exists and what contributes to the investor reaction. Section 5 summarizes the 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8
2.2 Literature Review 
 
The existing literature provides evidence that a link between the use of HYD and financial distress 
exists. Research by Dahiya, Saunders, Srinivasan (2003), Altman (2000), Boughton (2000), Asquith, 
Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) and Giammarino (1989) show the validity of this link between high-yield 
bonds and bankruptcy issues. Gilson and Warner (1998) shows that stockholders will react negatively to 
new issuances of HYD. Furthermore, they believe issuances of HYD may be initiated by instances other 
than a distress event. Gilson and Warner (1998) also provide results of cross-sectional testing in an 
attempt to explain why significant CARs are plausible for reasons other than financial distress. Regressed 
against the CARs are variables emphasizing flexibility, implicit information, and agency costs within the 
issuing firms. Two variables were employed to capture flexibility that included post-issue % sales growth 
and a variable to determine if the firm’s pre-interest coverage ratio is above or below the sample mean. 
Following the work of Healy and Palepu (1994) Value Line earnings forecasts were used to capture any 
bad news relative to future firm performance. Variables representing agency costs include the level of 
inside ownership within the firm and the use of the proceeds generated by the issuance. The use of 
proceeds variable is used to capture whether the issuance was allotted to the repayment of debt or used 
to finance investment in working capital or real assets.     
 
The results of Gilson and Warner (1998) reveal that bank debt reduces flexibility and keeps firms 
from pursuing profitable growth opportunities. The announcement of a HYD issue can convey a bad news 
event by management, which can spark a decline in earnings. Increases in agency costs now happen 
after the issue since managers now have the flexibility to pursue less profitable (or negative present 
value) projects that will not maximize the value of the firm.  Just as importantly, variables representing 
wealth transfers, financial distress, maturity and underwriter and time effects were shown to have no 
significance for determining why stock prices decline around firms’ announcing new issuances. The 
chapter concludes citing that financial flexibility is a key motivating factor driving new issuances of HYD.  
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Attempts to explain abnormal stock returns have taken a few different avenues. Fama and French 
(1996) use a three factor model to explain abnormal returns that includes regressing firm specific 
variables such as firm size and book to market ratio. Jensen, Johnson and Mercer (1998) provide 
arguments that the abnormal returns are influenced by monetary policy and vary significantly over time. 
Furthermore, it is shown in this test that when using macroeconomic factors, the three-factor model 
proposed by Fama and French (1996) will not provide adequate results. Hahn, O’Neill and Reyes (2004) 
study stock return anomalies by examining small firms and value stocks.  They use a model created by 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) that eliminates abnormal returns once differences are adjusted for 
various measures of systematic risk.  The model used by Eckbo et al. (2000) captures firms’ sensitivity to 
short and long-term interest rates, patterns of consumption and inflation, and find after accounting for 
these factors, stock returns to new issuances of equity appear normal.  
 
Hahn et al. (2004) attempts to explain the abnormal return through a regression model regressing 
a measure of default risk, difference in the Treasury return over the past 20 years, change in real per 
capita consumption of consumer goods, unanticipated inflation, and the return of the market against the 
abnormal return. They find that macroeconomic variables can resolve the return differential between large 
and small firms while the abnormal return used in investment strategies (long position in low market value 
stocks and short position in high market value stocks) is not significant when accounting for 
macroeconomic risk factors. They also reveal that the market does not consider exposure to changes in 
short term interest rates a relevant risk for small firms. When assessing value versus growth stocks, they 
find evidence that the book to market ratio, cash flow to price and dividend yields were significant in 
determining the abnormal return for growth stocks but fails to have any explanatory power for value stock 
firms2.  
 
 Fama, French, Jensen and Roll (1969) pioneered studies using event-study methodology which 
features market model prediction errors for hypothesis testing. The market model used is: 
 
                                                 
2 The test also reveals that abnormal returns appear to be contained to a few decades and do not continue throughout time. 
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,itmtiiit uRR +Β+= α      ,,......,1 ni =    ,,......,1 Tt =                                           (1) 
Where itR = return on a security i for period t and mtR = the return on the market portfolio for the period t. 
 
Jain (1982) shows applying the assumption that the joint distribution of security returns will be multivariate 
normal, the joint distribution of the return for any security ( iR ) as well as the return on the market portfolio 
( mR ) will be bivariate normal. This allows Equation 1 to be a valid representation for the returns on 
security i. The coefficients iα and iβ are mostly estimated using an ordinary least squares technique 
which determines the prediction error over the period of evaluation. These prediction errors ( itu ) are 
precisely the abnormal return shown by: 
 
       ,mtiiitit RRu βα −−=     t > T,   i = 1,……n.                                               (2) 
Where itR = return on a security i for period t and mtR = the return on the market portfolio for the period t. 
 
Leftwich (1981), Collins, Rozeff and Dhaliwal (1981) and Holthausen (1981) all developed models that 
examine abnormal returns using cross-sectional variables. Regressing cross sectional variables against 
the abnormal return will reveal the characteristics that have an influence upon the abnormal return for a 
given event.3 The general form of this model is represented by: 
 
,)var( iii wiablessprecificfirmfu +−−=     i =1,……,n.                                     (3) 
where iw is the disturbance term 
 
Models of this type are prevalent in academic literature. The most common application of event-study 
methodology is measuring the impact of an event and how investor’s react by changes in equity prices in  
                                                 
3 Event studies have generally focused on events such as new issuance of equity, stock splits, divestures, changes in capital 
structure and any public information that may impact security prices. 
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both the short and long-run. Ritter (1995) and Loughran (1993) both show that firms engaging in initial 
public offerings will significantly underperform firms that do not issue for a period up to 5 years. Brav, 
Geczy and Gompers (2000), Eckbo et al. (2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) find significant underperformance surrounding seasoned equity offerings. Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) find the underperformance can exceed 30% over a 5-year period in comparison to 
a firm that does not have a secondary equity issue. Lee and Loughran (1998) evaluate rights offerings 
and find little evidence of post-offering underperformance. Ikenberry et al. (1995) find significant abnormal 
returns of 12% exist in the four-year period immediately following stock repurchases.  
 
 Research using event-study methodology has also been prevalent in the debt markets. Mikkelson 
and Partch (1986), Eckbo (1986) and Dann and Mikkelson (1984) find that firms issuing straight debt4 
experience insignificant negative returns at the announcement of debt offerings and conclude firms 
issuing straight debt have no impact on shareholder wealth. Consequently, Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1999) find substantial long-run underperformance by firms that issue straight debt and find the 
underperformance is more severe for firms that are small, young and whose equity trades on the 
NASDAQ markets. Eckbo et al. (2000), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) and Lee and Loughran (1998) 
show significantly negative stock price reaction surrounds an issuance of convertible debt.  
 
 Gilson and Warner (1998) apply event-study methodology to firms’ issuing HYD and find 
stockholders also react to these issuances with negative CARs. They assess investor reactions through 
the use of event study methodology in an attempt to capture abnormal stock returns around 
announcements of HYD issues. Using a database of 164 firms, they find a mean CAR for the issuing 
firms stock to be -0.8% for both the (-1,1) and the (0,+1) event date windows. Furthermore, they show 
that firms issuing HYD for the first time experience a mean CAR of -0.11% for both the (-1,1) and the 
(0,+1) event windows. The sample revealed nearly 63% of the issuing firms had negative CARs around 
the announcement of HYD and 130 of the 164 firms in the sample were first time issuers of this type of 
debt instrument. 
                                                 
4 Straight debt is essentially a loan written at a specific interest rate, which is to be repaid over a set number of months.  
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 Gilson and Warner (1998) use event-study methodology to find statistically negative abnormal 
returns in the short-run surrounding an announcement of a HYD issuance. However, their database is 
related to subsequent bank loan rating changes and analyzes 164 firms. Current academic research has 
also identified a variety of uses for event-study methodology with little attention directed at cross-sectional 
studies in attempts to understand why stockholders react in the manner they do. Given the limitations in 
the database with respect to size and qualifying observations, I hypothesize that using a database 
encompassing a larger number of issues without restricting the database to firms with changes in bank 
debt rating will provide a more accurate assessment of investor reaction to the firms’ announcement of 
issuing new HYD.  
 
 Jain (1984) provides the foundation to conduct tests for firm specific variables explaining 
abnormal returns.  Gilson and Warner (1998) also complete cross-sectional tests in an attempt to identify 
any variables that may influence the abnormal return. They find variables associated with a firm’s 
flexibility have statistical significance while variables measuring wealth transfers, financial distress, 
maturity, underwriter and time effects were shown to have no significance.  
 
 It is here the limitations of the previous work exist. By using a database with a larger number of 
issuances and without restrictions tied to changes in bank loan ratings, a cross-sectional analysis can be 
completed using a database of firm-specific and bond characteristic variables regressed against the 
abnormal return.5 Testing of this nature will present evidence why stockholders react through abnormal 
stock returns which surround the announcement of a HYD issuance. After identifying any abnormal 
returns surrounding issuances of HYD, a cross-sectional analysis will be completed using bond and firm 
specific variables so it can be learned if the variables tested explain the abnormal returns surrounding an 
announcement of HYD.   
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Firm specific variables focusing on changes in Liquidity, Asset Management, Debt Management, and Profitability. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
 The data used in this chapter comes from several sources. New issuances of HYD issued during 
the period 1985-2003 will come from the SDC database.  Other data unique to each observation taken 
from the SDC database includes: the marketplace in which the firms’ equity is traded, issue date, issue 
amount, coupon amount, use of proceeds, callability, years to maturity, and the credit rating of the issue. 
The sample includes 4,217 issuances of HYD by public firms. I omitted 1,434 observations from the 
dataset for not having complete information over the variables identified; this leaves 2,783 issuances of 
HYD to be observed. Following Jain (1984)6 and Gilson and Warner (1998)7, I next seek out firm specific 
variables to complete a series of cross-sectional regressions to explain the abnormal return. Financial 
statements from Compustat are used to understand a firm’s financial position at a given point in time, and 
can be used as a predictor of future earnings and dividends. It is along these lines that I have selected 
firm specific ratios to explain the abnormal returns surrounding an issuance of HYD. I have selected ratios 
of liquidity, asset management, debt management and profitability to complete this series cross sectional 
analysis. The Compustat database was used to match 2,783 observations with full information in the SDC 
database in complete information with respect to financial variables. After eliminating observations in the 
database for incomplete information, the end result netted 700 observations.  Figure 1 shows the origin of 
the data, a brief description of the variables selected including any dummy variable classifications used in 
the testing. 
 
I will start by assessing the database of 2,783 firms with complete information from the SDC 
database, and complete a series of event studies to capture any CARs surrounding the issuance of HYD. 
I will test CARs in the short run to capture reaction to the announcement by starting with a one-day event 
window surrounding the announcement to an 11-day event window. Abnormal returns follow a single 
factor market model featuring ordinary least squares while using a portfolio standard deviation method  
 
                                                 
6 Jain (1984) uses market value of equity and debt to equity ratio to explain abnormal returns. 
7 Gilson and Warner (1998) use variables of flexibility, implicit information and agency costs to abnormal returns surrounding issues 
of HYD. 
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Figure 1 - Variable Used and Data Sources   
        
Figure 1 shows the data used and provides a brief description of the data and list the source of the data. 
        
Title   Description 
Data 
Source 
        
Bond Specific       
        
S&P rating   Dummy variables: BBB, BB, B, CCC SDC 
Exchange   Dummy variables: NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX SDC 
Use of Proceeds   Dummy variables: acquisition, general purpose, pmt on borrowings SDC 
    refinancing activity SDC 
Coupon Amount   Dummy variables: Fixed Coupon Amount, Floating, Variable SDC 
Callable   Dummy variables: callable bond SDC 
Yrs to Maturity   number of years til bond matures SDC 
Amount of Issue   amount of each individual issues SDC 
High-Yield Bond 
IBO   Dummy variable: First Time Issuer SDC 
        
Company 
Specific       
        
PERMNO   company identification variable CRSP 
Age at Issuance   age of firm at announcement date CRSP 
SIC Code   firm industry classification CRSP 
Total Current 
Assets   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
Total Assets   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
Tot Current 
Liabilities   earned the year of the issuance  ($millions) Compustat 
Total Liabilities   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
EBIT    earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
Sales   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
        
Market Specific       
        
Market Conditions   Dummy Variable: Bull or Bear Market Compustat 
 
 
across the sample. The general form of the equation measuring the return is: 
 
(4) 
 
where jtR = return of stock j, jα = the intercept, jB = Beta of stock j, mtR  = return of the market, tε  = the error term 
 
tmtjjjt RBR εα ++=
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with the error term having an expected value of zero and uncorrelated with the market return variable. 
The return of the individual stock and the market return are used to calculate the abnormal return as 
shown in Equation 5: 
 
)(
^
mtj
j
jjtjt RRAR βα +−=                                                                 (5) 
the coefficients j
^α  and ^ jβ are ordinary least squares estimates of jα  and jβ  
 
The CAR is then derivated by individual abnormal return for each trading day over the specified event 
windows and is shown in Equation 6: 
 
∑
−
=
t
t
jtjt ARCAR                                                                         (6) 
where the jtCAR  is calculated over each observation window t for each firm j 
 
Significant abnormal returns are captured using a z-score that indicate how the CAR deviates from the 
mean the distribution. After capturing the significant CARs, cross sectional tests through ordinary least 
squares regression are completed in order to determine whether bond and/or firm specific variables are a 
significant determinant to acquiring abnormal returns. Following Gilson and Warner (1998), I will test bond 
characteristics including rating of the bond, market where traded, and use of proceeds. The dependent 
variable in the regression will be the CAR.  The independent variables will be the characteristics of the 
bond identified in Figure 1. While similar tests were conducted by Gilson and Warner (1998), their 
database included only 164 firms and the last observations were from 1994. The contribution of the 
research is to identify whether bond and/or firm specific variables are significant in determining a CAR. 
Gilson and Warner (1998) only evaluate firms that have corresponding changes in bank loan ratings 
within 6-months of a new issuance. The following bond characteristics will be evaluated in the regression: 
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• Rating – The regression analysis features the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rating over the Moody’s 
rating in the analysis. However, both provide virtually the same end results. The rating agencies are given 
the responsibility of providing a rating for a new issuance in correlation to the risk of the bond. A bond 
with a high rating is expected to have a relatively lower stock price CAR in comparison to a bond with a 
low rating. The bonds used in this chapter are of S&P ratings BBB, BB and B and CCC. Bonds with a 
rating of “CC” or lower were not evaluated due incomplete information in the databases selected. I 
categorize each bond rating classification into dummy variables, grouping at the respective rating letter, 
but ignoring pluses and minuses.8 In general, high-yield bonds at issuance are expected to compensate 
bond investors with higher risk premiums for bonds of lower credit rating. Stockholders will react 
negatively, given the additional risk added introduced into the capital structure, causing a negative 
abnormal stock return. I expect to find a positive coefficient value as a result of the regression. This will 
cause the negative CAR to become less negative. I also expect to find the lower the rating at issuance, 
the more negative the CAR given the higher level of risk taken on by the investor associated with each 
worsening rating category. Bonds of BBB rating are expected to have a less negative impact on the CAR 
than bonds rated BB and so forth through the bonds being evaluated. I hypothesize the better rating, the 
less negative the CAR will be.  Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will reduce the amount 
of the negative CAR.  
  
• Exchange – The primary exchange in which the bond issuing firm participates is selected for 
classification. The three markets used are the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the NASDAQ 
exchange and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Prior academic research has shown that older and  
more established companies participate in the AMEX and NYSE exchanges while newer and more 
technology based companies participate in the NASDAQ market.  Gilson and Warner (1995) show that 
issuing firms that participate in the NASDAQ exchange experience higher costs of issuance. I categorize 
each market into dummy variables in the regression to capture whether the marketplace where the 
issuer’s equity trades is a factor over the CARs of the issue. I expect to see a positive impact on the CAR  
 
                                                 
8 The dummy variable categories for all variables categorized as dummy variables are featured in Figure 1. 
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of the issue by the exchange variable. I also expect to find firms whose equity trades in the NYSE and  
AMEX markets to experience a more positive investor reaction than NASDAQ firms given the NYSE and 
AMEX markets are generally comprised of more established firms.  Investors adding HYD to their 
portfolios purchase this type of security with the anticipation that the firm will perform at or above industry 
norms. A firm performing below industry level, in a competitive market, will not have the desired 
profitability level which will reflect in poor performance of it outstanding equity. Firms performing above 
their industry standard should create renewed interest in the outstanding equity by the investment 
community and will reflect such in their equity prices in the marketplace. I believe the pricing decision will 
reflect the liquidity of the firm’s other debt and equity offerings and the pricing decision is partly based on 
this rationale. I hypothesize the better the exchange, the less negative the CAR will be. Impact: positive 
variable, positive coefficient. This will reduce the amount of the negative CAR.  
 
• Use of Proceeds – Tests whether the use of proceeds regressed on the CAR impacts the market 
reaction of the bond are completed. Gilson and Warner (1998) show the intended use of proceeds by 
floating a new issue of HYD has an impact on the abnormal return of the issue.  Companies are required 
at the time of registration of a new issue to report to the Securities and Exchange Commission the 
intended use of proceeds from the issue. I categorize each bond rating classification into dummy 
variables grouping at the respective use of proceeds as reported by the issuing firm. These classifications 
include acquisition, general purposes, payments on borrowings, refinancing and other uses. Of these 
classifications, only the first four classifications will have results as the other uses classification will be lost 
in the regression. I believe this variable will have a mixed effect on the CAR. I expect to find a positive 
coefficient value in the regression results for firms issuing HYD for acquisition and general purposes.  
This will lower the negative CAR. Debt issued for acquisition implies capital is being issued for firm 
expansion and growth. Debt issued for general purposes does not clearly express its intended use 
although it does not send a negative signal to the investment community. Consequently, I expect to find 
firms issuing HYD for payments on borrowings and refinancing activities to have a negative coefficient 
value from the regression. This will cause the negative CAR to become more negative. Debt issued to 
repay previous debts can represent a negative signal by the firm to the marketplace. Historically, firm 
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issuing HYD to pay off other bank-loans and other outstanding bonds is foreseen as a preventative 
measure to ward off financial distress. Investors should be more willing to purchase equity in firms who 
raise capital for expansion and new projects in comparison to firms that are facing a distressed position 
and issue HYD to solve internal capital problems. I hypothesize the more debt issued for mergers and 
acquisitions and general purposes rather than repayments and refinancing, the less negative the CAR will 
be. Impact: (Debt issued for Acquisition and General Purposes) positive variable, positive coefficient. This 
will reduce the amount of the negative CAR. Impact: (Debt issued for Payments on Borrowings and 
Refinancing) positive variable, negative coefficient. This will increase the amount of the negative CAR. 
    
• Coupon Amount – Similar to their investment grade counterparts, HYD issues generally offer an 
investor coupon payments. These coupon payments are listed at the time of issuance, stated in a fixed 
value, or can be floating or variable. With floating rate bonds the coupon rate changes are benchmarked 
on short-term interest rates and can change multiple times per year. Variable rate coupon bonds use 
long-term interest rates or long-term treasuries as its benchmark for the variable rate and can only adjust 
once per year.  Each coupon type is categorized as a dummy variable in the regression analysis. While it 
is widely shown in academic research bond investors require higher yield for assuming more risk, the role 
of the coupon payment with respect to high-yield bonds has been overlooked. The anticipated the sign of 
the coefficient generated from the regression is negative. This will cause the negative CAR to become 
more negative. High-yield bonds offer higher coupon payments to their investors compared to their 
investment grade counterparts. This excess coupon amount paid by issuing firms to lure investors to 
invest in bonds of higher risk will put excess burden on the financial performance of the firm by having to 
pay higher interest payments. I hypothesize bonds with a fixed coupon payment will less of an impact 
over the CAR than a floating or variable coupon payment. The return to the investor is a consistent 
amount over the life of the bond for a fixed rate coupon, where it is not when the issue is written with a 
floating or variable coupon amount. I also hypothesize the lower the coupon rate, the less negative the 
CAR will be. Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will increase the amount of the negative 
CAR.  
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• Callable – Lee and Loughran (1997) and Fridson and Garman (1998) showed that the callability 
of a bond, or to retire the bond before its maturity date, adds values to the issue.  The issuer can benefit 
from changes in the economic climate and take advantage of improved interest rate conditions by calling 
in existing bonds and reissuing new bonds at a lower rate. Similarly, a company may improve its credit 
standing which qualifies the firm to issue a higher rated bond, which can reduce its interest payments, 
therefore calling bonds of higher yields. A dummy variable is used to differentiate callable from non-call 
issues in the database.9 I expect to find bonds that are callable will produce a positive sign in the 
regression equation. This is attributed to the likeliness of the issue being called and the simultaneous risk-
decreasing event of holding the asset when it is called. I hypothesize that callable bonds will have a less 
negative CAR than non-callable bonds. Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will reduce the 
amount of the negative CAR.  
 
• Years to Maturity – The years to which the bond matures is being evaluated in order to gain a 
general understanding whether stockholders react more negatively to bond issued for longer horizons 
than shorter horizons. Bonds with a longer maturity horizon have a larger risk of default than bonds with a 
shorter maturity horizon. While the purchaser of the bond is being compensated with a greater default risk 
premium, stockholders are bearing the additional risk. This should cause the price of the stock to 
decrease as stockholders will recognize the firm having additional debt obligations. Even in cases where 
the firm is issuing a high-yield bond for refinancing purposes, in most cases either the interest payments 
are increased of the term of the debt structure is lengthened or both. It is this rationale that is being tested 
by categorizing the years to maturity of the issuance into segments using dummy variables to capture if 
this relationship holds true in the high-yield marketplace. I expect to find that years to maturity will have a 
negative impact on the CARs at issuance, i.e. the longer the years to maturity of an issue, the more 
impact on the CAR. I hypothesize that the shorter the term to maturity, the less negative the CAR will be. 
Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will increase the amount of the negative CAR. 
 
                                                 
9 Non-callable bonds take on a value of zero while callable bonds are assigned a value of 1 in defining the dummy variables. 
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• Issue Amount – The amount of the issue creates a direct impact on the capital structure of the 
firm. The smaller the issue, the less of an impact or unbalance of the firms’ existing capital structure.  
Firms offering additional debt may run the risk of deviating from the industry norm capital structure and 
therefore limit their ability to compete in a competitive marketplace for their goods and services. I employ 
dummy variables in the regression to assess the impact of the issue size. I expect to find the higher the 
issue amount, the greater the negative reaction to the CAR. Given this rationale, I expect to find a 
negative sign in the regression equation from the impact of the issue amount and the effect it will have on 
the firms’ capital structure. Stockholders will react through higher abnormal returns given higher issue 
amounts with respect to how the issue impacts the firms existing capital structure. I hypothesize the lower 
the issue amount, the less negative the CAR will be. Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This 
will increase the amount of the negative CAR.  
 
• First-Time Issuers – A firm’s announcement of an issuance of HYD historically has been viewed 
as a negative signal from management. Gilson and Warner (1998) show stockholders also react 
negatively to announcements of a high-yield bond IBO’s through negative abnormal returns on the firm’s 
equity. I do not expect to find this relationship holds true given the changing nature for the reason of 
issuance and declining default rates over time. I use a dummy variable to represent first-time issuers in 
the regression. I expect to find the coefficient of the variable to be a positive sign in the regression 
equation therefore lowering the amount of the abnormal return. I hypothesize when the issuer is a first-
time issuer of high-yield debt, the less negative the CAR will be. Impact: positive variable, positive 
coefficient. This will reduce the amount of the negative CAR. 
 
• Age at Issuance – The age of the firm at issuance is tested for any significant effects over the 
CAR. Older, more established firms should present a more stable investment opportunity than younger 
firms. Firms that are established over the long-term will have better information as to business trends and 
their respective place within their industry, and the overall marketplace compared to younger firms. 
Investors also have more historical information to evaluate the firm and better knowledge of firm 
performance given a longer history of operations for the older firms. I expect to find the age of the firm will 
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have a positive effect, which in turn will lower the negative CAR. I hypothesize the older the issuing firm, 
the less negative the CAR will be. Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will reduce the 
amount of the negative CAR. 
 
• Market Conditions - Historically investors prefer equity investments when the stock markets are 
increasing in value and prefer debt instruments when the market takes a downturn.  Fridson and Garman 
(1998) show HYD has characteristics that resemble an equity security where both are sensitive to market 
conditions. A positive economic climate will lead to increased corporate profits, rising equity prices and 
growing cash flows. These three factors will generally decrease default risk, which in turn will create 
investor demand and spark price appreciation creating a higher return. During recessionary periods, 
these relationships are the opposite.  I use a dummy variable in the regression equation to represent 
market conditions. Market conditions are categorized by evaluating the closing price of the NYSE and 
NASDAQ to capture whether a given year provided a gain or loss in value. HYD issuances are 
categorized by the year of issuance. Following the prior research of Fridson and Garman (1998), I expect 
to find high-yield bonds issued in years of increasing stock market returns will have a negative coefficient 
in the regression equation. This will cause the negative CAR to become more negative. I hypothesize 
firms issuing high-yield debt in increasing stock markets, the less negative the CAR will be.  Impact: 
positive variable, negative coefficient. This will increase the amount of the negative CAR.  
 
The regression equation10 after accounting for the impact of the bond characteristics will look like: 
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where 0α is the intercept and iw is the disturbance term. The sign above the intercept terms represents the sign of the intercept as 
a result of the regression. The sign above the variable represents the sign of the variable in the database. 
 
                                                 
10  The expected sign of the intercept is represented in the equation. The sign above the variables represents the expected sign of 
the variable. 
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The next part of this chapter will cross-sectionally test firms with statistically significant CARs 
using the firm specific accounting ratios. Jain (1984) tested variables of market value and profitability to 
explain abnormal returns surrounding issuances of equity. Gilson and Warner (1998) used variables of 
flexibility, implicit information and agency costs to capture CARs and changes in bank monitoring after an 
issuance. Both sets of variables used by Jain (1984) and Gilson and Warner (1998) were representative 
of the year the debt instrument was issued. I will regress the firm specific financial ratios to capture 
whether firm performance is a determinant of abnormal returns. The intent of this line of testing is to 
determine whether HYD is being issued by firms of poor or declining performance. Investors and analysts 
rely on financial ratios to help predict future earnings and dividends. Similarly, these ratios will prove to be 
useful in determining CARs that surround an issuance. The ratios used will be normalized11 at the general 
industry level (1000 SIC code level) to capture any industry effects across the data. Normalization is 
computed by using the ratio of the firm divided by the ratio of the industry average.  The following ratios 
will be used in the regression equation: 
 
• Ratio of Liquidity - the current ratio will be used to capture the firms’ liquid assets, or how easily 
the assets of the firm can be converted to cash at fair market value. This measures whether a firm can 
meet its current obligations. The current ratio is calculated by dividing the firms’ current assets by its 
current liabilities. Current assets include cash, marketable securities, accounts receivables, inventories 
and marketable securities. Current liabilities include accounts payable, maturities of long term debt, 
accrued income taxes, short-term notes payable, current maturity of long-term debt and various accrued 
expenses such as wages and salaries due. Firms inherently do not have negative values for their current 
liabilities nor current assets. This creates a positive value for a firms’ current and normalized ratios. 
Previous literature reveals that firms that issue HYD are cash strapped or have no access to traditional 
financing methods. I expect to find current assets to be lower and current liabilities to be higher than firms 
that do not issue HYD. This will lead to the regression equation showing the normalized current ratio 
having a negative impact which will increase the CAR. I hypothesize the higher the firms’ current ratio, the 
                                                 
11 Normalization will take place by identifying the issuances of HYD by SIC code at the 1000 level.  Each ratio in the analysis will be 
grouped by SIC code then divided by the industry average for the given ratio in the year of the issuance. After normalization, the 
new ration will be employed in the cross-sectional regressions. 
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less negative the CAR will be. Sign of the normalized ratio: positive; Impact: positive variable, positive 
coefficient. This will decrease the amount of the negative CAR. 
 
• Ratio of Asset Management – an asset management ratio is selected to capture how effectively 
management is managing the assets of the firm. Poor asset management proves to be unproductive  
since excess inventory represents an inefficient investment, albeit with tangible goods, accounting for low 
or even zero rates of return. The total asset turnover ratio captures how effectively management oversees 
its assets and is derived by dividing sales by total assets. The sign of the total asset turnover and the 
normalized total asset turnover ratios is positive since sales and total assets do not have negative values. 
Firms issuing HYD should be cash strapped in part due to poor asset management. The regression 
results will show the normalized total assets turnover ratio contributes or increases the negative CAR. I 
hypothesize the higher the firms’ total asset turnover ratio, the less negative the CAR will be.  Sign of the 
normalized ratio: positive; Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will decrease the amount of 
the negative CAR. 
 
• Ratio of Debt Management – a debt management ratio will be used to determine to which extent 
firms are using debt financing. The debt management ratio is derived by dividing the total debts of the firm 
by their total assets. Total debt includes both current liabilities and total long-term debt while total assets 
are a measured by the summation of the firm’s current and fixed assets. The expected sign of the 
normalized ratio is positive, albeit lower than firms that use investment grade debt in its capital structure. I 
expect to find and higher total liabilities and lower total assets for firms that issue HYD due to the lack of 
cash for investment opportunities or issuances for operating capital. These are two main reasons a firm 
will pursue issuances of non-investment grade debt. In addition, HYD is more expensive than investment 
grade debt and will also have impact on the debt management ratio. An increase in the firms’ debt 
management ratio can prove to have a positive impact or increase the negative CAR. Stockholders may 
believe the firm has taken on too much debt or dampen the firms’ probability of future success. I 
hypothesize the lower the firms’ debt management ratio, the less negative the CAR will be. Sign of the 
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normalized ratio: positive; Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will increase the amount of 
the negative CAR. 
 
• Ratio of Profitability – a ratio representing profitability or the profit margin will be used to capture 
the end result of management’s policies and decisions. The basic earnings power ratio will be used to 
capture the profitability of the firm. This ratio is calculated by dividing the firms’ EBIT by its total assets. By 
using EBIT, this will capture the earnings of the firm before the effects of interest and taxes. The expected 
sign of the normalized ratio is negative because many firms issue HYD issue to ward off a distress event. 
I expect to find low or even negative EBIT for issuing firms. That will present a negative or a slightly 
positive basic earning power ratio. I propose this will create a positive impact on the determination of the 
CAR. Stockholders purchase HYD on the likelihood of future profitability. Investors take into account the 
potential earnings of the firm and will reflect a sense of optimism that the earnings of the firm are 
expected to increase after the issuance. However, the effect of the capital infusion to the firm is unknown 
at the announcement of an issuance; investor optimism will be overshadowed by potential profitability 
loss, and create a punishing effect on the firms equity. I hypothesize the higher the firms’ basic earnings 
power ratio is, the less negative the CAR will be.  Sign of the normalized ratio (positive ratio): positive; 
Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will decrease the amount of the negative CAR. Sign of 
the normalized ratio (negative ratio): negative; Impact: negative variable, positive coefficient. This will 
increase the amount of the negative CAR. 
 
This series of cross-sectional regressions feature ordinary least squares regression and will be 
conducted using the normalized accounting ratios identified above. The dependent variable in the 
regression will be the CAR, while the independent variables will be the normalized ratios of financial 
performance.  All variables of firm performance are extracted from the Compustat database and are 
representative of the year the HYD issuance is announced.  The cross-sectional regressions feature 
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ordinary least squares regression using the normalized accounting ratios identified. The regression 
equation12 will be: 
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where 0α is the intercept and iw is the disturbance term. The sign above the intercept terms represents the sign of the intercept as 
a result of the regression. The sign above the variable represents the sign of the variable in the database 
 
These cross sectional tests will be performed on a firm by firm basis after taking note whether a 
significant CAR exists surrounding an announcement of HYD.   
 
The last section of this chapter will include categorizing the bonds by industry classification13 to 
capture any industry effects that may be prevalent with issuing debt. The testing process will be identical 
to the previous section, however, each industry classification will have its own regression and set of 
results. Current trends in debt issuance reveal that small, young firms and firms that are technology 
based rely on debt more heavily than older and more established firms. Analysis into this trend will reveal 
whether various HYD issuers grouped by industry experience more or less CARs and whether bond or 
firm characteristics are an indicating factor in these trends. Cross-sectional analysis will be conducted in 
the same manner as the previous section with one exception. The ratios used to measure liquidity, asset 
management, debt management and profitability will not be normalized due to the issuing firms being  
categorized at the 1000 SIC code level. The contribution factor is to determine whether one industry has 
more significant investor reaction to new issuance of HYD, and whether the industry the firm participates 
in is a contributing factor. I expect to find the coefficient value to be positive given the industry 
                                                 
12  The expected sign of the intercept is represented in the equation. The sign above the variables represents the expected sign of 
the variable. 
13 Industry classification will be conducted at the 1000 SIC code level.  
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classification is assigned at the 1000 level. Any industry effects should be revealed by the value of the 
intercept. Young and technology based industries should exhibit a lower value intercept having less of a  
contribution factor than older, more established industries. I hypothesize the older and more established 
an industry, the less negative the CAR will be. Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will 
decrease the amount of the negative CAR. 
 
The regression equation14 tested including the firms’ industry classification is: 
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where 0α is the intercept and iw is the disturbance term. The sign above the intercept terms represents the sign of the intercept as 
a result of the regression. The sign above the variable represents the sign of the variable in the database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14  The expected sign of the intercept is represented in the equation. The sign above the variables represents the expected sign of 
the variable. 
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2.4 Evaluation and Testing 
 
Firms issuing HYD instruments are extremely sensitive to liquidity in the high-yield marketplace. 
Firms using this type of debt have limited themselves to not having the ability to access the more stable 
bank financing which in return means they face greater problems when trying to raise capital. HYD 
issuing firms’ performance and investment spending relies greatly on cash flow, the ability to leverage, 
and other balance sheet factors. This implies they are susceptible to current and future expectations 
toward business cycles and any changes in monetary policy by the Federal Reserve Board.  
 
Bond issuance data is extracted from the SDC database, then matched with the firms permanent 
number in the CRSP database and finally cross referenced with firm specific financial information in the 
Compustat database. The initial database of high-yield issuances between 1985-2003 revealed 4,217 
observations. After screening the database for varied bond characteristics15 the database was downsized 
to 1,517 observations. The remaining 1,517 issuances were then cross-referenced with the Compustat 
database to find the various firm performance measures16 to compute the firm specific performance 
variables which include an issuing firm’s: current ratio, debt management ratio, total assets turnover ratio 
and the basic earnings power ratio. This left 1,186 observations with complete information. The final 
criterion for the database is for the firm to have a significant abnormal return over the observation period. 
Firms revealing a significant negative abnormal return on their equity prices surrounding an 
announcement of a high-yield issuance at the 95% confidence interval or better numbered 700. This 
provided the final database to be comprised of 700 issuances of HYD which includes 331 bond IBO’s and  
369 SBO’s (seasoned bond offerings). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Bond characteristics include coupon amount, use of proceeds, callability of the issue, the years to maturity of the issue, the S&P 
rating of the issue, the exchange the firm participates with its equity, whether the firm has been delisted, the use of the proceeds 
from the issue, and the industry code 
16 Firm variables extracted were total assets, total current assets, total liabilities, total current liabilities, earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) and sales. 
 28
2.4.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
2.4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reveals the distribution of the database and shows the 700 issuances with complete 
information have a value of over $120 billion. Table 1 further reveals almost half (58.40%) of the 
issuances are of firms that participate in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) followed by 31.71% of 
the issuances by NASDAQ participating firms. Less than 10% of the issuances used are from firms that  
 
Table 1  
Market Distribution of High-Yield Debt Issues 1985-2003 
              
This table presents the market distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period  
between 1985-2003. The sample is categorized by the year of the issuance, the number  
issuances per year, the total amount issued in the bond market and the equity market in 
which the issuing firm participates.          
              
    Total       Exchange 
Year Number Proceeds American NASDAQ NYSE Not Listed 
              
1985 40 $1,809.7 7 13 16 4 
1986 67 $3,211.7 7 29 29 2 
1987 58 $3,907.4 7 30 19 2 
1988 15 $2,250.6 2 4 4 5 
1989 26 $2,007.7 5 11 9 1 
1990 16 $2,821.3 1 3 12 0 
1991 26 $4,444.0 1 3 22 0 
1992 80 $12,787.5 2 12 64 2 
1993 79 $15,829.6 4 29 45 1 
1994 27 $3,451.3 2 8 17 0 
1995 46 $8,148.7 7 17 19 3 
1996 43 $8,804.2 2 15 25 1 
1997 33 $6,169.4 0 14 19 0 
1998 40 $10,388.0 0 9 31 0 
1999 14 $5,845.0 0 3 11 0 
2000 25 $11,261.5 0 10 15 0 
2001 27 $8,213.0 1 7 19 0 
2002 21 $5,772.5 0 4 17 0 
2003 17 $4,947.6 0 1 16 0 
Totals 700 $120,070.7 48 222 409 21 
% of Issue   (millions) 6.86% 31.71% 58.43% 3.00% 
 
 
participate in the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or other domestic markets. Table 2 highlights each 
issues intended use of proceeds as listed in the SDC Database. The most popular use of newly 
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generated proceeds were for general purposes (308), closely followed by firms retiring or refinancing 
bank debt (182), firms retiring or refinancing foreign debt (111). These three areas encompass roughly  
 
Table 2 
Distribution of High-Yield Debt Issues by Use of Proceeds 
              
This table presents the market distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period  
between 1985-2003. The sample is categorized by the specified or intended use of the  
issuance as reported to the SEC. The sample is highlighted by year of the issuance  
and the reported use of proceeds.         
              
      Ref Retire       
  Acq General  Retire   FX Inc   Total 
Year Financing Purposes Bank Debt Debt Other* Issue 
              
1985 7 18 10 0 5 40 
1986 5 28 19 6 9 67 
1987 4 29 9 4 12 58 
1988 1 6 6 2 0 15 
1989 1 16 7 0 2 26 
1990 0 5 6 2 3 16 
1991 0 9 7 8 2 26 
1992 0 24 32 24 0 80 
1993 4 16 24 34 1 79 
1994 2 9 12 4 0 27 
1995 1 18 16 6 3 43 
1996 5 12 11 11 7 46 
1997 3 20 7 0 3 33 
1998 2 28 4 1 5 40 
1999 0 12 2 0 0 14 
2000 2 14 4 2 3 25 
2001 1 16 4 2 4 27 
2002 1 15 1 3 1 21 
2003 0 13 1 2 1 17 
              
Totals 39 308 182 111 61 700 
% Issues 5.57% 44.00% 26.00% 15.86% 8.71%   
Issue Amt 6,360.4 54,446.2 28,651.4 21,623.3 9,989.4 121,070.7 
  (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions) 
*Other Includes: Stock Repurchases, Securities Acquisition, Investment in Affiliates, Project Financing, Capital 
Expenditures, Capital Investment Funds, Working Capital, Capital Acquisition, Investment in Other Companies,  
Refinancing and Secondary Financing         
 
86% of all issues between 1983-2003. Acquisition purposes listed as the primary reason for issuance is 
only 39 or 5.57% of the database. The least popular reasons to issue bonds are lumped together as 
other17 in the table and represent 8.71% of the issuances. 
 
                                                 
17 This group includes stock repurchases, securities acquisition, investment in affiliates, capital expenditures, capital investment 
funds, working capital, capital acquisition, investment in other companies, general refinancing and secondary financing. 
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Table 3 features the distribution of the database accounting for the various ratings of the 
issuances analyzed.18 Table 3 shows of the 700 issuances that comprises the database, 44.00% or  
308 are of single B rating by Standard and Poors. Bonds of BB rating are second most prevalent in the 
database accounting for 28.00% of the issuances. Bonds of no rating, BBB and CCC complete the 
database with 12.14%, 11.71% and 4.14% respectively. 
 
Table 3 
S&P Rating of the Issuance 
 
This table presents the distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period  
1985-2003 identifying the issuances by their Standard & Poor's rating as well 
as the year of issuance. Panel A represents the number of issues in a given     
year categorized by the rating of the issue. Value represents the amount of  
the issuance categorized by aggregate amounts. 
              
Panel A: Number of Issues         
Year BBB BB B CCC NR Total 
              
1985 2 6 23 0 9 40 
1986 5 9 31 5 17 67 
1987 3 5 29 7 14 58 
1988 1 3 6 2 3 15 
1989 1 3 14 4 4 26 
1990 3 6 7 0 0 16 
1991 6 11 8 0 1 26 
1992 7 33 33 1 6 80 
1993 19 16 40 2 2 79 
1994 6 4 16 0 1 27 
1995 5 6 28 2 2 43 
1996 3 19 21 0 3 46 
1997 5 13 11 0 4 33 
1998 4 26 7 1 2 40 
1999 3 5 2 1 3 14 
2000 0 9 5 2 9 25 
2001 3 10 10 1 3 27 
2002 4 9 7 0 1 21 
2003 2 3 10 1 1 17 
Total 82 196 308 29 85 700 
% of Issue 11.71% 28.00% 44.00% 4.14% 12.14%   
Monetary Value           
Total $17,896.2 $42,197.5 $49,825.2 $4,259.0 $6,892.8 $121,070.7 
% of  Issue 14.78% 34.85% 41.15% 3.52% 5.69%   
 
 
                                                 
18 Bonds of non-investment grade as defined by Standard and Poors are evaluated. Credit grades of BBB, BB, B, and CCC compile 
the sample. The database also was defined by selecting the Moody’s Investor Service rating of the issue, however, the 
categorization of the bonds fell into the same classification level irrespective of the rating agency. 
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The monetary distribution of the sample is shown in table 3. This finds the same relationships 
with respect to proportionality as the number of issues based on rating for the first two most prevalent 
ratings. Bonds of B rating account for 41.15% of the monetary value and accounts for $49,825.3 million of 
the sample. Second are bonds with a rating of BB with $42,197.5 million. The monetary distribution differs 
from the aggregate number of issuances from here. The order if value is bonds of BBB rating followed by 
non-rated then CCC bonds. This trend reveals while more non-rated bonds are being issued than BBB 
rated bonds, the average amount of the issue is less for non-rated bonds than BBB bonds.19 Bonds of 
BBB have an average amount of $218.246 million compared to non-rated bonds have an average 
issuance of $81.091 million. 
 
2.4.1.2 Industry level 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the sample by highlighting the industry in which the issuing firm 
is classified. This line of research provides descriptive statistics of the sample firms at the 1000 SIC code 
level. Appendix A includes a comprehensive list of SIC codes and the industries that participates under a 
given industry classification. Table 4 lists the distribution of the database from the number of issued high-
yield bonds from a given industry classification. Panel A reveals firms of the Manufacturing20 and the 
Transportation, Utilities and Sanitary Services issuances respectively over the period 1985 – 2003. The 
financial services sector (6000 sic code) is the least prevalent in the database only being represented by 
6 issuances or 0.86% of the total database. This limited number is attributed to the regulation at the 
federal and state levels and the differences in the required reporting of financials in this industry 
categorization. The last part of Table 4 highlights the monetary distribution of the sample with respect to 
SIC code. The monetary distribution is similar to the number of issuances represented with the 
manufacturing sector having 32.95% of the monetary value at $39,992.9 million while the Transportation, 
Utilities and Sanitary Services sector accounts for $35,942.8 million or 29.69% of the value represented in 
the database. The Financial Services sector again is represented with the lowest monetary value at 
$856.8 million or 0.71%  
 
                                                 
19 Average issue amount is computed by: (# of issues in a given credit rating / total dollar value issued with a given credit rating). 
20 includes both the 2000 and 3000 SIC code issuances 
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of the total monetary value of the sample. The total monetary value represented in the database is  
just a bit over $121 billion.   
 
Table 4 
SIC Distribution of High-Yield Debt Issuances 
  
This table presents the market distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period between 
1985-2003 identifying the issuing firms by their Standard Industry Classification as well as the 
year of issuance. Panel A represents the number of issues in a given year with respect to the    
SIC code of the issuing firm. Panel B list the aggregate amount of the issue taking into account the 
year of issuance and the SIC code. 
  
Panel A: Number of Issues               
                  Total 
SIC 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Issue 
                    
1985 1 7 11 10 3 1 6 1 40 
1986 2 9 23 11 7 3 7 5 67 
1987 2 14 19 5 10 0 5 3 58 
1988 3 2 3 2 3 0 2 0 15 
1989 4 2 8 5 4 0 1 2 26 
1990 5 7 3 0 1 0 0 0 16 
1991 3 4 5 4 8 0 2 0 26 
1992 8 13 16 13 20 0 4 6 80 
1993 7 6 22 12 14 0 14 4 79 
1994 7 2 7 4 3 0 2 2 27 
1995 2 5 6 12 8 0 4 6 43 
1996 5 3 9 14 4 0 7 4 46 
1997 6 2 8 13 3 0 1 0 33 
1998 6 1 7 24 0 1 1 0 40 
1999 1 2 2 5 2 0 2 0 14 
2000 1 3 6 11 0 0 4 0 25 
2001 2 6 4 11 1 0 2 3 29 
2002 0 0 8 5 4 1 1 0 19 
2003 2 1 1 6 3 0 4 0 17 
Totals 67 89 168 167 98 6 69 36 700 
  9.57% 12.71% 24.00% 23.86% 14.00% 0.86% 9.86% 5.14%   
Monetary Value                 
Totals $10,437.1 $12,450.0 $27,442.9 $35,942.8 $12,821.0 $856.8 $14,431.0 $6,689.1 $121,070.7 
  8.62% 10.28% 22.67% 29.69% 10.59% 0.71% 11.92% 5.52%   
 
 
2.4.2 Stock Price Impact 
 
The contribution of the research is to capture the investor reaction that surrounds the 
announcement of an issuance of HYD. Gilson and Warner (1998) capture investor reactions through the 
use of event study methodology featuring a market model in an attempt to capture abnormal stock returns 
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around announcements of HYD issues. They use a database of 164 stocks encompassing the NYSE, 
NASDAQ and the American stock markets. They found a mean CAR of -0.8% for both the (-1,1) and the 
(0,+1) event date windows. Furthermore they showed that firms issuing HYD for the first time experience 
a mean CAR of -0.11% for both the (-1,1) and the (0,+1) event windows.  It is along these lines that 
provided the motivation to run event studies to capture the CARs over a database of 700 HYD issuances. 
 
2.4.2.1 General sample – CARs 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the event studies over the database as well as accounting for if 
the firm is a first-time issuer of HYD. It is shown here that roughly half of the issuances in the database 
are bond IBO’s with the other half of the issuances are being issued by firms that have previously issued 
a high-yield debt. The tests show stockholders negatively react to announcements of HYD in four of the 
five event windows tested for all bonds in the database.  
 
Table 5 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for High-Yield Bond Issuing Firms 
Based on Current Position and Number of High-Yield Issuances 
  
Cumulative abnormal return for high-yield debt issuing firms over the period 1985-2003. Day   
zero in the observation windows are represented as the day of the announcement for a new  
issuance of high-yield debt. The sample of high-yield bonds is compiled from the SDC database  
while the cumulative abnormal return is calculated using the Center for Research in Security  
Prices (CRSP) database. Announcements of new issuance are categorized by the entire 
sample, a firms current status as operational or being delisted and whether a firm is issuing its 
first high-yield debt or has multiple high-yield issues over the observation window. 
   
Event Window 1-day 3-day  5-day  7-day  9-day 11-day 
  (0,1) (-1,1) (-2,2) (-3,3) (-4,4) (-5,5) 
All Bonds (n=700) -0.44% -0.75% -0.59% -0.74% -0.87% -0.93% 
  -0.011 -1.973*     2.702**    3.312***   2.819**    3.599***   
              
First-Time Issuers (n=331) -0.71% -1.06% -1.27% -1.53% -1.86% -1.94% 
  
-
3.302***   
-
3.760***   -3.070**   -2.783**   
-
3.195***   -3.062**   
              
Non-First Time Issuers (n=369) -0.20% -0.47% 0.02% -0.03% 0.02% -0.01% 
 3.057**    0.804 6.548***   7.115***   6.826***   7.769***   
              
   * significant at .05  ** significant at .01   *** significant at .001 
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The level of significant reaction varied from -0.75% at the 3-day window to -0.93% at the 11-day window 
with a significance level of 95% over the three, five, seven, nine and 11 day event windows.21 The second 
group of tests in this series evaluates firms that issue HYD for the first time compared to firms that issued 
multiple times.22 First-time HYD issuing firms faced sharply more negative reaction than multiple issuers. 
The event study finds stockholders punish first time issuers in all event windows from a range of –0.71% 
in the 1-day window to –1.94% in the 11-day window. Multiple time issuing firms also exhibit negative 
investor reaction but not nearly as severe. Significant reaction at the 95% confidence level varies from –
0.01% to –0.20% in the 1,5,7,9 and 11-day windows while the 3 day window finds no significant reaction.  
 
2.4.2.2 Industry CARs 
Each issuance of HYD is separated by their respective SIC codes at the 1000-level for analysis to 
capture industry specific investor reaction to new issuances. Table 6 shows the results of the event 
studies conducted at the 1000 SIC code level. HYD issued by firms with SIC codes of 1000 and 7000 
revealed no significant abnormal returns. Firm activities in the 1000 SIC code includes Mining and 
Construction, while the 7000 SIC code includes the Services industry.23 Appendix A provides a complete 
industry list of each business type and its respective general classification.  
 
The 2000 and 3000 SIC codes represent the manufacturing sector. Table 6 shows 89 firms within 
the 2000 SIC code and 168 firms within the 3000 SIC code. Firms within the 2000 SIC code had 
significant investor reactions to new issuances of HYD at the 3,7,9 and 11-day event windows.  Negative 
significant abnormal returns ranging from –1.02% at the 3-day window to –1.76% at the 11-day window 
were found at the 95% confidence level. The 5-day window had significant abnormal returns at the 90% 
confidence level. The 3000 SIC code firms revealed negative significant abnormal returns over all 
windows tested with reaction ranging from -0.06% to –0.54%.  
 
                                                 
21 The table lists testing windows in actual days before and after a given announcement of an issuance. For example, the (-1,1) day 
window represents three trading days, the day before the announcement, the day of the announcement and the day following an 
announcement. 
22 The SDC database has each observation marked whether the issuance is the first for a particular firm. 
23 The services industry is represented by forms of both 7000 and 8000 SIC codes. While the 7000 SIC code firms revealed no 
significant abnormal returns, the 8000 SIC code did reveal negative reaction to new issuances. The 7000 SCI code is comprised on 
consumer service firms while the 8000 SIC code is comprised of social service firms.  
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  The 167 4000 SIC code firms, or those with the Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas 
and Sanitary Services classification, exhibited significant abnormal returns over the 3 and 5-day windows 
with losses of –0.52% and –1.10% respectively.  Additionally, the 7 and 9-day windows had abnormal 
returns significant at the 90% confidence level. The 98 5000 SIC code firms, or those with the Wholesale 
and Retail Trade classification, have significant abnormal returns in all testing windows except the 5-day 
window. The level of underperformance over the significant windows ranged form –1.02% at the 3-day  
 
 
Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for High-Yield Bond Issuing 
Firm's Stock Exchange where Firm's Equity Trades 
              
Cumulative abnormal return for high-yield debt issuing firms over the period 1985-2003.  
Day zero in the observation windows are represented as the day of the announcement  
for a new issuance of high-yield debt. The sample of high-yield bonds is compiled from 
 the SDC database while the cumulative abnormal return is calculated using the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Announcements of new issues are  
categorized by the standardized industry code (SIC Code) of the issuing firm. 
              
Event  1-day 3-day  5-day  7-day  9-day 11-day 
Window (0,1) (-1,1) (-2,2) (-3,3) (-4,4) (-5,5) 
 SIC Code 0.34% 0.35% 0.03% 0.59% 0.17% 0.15% 
 1000 (n=67) 1.052 1.195 0.567 1.167 0.578 0.17 
             
2000 (n=69) -0.42% -1.02% -0.32% -1.21% -1.61% -1.76% 
  -0.978 -2.098*     -1.351 -2.165*       -2.023*       -1.762*       
             
3000 (n=168) -0.37% -0.54% -0.14% -0.33% 0.08% -0.06% 
  4.742***   2.689**    10.221***   10.714***   10.151***   11.601***   
             
4000 (n=167) -0.25% -0.52% -1.10% -0.93% -1.07% -0.75% 
  -1.262 -1.787*     -2.427**     -1.398 -1.448 -1.06 
             
5000 (n=98) -1.02% -1.50% -0.62% -1.55% -1.95% -2.38% 
  -2.671**   
-
3.230***  -1.151 -1.875*       -2.088*       -2.426**     
             
6000 (n=6) -0.87% -1.47% -0.58% -0.92% -2.16% -2.86% 
  -2.457**   -2.379**   -0.752 -0.616 -0.605 -0.637 
             
7000 (n=69) -0.74% -0.94% -0.48% -0.08% -0.03% 0.16% 
  -0.663 -0.782 0.099 0.467 0.822 1.049 
             
8000 (n=36) -0.99% -1.64% -2.33% -2.14% -2.97% -3.56% 
  -1.63 -1.992*     -2.387**     -1.909*       -2.288*       -2.517**     
   * significant at .05  ** significant at .01   *** significant at .001 
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window to –2.38% at the 11-day window. The 6 6000 SIC code firms, or those with the Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate classification, had 1 and 3-day window negative significant abnormal returns 
of –0.87% and –1.47%, respectively. 
 
The 69 7000 SIC code firms had no significant abnormal returns.  The 36 8000 SIC code firms, or 
those with Health, Legal, Educational and Social Services classification had a negative investor reaction 
to new issuances of HYD over all testing windows. The 1-day window does show negative significant 
abnormal returns but only at the 90% confidence level The remaining test windows (3,5,7,9,11-days) all 
reveal significant abnormal returns ranging from –1.64% to –3.56%.  
 
The results of the event studies reveal stockholders do react negatively to new issuances of HYD, 
with the size and significance of the reaction depending on the SIC code classification of the issuances. 
In general, stockholders react negatively to new issuances of HYD by reducing the returns of the firms’ 
equity surrounding the announcement of an issuance by nearly 1%. The tests further reveal stockholders 
exhibit a more negative reaction to issuances by firms in the 8000 SIC code (social services) industry 
than any other industry classification. In contrast, stockholders have no significant reaction to firms 
issuing HYD in the 1000 (mining and construction) and 7000 (consumer services) SIC classifications. 
Attempts to explain investor reaction to new issuances of HYD through negative abnormal returns are 
investigated further. 
 
2.4.3 Regression Results 
 
2.4.3.1 General sample 
The first in the series of regressions uses the abnormal return as the dependent variable, and 
several explanatory variables which include: the coupon type, the amount of the issuance, whether the 
issuance is callable or not, the years to maturity of the issuance, the rating of the issue as categorized by 
S&P, the exchange where the equity of the issuer participates, whether the firm is a first time issuer of 
HYD, the intended use of the proceeds from the issue, and whether the equity market is in a bull or bear 
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state at the time of issuance. Table 7 shows the results of the regression analysis using the 1, 3,5,7,9 and 
11-day event windows surrounding an announcement of a debt issuance.   
 
The regression tests confirm some of the earlier hypothesis by revealing variables that prove to 
be significant24 in determining the abnormal return that surrounds an announcement of a HYD issuance. 
The first regression analysis (Equation 6) reveals that several variables are statistically significant in 
determining an abnormal return.  These include: the length of the issue, the age of the firm, issue amount, 
the rating of the issue and whether a firm is a first time issuer. While these test variables prove to be 
significant, the coupon amount, the exchange where the firms equity trades, the use of proceeds, 
callability of the issue and market conditions do not have a significant impact on the abnormal return 
surrounding an announcement of a high-yield bond issuance in the event windows tested. 
  
 Variables shown to be significant occur in all the event windows tested. In the 1-day window, 
which evaluates the announcement day as day zero and the first day after the announcement, it is 
learned that the age of the firm at issuance and bonds rated BBB, BB and CCC are significant in 
explaining the abnormal return. The 1-day window revealed an 2R  of .5300 with an adjusted 2R  of .5147 
or roughly 53% of the variation explained by the regression equation. The 3-day event window with an 2R   
of .5117 (adjusted 2R  of .4958) captures the day before the announcement of an issuance, the  
announcement day and the day prior to the announcement. The age of the firm at issuance and bonds of 
CCC rating are no longer found to be significant in this window. Bonds of CCC rating are no longer found 
to have a significant impact over abnormal return for the remaining observation windows. Variables 
revealing statistical significance in the 3-day window include the length of the issue, and bond with a BBB 
or BB rating. The 5-day25 window ( 2R  of .4880) has the same relationships as the 3-day window with one 
inclusion; bonds of a B rating have a statistical significance.   
 
 
                                                 
24 Test of significance are evaluated at the 95% confidence level or above. Variables testing significant are at the 95% confidence 
level or above.  
25 5-day window tests the two days before and after the announcement date as well as the announcement date. 
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Table 7 
Regression Relating the Cumulative Abnormal Return Surrounding an Announcement of  
a High-Yield Debt Issuance to Bond and Firm Specific Characteristics  
  
The ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of the cumulative abnormal return is tested 
surrounding the announcement of a high-yield debt issuance ion a variety of test windows that include 
the announcement date to the first day after the announcement (0,1) to a range of 5 days before and 
after the announcement (-5,5) or an 11-day window. Coupon amount is a dummy variable that is 
categorized based on a fixed, floating or variable amount. Amount of Issuance is a variable based 
on the size of the issue with respect to dollar amount. The Years to maturity classification 
distinguishes the issuances by the number of years from issuance the bond will mature. The rating of 
issue takes a dummy variable format and takes into account the issues Standard and Poor's rating. 
Age of the firm at issuance is analyzed while a dummy variable is used to for callable bonds in nature. 
The exchange in which the issuing firms equity trades at time of issuance is represented by dummy 
variables. A dummy variable is used to identify  a firm issuing high-yield debt for the first time is 
of any significance. A dummy variable is used to determine if market conditions has any effect on 
the cumulative abnormal return. The use of proceeds is represented with dummy variables noting the 
issuing firms reported use of proceeds form the issue. The numbers in parentheses are the p-values. 
                
                
Window   1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 7-Day 9-Day 11-Day 
                
Variable               
Intercept   -0.0652820 -0.0782600 -0.1056560 -0.1171550 -0.1320630 -0.1533090 
    [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] 
Length of Issue               
Years to Maturity 0.0002425 0.0004094 0.0005564 0.0008456 0.0007945 0.0008969 
    [.075] [.013] [.024] [.009] [.015] [.019] 
Age               
Firm Age at Issue 0.0002080 0.0001873 0.0002362 0.0005490 0.0005599 0.0007953 
    [.040] [.127] [.199] [.025] [.023] [.006] 
Issue Amount               
Amount of Issue   -0.0000092 -0.0000070 -0.0000112 -0.0000251 -0.0000245 -0.0000428 
    [.051] [.221] [.187] [.026] [.031] [.001] 
Coupon Amount               
Fixed Amount   -0.0065076 -0.0096677 -0.0053649 -0.0106010 -0.0070699 -0.0113830 
    [.187] [.105] [.546] [.367] [.550] [.413] 
Floating   -0.0094699 -0.0105110 -0.0060456 -0.0093913 -0.0118030 -0.0094362 
    [.109] [.142] [.570] [.504] [.404] [.570] 
Variable   -0.0083410 -0.0150710 -0.0049640 -0.0047975 -0.0108680 -0.0104890 
    [.175] [.043] [.654] [.744] [.462] [.545] 
Standard and Poor's' Rating of the Issue         
BBB   0.0149690 0.0143070 0.0236370 0.0296500 0.0322610 0.0354130 
    [.000] [.001] [.000] [.001] [.000] [.001] 
BB   0.0094285 0.0099188 0.0226570 0.0309730 0.0297990 0.0401160 
    [.002] [.008] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] 
B   0.0028187 0.0061829 0.0098323 0.0182730 0.0158310 0.0210660 
    [.303] [.061] [.047] [.005] [.016] [.006] 
CCC   -0.0104870 -0.0032921 -0.0031507 -0.0015441 -0.0131380 -0.0103980 
    [.026] [.561] [.709] [.890] [.243] [.432] 
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Table 7  continued           
Standard and Poor's' Rating of the Issue         
BBB   0.0149690 0.0143070 0.0236370 0.0296500 0.0322610 0.0354130 
    [.000] [.001] [.000] [.001] [.000] [.001] 
BB   0.0094285 0.0099188 0.0226570 0.0309730 0.0297990 0.0401160 
    [.002] [.008] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] 
B   0.0028187 0.0061829 0.0098323 0.0182730 0.0158310 0.0210660 
    [.303] [.061] [.047] [.005] [.016] [.006] 
CCC   -0.0104870 -0.0032921 -0.0031507 -0.0015441 -0.0131380 -0.0103980 
    [.026] [.561] [.709] [.890] [.243] [.432] 
Exchange where Firms' Equity Trades           
NYSE   0.0091268 0.0018057 0.0047870 0.0111350 0.0067776 0.0101430 
    [.117] [.797] [.647] [.422] [.626] [.535] 
NASDAQ   0.0061875 0.0007552 0.0041780 0.0057923 0.0100300 0.0133370 
    [.217] [.901] [.644] [.628] [.403] [.344] 
AMEX   0.0075849 0.0077587 0.0035747 0.0069582 0.0105440 0.0161000 
    [.142] [.214] [.700] [.572] [.394] [.268] 
Use of Proceeds               
Acquisition   0.0040296 0.0074548 -0.0026539 -0.0148470 -0.0178440 -0.0112350 
    [.505] [.308] [.807] [.301] [.217] [.508] 
General Purposes 0.0004249 0.0050966 -0.0075867 -0.0228560 -0.0227470 -0.0161780 
    [.934] [.413] [.413] [.062] [.065] [.263] 
Payment on Loans -0.0046747 -0.0029763 -0.0200820 -0.0247510 -0.0226900 0.0076508 
    [.556] [.757] [.160] [.191] [.234] [.733] 
Refinancing   -0.0007455 0.0064487 -0.0050897 -0.0134880 -0.0204580 -0.0117750 
    [.885] [.302] [.583] [.272] [.097] [.416] 
Callability of the Issuance           
CALLLIST   0.0025931 0.0024248 0.0050513 0.0078518 0.0064305 0.0043358 
    [.201] [.319] [.163] [.102] [.184] [.446] 
Market Conditions             
Bull Market   -0.0007138 -0.0009163 -0.0033302 -0.0033259 -0.0051484 -0.0025580 
    [.715] [.698] [.344] [.476] [.272] [.642] 
Number of Issuances             
First-time Issuer   -0.0003586 0.0015593 0.0031734 0.0043725 0.0069142 0.0109340 
    [.832] [.446] [.298] [.278] [.088] [.022] 
                
R-squared   0.5300260 0.5117150 0.4880460 0.4319750 0.4452990 0.4245910 
Adjusted   0.5147530 0.4958470 0.4714090 0.4135160 0.4272740 0.4058920 
observations   700 700 700 700 700 700 
 
 
Beginning with the 7-day event window ( 2R  of .4319) and continuing into the 11-day window 
( 2R  of .4245), the level of variation explained by the regression equation begins to weaken. However, a 
few new variables show significance in explaining the abnormal return. The 7-day and the 9-day window 
reveal the same significant variables. The length of the issue, the age of the firm and the issue amount 
are found to reveal significance along with bonds of BBB, BB and B ratings. The final observation 
window, or the 11-day observation period has the same relationships as the 7 and 9-day windows with 
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one inclusion. First-time issuers show significance in this window, although this is the only incidence of 
this variable of the event windows tested.  
 
Section 4 provides an explanation of the variables used in the regression and their believed 
impact over the abnormal return. The results in table 7 are the first in a series of regression results. The 
regression results show that the years to maturity and the age of the firm at issuance have a positive 
coefficient value as predicted, with both being statistically significant in determining an abnormal return. 
The exchange where the firms’ equity trades and whether the issue is callable both have a positive 
coefficient as predicted, but are not statistically significant in determining a CAR. Variables revealing a 
positive coefficient value when multiplied with a positive valued variable will lower the amount of the CAR. 
The amount of the issue retains its predicted intercept (negative) in the regression results, and is 
significant in determining a CAR.  The coupon amount and whether the market is in a bull or bear state 
both have a negative coefficient as predicted, but are not of statistically significant in determining a CAR. 
Variables revealing a negative coefficient value when multiplied with a positive valued variable will 
increase the amount of the CAR. 
 
 The final variables tested in this regression (Equation 6) have mixed results to their impact on the 
CAR. The rating of the issue results show bonds of a rating of BBB, BB and B all have a positive 
coefficient value which will result in a positive impact over the CAR. Bonds of CCC rating have a negative 
coefficient value. Bonds issued with a CCC rating will increase the negative CAR. The use of proceed 
variables also reveal mixed results. Bonds issued for acquisition, general purposes and payments on 
loans have mixed or changing signs throughout the observation windows. Bonds issued for refinancing 
have the same sign (negative) for its intercept over the observation window. Both of these variable 
categories are shown to be not significant in determining an abnormal return. The final variable with 
mixed results identifies first-time issuers. This variable has a negative intercept value in the 1-day window 
and a positive intercept value over the rest of the sample.  
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2.4.3.2 Inclusion of firm specific ratios 
 The next series of regressions includes variables of firm performance. Here it will be answered 
whether an abnormal return can be partially explained by the financial performance of the firm. It is 
routine for investors and analysts to rely on financial ratios to help predict future earnings and dividends. 
This line of testing includes various ratios of financial performance to identify significance in determining 
CARs that surround an issuance of HYD. Issuing firms’ current, total asset turnover, debt and basic 
earning power ratios are used in this series of regression tests. All ratios are normalized26 at the general 
industry level to capture any industry effects across the data. The testing windows used in this series of 
test are the same in the previous section.  
 
 Table 8 reveals the results from the inclusion of firm ratios into the regression analysis (Equation 
7) with the same variables used in the previous regression test. It is here the test results show a slightly 
increased measure of 2R . In the 1,3 and 5-day windows, the 2R  is .5335, .5158 and .4937 respectively 
compared to .5300, .5117 and .4880 over the same testing windows. This trend continues over the entire  
series of regressions when comparing them to the previous series of regressions. The 1-day window finds 
the age of the firm and bonds of BBB, BB and CCC rating to be of significance as found with the earlier 
results. The length of the issue, the amount of the issue, and a firm’s total asset turnover ratios are also 
shown to be significant when accounting for firm performance in the regression equation. In the 3-day 
event window, the length of the issue, a variable coupon amount, binds rated BBB and BB and the total 
asset turnover ration are found to have significance. The 5-day event window has similar results as the 3-
day window except in one instance. In this window the total asset turnover ratio loses its significance 
while the current ratio is proven to be a significant variable. The 7-day and 9-day event windows find the 
same variables significant in determining a CAR. Variables identifying years to maturity, the age of the 
firm at issuance, issue amount and bonds rated BBB, BB and B are represented in both sample windows. 
The 11-day event window has the same relationships as the 7and 9-day windows with one inclusion. The 
firms issuing a high-yield bond for the first time are found to have significance. 
                                                 
26 Normalization will take place by identifying the issuances of HYD by SIC code at the 1000 level.  Each ratio in the analysis will be 
grouped by SIC code then divided by the industry average for the given ratio in the year of the issuance. After normalization, the 
new ratio will be employed in the cross-sectional regressions. 
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Table 8 
Regression Relating the Cumulative Abnormal Return Surrounding an Announcement of  
a High-Yield Debt Issuance to Bond and Firm Specific Characteristics Including Normalized  
Ratios of Firm performance 
              
The ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of the cumulative abnormal return is tested 
surrounding the announcement of a high-yield debt issuance ion a variety of test windows that include 
the announcement date to the first day after the announcement (0,1) to a range of 5 days before and  
after the announcement (-5,5) or an 11-day window. Coupon amount is a dummy variable that is  
categorized based on a fixed, floating or variable amount. Amount of Issuance is a dummy variable 
based on the size of the issue with respect to dollar amount. The Years to maturity dummy classification  
distinguishes the issuances by the number of years from issuance the bond will mature. The rating of 
issue takes a dummy variable format and takes into account the issues Standard and Poor's rating.  
Age of the firm at issuance is analyzed while a dummy variable is used to for callable bonds in nature. 
The exchange in which the issuing firms equity trades at time of issuance is also represented by dummy  
variables. A dummy variable is used to identify whether a firm issuing high-yield debt for the first time is  
of any significance. A dummy variable is used to determine whether market condition has any effect on 
the cumulative abnormal return. The use of proceeds is represented with dummy variables noting the  
issuing firms reported use of proceeds from the issue. Normalized ratios of firm performance are used   
to capture if firm performance is a determinant of a cumulative abnormal return while the normalization 
of the variable will remove any industry effects. The number in parentheses are the p-values. 
              
 
Window 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 7-Day 9-Day 11-Day 
              
Variable             
Intercept -0.0634210 -0.0797810 -0.0954420 -0.1057420 -0.1279460 -0.1399700 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] 
Length of Issue             
Years to Maturity 0.0002959 0.0004741 0.0005192 0.0007570 0.0007318 0.0008078 
  [.032] [.005] [.037] [.022] [.028] [.038] 
Age             
Firm Age at Issue 0.0002471 0.0002146 0.0001862 0.0005114 0.0005101 0.0007709 
  [.017] [.086] [.319] [.040] [.042] [.009] 
Issue Amount             
Amount of Issue -0.0000099 -0.0000075 -0.0000112 -0.0000250 -0.0000244 -0.0000430 
  [.036] [.188] [.190] [.027] [.032] [.001] 
Coupon Amount             
Fixed Amount -0.0063638 -0.0094669 -0.0075729 -0.0124450 -0.0088317 -0.0132250 
  [.198] [.114] [.395] [.292] [.458] [.344] 
Floating -0.0097792 -0.0103320 -0.0080114 -0.0112810 -0.0127260 -0.0115060 
  [.098] [.150] [.452] [.424] [.370] [.490] 
Variable -0.0086382 -0.0152860 -0.0048444 -0.0050545 -0.0111980 -0.0109660 
  [.160] [.040] [.662] [.731] [.450] [.528] 
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Table 8  continued             
Standard and Poor's' Rating            
BBB 0.0146940 0.0144790 0.0211760 0.0276520 0.0312320 0.0332800 
  [.000] [.001] [.001] [.002] [.000] [.001] 
BB 0.0095916 0.0098311 0.0209690 0.0303750 0.0290840 0.0398260 
  [.002] [.009] [.000] [.000] [.000] [.000] 
B 0.0026752 0.0056209 0.0090041 0.0188320 0.0157910 0.0219930 
  [.334] [.094] [.073] [.005] [.018] [.005] 
CCC -0.0111110 -0.0045226 -0.0014278 0.0013702 -0.0113770 -0.0071331 
  [.019] [.429] [.867] [.903] [.317] [.593] 
Exchange where Firms' Equity Trades           
NYSE 0.0096000 0.0027884 0.0033327 0.0090855 0.0058840 0.0080288 
  [.099] [.692] [.750] [.513] [.673] [.624] 
NASDAQ 0.0058617 0.0008189 0.0035898 0.0049307 0.0093952 0.0121570 
  [.242] [.893] [.692] [.681] [.436] [.390] 
AMEX 0.0069805 0.0074337 0.0024306 0.0062182 0.0103810 0.0152190 
  [.176] [.234] [.794] [.615] [.403] [.296] 
Use of Proceeds             
Acquisition 0.0045094 0.0075442 -0.0028906 -0.0149060 -0.0184460 -0.0111230 
  [.455] [.302] [.790] [.300] [.203] [.512] 
General Purposes 0.0012556 0.0054386 -0.0068604 -0.0223110 -0.0228700 -0.0153350 
  [.808] [.383] [.459] [.070] [.064] [.290] 
Payment on Loans -0.0044731 -0.0037177 -0.0199290 -0.0233640 -0.0228860 0.0095225 
  [.573] [.699] [.163] [.218] [.232] [.672] 
Refinancing 0.0002221 0.0068254 -0.0051028 -0.0133180 -0.0209900 -0.0111760 
  [.966] [.276] [.582] [.279] [.090] [.442] 
Callable Issue              
CALLLIST 0.0022286 0.0023128 0.0046936 0.0075392 0.0067480 0.0038925 
  [.273] [.344] [.197] [.118] [.166] [.496] 
Market Conditions             
Bull Market -0.0008343 -0.0012587 -0.0014793 -0.0017235 -0.0041326 -0.0009856 
  [.674] [.600] [.679] [.717] [.387] [.860] 
Number of Issuances             
First-time Issuer -0.0004204 0.0014789 0.0031312 0.0043592 0.0068151 0.0108810 
  [.803] [.469] [.303] [.280] [.093] [.023] 
Normalized Ratios of Firm Performance           
Current -0.0002474 0.0000485 -0.0013058 -0.0009478 -0.0001022 -0.0009509 
  [.464] [.906] [.033] [.242] [.900] [.319] 
Total Asset Turnover  -0.0018717 -0.0020339 0.0014954 0.0025261 0.0016709 0.0022480 
  [.012] [.024] [.263] [.154] [.350] [.284] 
Basic Earnings Power -0.0001001 0.0000833 0.0005516 0.0002345 0.0007163 0.0001796 
  [.644] [.751] [.159] [.652] [.171] [.770] 
Debt  -0.0009344 0.0020170 -0.0049371 -0.0081707 -0.0030156 -0.0100600 
  [.685] [.471] [.236] [.137] [.585] [.121] 
              
R-squared 0.5355760 0.5158100 0.4937000 0.4355960 0.4475870 0.4275590 
Adjusted 0.5176340 0.4971040 0.4741400 0.4137910 0.4262460 0.4054440 
observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 
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 The impact of the variables tested over the CAR is determined by the sign of the variables as well 
as the sign of the intercept. The relationships identified and the impact of the variables on the cumulative 
return in Table 7 remained throughout Table 8. Four new variables are tested in Equation 7 with the 
results listed in Table 8. These variables are normalized measures of firm performance and include the 
current, total asset turnover, basic earnings power and a ratio of debt management. All four variables of 
firm performance have varied signs of the intercept over the observation windows tested. Only the current 
and the total assets turnover ratios reveal significance in determining a CAR. 
   
2.4.3.3 Industry speaking 
The final series of cross-sectional regression tests categorizes each issuing firm by the industry 
they participate as indicated by their respective SIC code. These tests use a firms’ industry classification 
to capture any industry effects that may be prevalent with issuing debt. Appendix A is a descriptive list of 
the Standardized Industry Classification (SIC Code) codes.27 Tests taking into consideration a firms’  
industry code explained the greatest amount of variation in the regression equation (Equation 8). Table 9 
reveals the results of this line of testing. The 2R  when including a variable to identify the firms’ industry 
classification ranges from .5429 in the 1-day event window to .4402 in the 11-day window. This compares 
to a range of .5300 to .4254 in the first series of regressions which does not take into account firm ratios 
or industry characteristics.  
 
Table 9 shows the results of the regression using Equation 8 which includes categorizing the firm 
by it’s SIC code. The age of the firm, amount of the issue and bonds rated BBB, BB and CCC are shown 
to have statistical significance in the 1-day window while the length of the issue and bonds with a rating of  
BBB, BB and B are significant in the 3-day window test. The test over the 5-day window shows the length 
of the issue, bonds of BBB and BB rating and the current and debt management ratios have significance. 
The last three windows tested (7-day, 9-day and 11-day event windows) have very similar results. The 
length of the issue is significant in the 7-day and 11-day windows with the age of the firm at issuance and  
 
                                                 
27 Firms of the 2000 and 3000 SIC are tested as industries in the same classification. Service industries categorized at 7000 or 8000 
SIC code firms are grouped together for testing purposes as well. 
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Table 9 
Regression Relating the Cumulative Abnormal Return Surrounding an Announcement of  
a High-Yield Debt Issuance to Bond and Firm Specific Characteristics that Include 
the Issuing Firms Standardized Industry Classification 
              
The ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of the cumulative abnormal return is tested 
surrounding the announcement of a high-yield debt issuance ion a variety of test windows that include 
the announcement date to the first day after the announcement (0,1) to a range of 5 days before and  
after the announcement (-5,5) or an 11-day window. Coupon amount is a dummy variable that is  
categorized based on a fixed, floating or variable amount. Amount of Issuance is a dummy variable 
based on the size of the issue with respect to dollar amount. The Years to maturity dummy classification  
distinguishes the issuances by the number of years from issuance the bond will mature. The rating of 
issue takes a dummy variable format and takes into account the issues Standard and Poor's rating.  
Age of the firm at issuance is analyzed while a dummy variable is used to for callable bonds in nature. 
The exchange in which the issuing firms equity trades at time of issuance is also represented by dummy  
variables. A dummy variable is used to identify whether a firm issuing high-yield debt for the first time is  
of any significance. A dummy variable is used to determine whether market condition has any effect on 
the cumulative abnormal return. The use of proceeds is represented with dummy variables noting the  
issuing firms reported use of proceeds from the issue. Normalized ratios of firm performance are used   
to capture if firm performance is a determinant of a cumulative abnormal return while the normalization 
of the variable will remove any industry effects. Dummy variables representing the issuing firms SIC code 
are included to test for any industry effect over the cumulative abnormal return. P-values are in brackets. 
              
Window 1-Day 3-Day 5-Day 7-Day 9-Day 11-Day 
              
Variable             
Intercept -0.0744800 -0.0830950 -0.0947890 -0.0775470 -0.1192550 -0.1259930 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.014] [.000] [.001] 
Length of Issue             
Years to Maturity 0.0002667 0.0004250 0.0004927 0.0007043 0.0006662 0.0007215 
  [.055] [.012] [.050] [.034] [.045] [.064] 
Age             
Firm Age at Issue 0.0002162 0.0001786 0.0002348 0.0005532 0.0005101 0.0008280 
  [.039] [.162] [.217] [.029] [.045] [.005] 
Issue Amount             
Amount of Issue -0.0000109 -0.0000083 -0.0000133 -0.0000271 -0.0000263 -0.0000461 
  [.022] [.154] [.123] [.018] [.022] [.001] 
Coupon Amount             
Fixed Amount -0.0056918 -0.0089295 -0.0056588 -0.0112430 -0.0071955 -0.0125600 
  [.249] [.138] [.526] [.341] [.544] [.367] 
Floating -0.0094405 -0.0100920 -0.0050203 -0.0087121 -0.0095890 -0.0082754 
  [.111] [.162] [.638] [.537] [.499] [.618] 
Variable -0.0061518 -0.0139630 -0.0040383 -0.0047572 -0.0091004 -0.0124200 
  [.320] [.064] [.718] [.748] [.541] [.476] 
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Table 9  continued             
Standard and Poor's' Rating            
BBB 0.0164550 0.0154980 0.0206430 0.0279310 0.0309070 0.0312550 
  [.000] [.001] [.002] [.002] [.000] [.003] 
BB 0.0106930 0.0102220 0.0195170 0.0294460 0.0277550 0.0369820 
  [.001] [.008] [.001] [.000] [.000] [.000] 
B 0.0041143 0.0067296 0.0096729 0.0192520 0.0164120 0.0216580 
  [.139] [.047] [.055] [.004] [.014] [.006] 
CCC -0.0097356 -0.0035668 -0.0011775 0.0031507 -0.0089528 -0.0056201 
  [.040] [.536] [.890] [.780] [.430] [.673] 
Exchange where Firms' Equity Trades           
NYSE 0.0101940 0.0024068 0.0025619 0.0086308 0.0056282 0.0059064 
  [.082] [.736] [.809] [.538] [.689] [.720] 
NASDAQ 0.0049793 0.0019980 0.0022240 0.0021718 0.0072263 0.0087358 
  [.322] [.745] [.807] [.857] [.550] [.538] 
AMEX 0.0072740 0.0072465 0.0024938 0.0059965 0.0110990 0.0147280 
  [.161] [.251] [.790] [.629] [.373] [.313] 
Use of Proceeds             
Acquisition 0.0049993 0.0080712 -0.0005037 -0.0120340 -0.0157540 -0.0082487 
  [.411] [.276] [.963] [.405] [.278] [.628] 
General Purposes 0.0018618 0.0058301 -0.0044653 -0.0196600 -0.0201740 -0.0124330 
  [.720] [.355] [.632] [.111] [.104] [.392] 
Payment on Loans -0.0032873 -0.0028603 -0.0167020 -0.0193460 -0.0187360 0.0128140 
  [.681] [.770] [.247] [.311] [.330] [.571] 
Refinancing 0.0010491 0.0073232 -0.0016566 -0.0100680 -0.0181250 -0.0078197 
  [.841] [.249] [.860] [.416] [.145] [.592] 
Callable Issue             
CALLLIST 0.0022222 0.0025129 0.0043614 0.0077070 0.0067912 0.0046553 
  [.275] [.308] [.232] [.111] [.163] [.415] 
Market Conditions             
Bull Market -0.0009362 -0.0014275 -0.0013209 -0.0006541 -0.0027211 0.0006139 
  [.640] [.558] [.715] [.891] [.571] [.913] 
Number of Issuances             
First-time Issuer -0.0005656 0.0013736 0.0028424 0.0051341 0.0076635 0.0116320 
  [.738] [.506] [.353] [.205] [.060] [.015] 
Normalized Ratios of Firm Performance           
Current -0.0002714 -0.0000929 -0.0011537 -0.0011158 -0.0003268 -0.0011015 
  [.343] [.790] [.027] [.104] [.635] [.173] 
Total Asset Turnover  -0.0024454 -0.0021334 0.0010314 0.0022848 0.0039504 0.0038150 
  [.056] [.169] [.654] [.454] [.197] [.288] 
Basic Earnings Power -0.0015952 0.0002345 0.0076231 0.0029837 0.0113520 0.0067432 
  [.556] [.943] [.120] [.646] [.082] [.378] 
Debt  -0.0042215 0.0010026 -0.0141850 -0.0204940 -0.0154270 -0.0265160 
  [.251] [.823] [.034] [.019] [.080] [.010] 
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Table 9  continued             
SIC Code             
1000 0.0030390 -0.0024055 -0.0003178 -0.0328110 -0.0125680 -0.0130690 
  [.741] [.830] [.985] [.137] [.570] [.615] 
2000 0.0135870 0.0083501 0.0022841 -0.0257660 -0.0077456 -0.0110710 
  [.134] [.450] [.889] [.235] [.722] [.664] 
3000 0.0125180 0.0043608 -0.0028603 -0.0321690 -0.0149290 -0.0209980 
  [.164] [.691] [.860] [.135] [.489] [.407] 
4000 0.0125510 0.0054465 0.0065560 -0.0210130 0.0020031 -0.0014023 
  [.161] [.617] [.685] [.326] [.926] [.956] 
5000 0.0162970 0.0064042 -0.0011338 -0.0184380 -0.0019860 -0.0064503 
  [.076] [.566] [.945] [.401] [.928] [.803] 
7000 0.0076605 0.0038534 -0.0018093 -0.0219510 -0.0063656 -0.0007815 
  [.405] [.731] [.913] [.319] [.773] [.976] 
8000 0.0132520 0.0034229 0.0055715 -0.0239410 -0.0055802 -0.0115280 
  [.164] [.768] [.746] [.293] [.807] [.667] 
              
R-squared 0.5429550 0.5174690 0.4995900 0.4452820 0.4588580 0.4402610 
Adjusted 0.5203090 0.4935600 0.4747950 0.4177960 0.4320450 0.4125260 
observations 700 700 700 700 700 700 
 
the issue amount being significant determinants of the CAR in all three event windows. Bonds with ratings 
of BBB, BB and B are also shown to be a significant determinate in the latter observation windows. The 
debt management ratio is the final variable determined to have significance over the CAR. This takes 
place in the 7-day and 11-day windows.  
 
 The inclusion of a test variable segregating the data by the firms’ industry classification has mixed 
results. The sign of the intercept was determined by the cross-sectional regression. The sign of the 
intercept changes for each industry classification, variant upon the test window. One interesting thing to 
note is the lack of significance by testing the firms’ industry classification in determining a CAR. Given the 
lack of significance with the SIC code variable, this suggests the industry classification has no impact 
over the cumulative return.  
 
2.4.4 Variables of the Regression 
 
The intent of this line of research is to identify various characteristics that are significant in 
determining the abnormal return that surrounds an issuance of HYD. Using the abnormal return as the 
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dependent variable, and various bond and firm characteristic variables as explanatory variables, it can 
begin to explain the CAR that surrounds an announcement of a HYD issuance. All observations in the 
database experience a negative abnormal return surrounding the announcement of a high-yield bond 
issuance. The age of the firm at issuance is selected as an independent variable and found to be 
significant in determining the CAR. The intercept is of positive value which will lead to a positive impact 
on the return. This positive impact lowers the amount of the negative CAR which supports the hypothesis 
the older the firm at issuance, the lower the CAR will be. The amount of the issuance is found to have a 
negative intercept as a result of the regression. The negative coefficient will have a negative impact over 
the CAR; this will contribute to a more negative CAR. This evidence supports the hypothesis of the lower 
the issue amount, the less negative the CAR, this is also found to have statistical significance. The 
coupon amount is classified as a fixed amount, floating or variable. In only one instance does this variable 
show significance. This happens in Equation 7 where the variable coupon rate has statistical significance 
in the 3-day window. The sign of the intercept is negative showing a variable coupon rate to increase the 
value of the negative CAR. With only one instance revealing significance, this provides only minimal 
justification at best supporting the hypothesis of the lower the coupon amount, the less negative the CAR.  
 
The rating of the issue proves to be a significant determinant with all four rating classifications 
proving this relationship. However, bonds with a rating of BBB, BB and B have a positive intercept while 
bonds of CCC rating have a negative. Bonds in the “B” range will have a lower the CAR than BBB-rated 
and BB-rated bonds while CCC-rated bonds will cause it to increase. These relationships support the 
hypothesis the better the credit rating of the bond, the less negative the CAR. First-time high-yield bond 
issuers are shown to have a mixed intercept value in the windows observed. First-time issuers are proven 
to have significance in Equation 6 and 7, being significant at the 11-day window with a positive intercept. 
This result at the 11-day test window supports the hypothesis stating that first-time issuers will have a 
lower CAR than seasoned high-yield bond issuers. The debt management ratio also has explanatory 
power over a CAR.  The test results reveal a negative intercept value which would suggest the debt 
management ratio contributes to the negative CAR. These results support the debt management 
hypothesis which states the lower the firms’ debt management ratio, the less negative the CAR will be.  
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Several variables tested did not reveal any significance over the CAR, this includes the years to 
maturity, the exchange where the equity of the firm trades, the use of proceeds, whether the issue is 
callable or not, and if the market is in a bull or bear state. The regression results show the length of the 
issue is a statistically significant determinant of a CAR. However, the positive value of the intercept will 
lead to a positive impact on the return, lowering the CAR. This variable is not significant and does not 
support the hypothesis the shorter the length of the issue, the lower the CAR. It was hypothesized the 
better the stock exchange the firm participates, the less the negative CAR. The results do not support this 
hypothesis. The results also do not support the hypothesis that firms issuing high-yield debt for 
merger\acquisition and general purposes will have less of a CAR than firms issuing for repayment 
refinancing purposes. The results of the regression do support the hypotheses for both callable bonds 
and markets conditions. I expected to find that callable bonds will have less of a less negative CAR than 
non-callable bonds and bonds issued in bear markets will have a less of a negative CAR than bonds 
issued in a bull market. While these relationships are supported by the results, these variables are not 
found to be of significance in determining the CAR. 
 
Measures of liquidity and asset management are found to be statistically significant determinants 
of the CAR, but the negative intercept value refutes the expected relationship. Ratios of liquidity and 
asset management are not significant since the results do support the hypotheses stating the higher the 
firms’ current and total asset turnover ratios, the less negative the CAR will be. Additionally, a measure of 
firm profitability was tested using the basic earning power ratio. This was found to have no explanatory 
power and does not support the hypothesis stating the higher the basic earning power ratio, the less the 
negative CAR. In instances where the intercept value is positive, a more negative CAR will happen. The 
final testing variable infused into the sample is done in Equation 8 with the addition of the industry 
classification variable. Table 9 reveals the results of this inclusion and shows the industry classification of 
the firm has no impact over the CAR. The results further do not support the hypothesis stating that older, 
more established industries should exhibit less negative CAR. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
The first series of testing conducted in this chapter finds statistically significant negative abnormal 
stock returns surround an announcement of an issuance of HYD. The second major part of this research 
attempts to explain the significant return through a series of cross-sectional regressions. This line of 
research finds significant negative abnormal returns exist surrounding an announcement of HYD 
issuance. It is also found that various bond and firm characteristics contribute to the composure of an 
abnormal return. Further work is still necessary to fully understand what causes the significant abnormal 
return that encumbers an announcement of HYD. The evidence of significant explanatory variables in this 
research provides a partial explanation for contributing factors of an abnormal return.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
VARIABLES AFFECTING THE YIELD SPREAD OF HIGH-YIELD BONDS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 High-yield bonds are issued by firms which do not qualify for "investment grade" rated bonds by 
one of the leading credit rating agencies (S&P and Moody’s’ are the two most common). High-yield bonds 
in many cases offer greater yields to compensate for the significant increase in credit risk. Some investors 
place these types of bonds in their portfolio because of the higher rate of income generation from the 
higher coupon payments, and they offer the potential for capital appreciation if the borrower's debt rating 
is upgraded due to improved earnings, mergers or acquisitions, positive industry developments, etc.  
 
Research on the investment grade corporate bond market has been abundant, while research on 
the high-yield corporate bond market has been avoided by most. However, this market accounted for 
$174 billion of new issuances between 1997 and 2002.28 In the 1980s, investors viewed high-yield debt 
as “story bonds” in which the value was not derived from financial ratios. During the 1990s, there are 
large discrepancies between the preliminary pricing of high-yield debt instruments by underwriters and 
the actual price of the bonds at issuance. 
 
This chapter attempts to fill the void in current research by identifying various bond, and company 
specific variables that have an impact over the pricing of newly issued bonds, by assessing the spread 
above the prevailing Treasury yield at the time of issuance. Section 2 surveys the various academic 
research which attempts to evaluate risk. Section 3 is the literature review looking at the research to 
identify the variables that determine how to price a high-yield and the various models that attempt to 
determine yield premium and yield spread, and evaluates the trends over the high-yield debt issued. 
                                                 
28 Private issues of debt are excluded from this estimate. Bond statistical information is from The Bond Market Association 
publication, “An Investors Guide to High-Yield Bonds” 2000. 
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Section 4 presents the testing methodology used in the model derived in this research and presents the 
results of the regressions performed. The final section or Section 5 is the conclusion. 
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3.2  Literature Review 
 
Academic literature shows that non-investment yields change along with movements in the 
interest rates of risk-free assets or Treasury securities with qualities similar of those found with investment 
grade assets. A significant amount of research has been directed at the pricing of corporate debt. 
Boardman and McEnally (1983), Silvers (1973) and Fisher (1959) have established there are three basic 
factors that account for pricing new issuances of debt: default risk, interest rate risk and liquidity. Where 
high-yield issues differ from their investment grade counterparts is that they are more sensitive to these 
factors given their position in the capital structure and their credit rating. These three factors for pricing 
new issuances of debt will be evaluated further. 
 
3.2.1 Defining Risk 
 
3.2.1.1 default risk 
When the quality of an issuance decreases, the default risk will start to dominate the interest rate 
risk with respect to bond valuation. By analyzing yield as compared to yield spread, the strength and 
significance of changes in Treasury rates on the yield of non-investment grade bonds can be studied. 
Default risk has a major influence over credit yields and spreads. Fridson and Jonsson (1995) find the 
Moody’s trailing-12-month default rate for high-yield debt and an index of lagged economic indicators29 
will have a statistically significant effect on changes in yield spreads. However, when testing an index of 
leading economic indicators, it was found to have no statistical significance. Barnhill, Joutz and Maxwell 
(2000) find that the Moody’s trailing-12-month default rate is a significant variable in both the long and 
short run. Both the literatures of Barnhill et al. (2000) and Fridson and Jonsson (1995) focus on the bond 
market as a whole. While it is standard practice that investors price bonds on the future probability of 
default and not information from the past, Broughton (2000) suggests that investors place a tremendous 
amount of emphasis on the past information in pricing risky debt.  
 
                                                 
29 The economic indicators used include changes in the Merrill Lynch Treasury master index, changes in implied volatility of 30-year 
Treasury bond futures, changes in the Russell 2000 and S&P 500 Index returns and changes in volatility over both indexes. 
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Shane (1994), Ramaswami (1992) and Bookstaber and Jacob (1986) use equity indexes as a 
determinant of default risk. High-yield debt is generally issued in a subordinated position; this means 
investment grade bondholders will have first access to assets if the firm goes astray. A host of academics 
have shown the correlation of returns on high-yield bonds with equity indices. This relationship is also 
consistent with the Black and Scholes (1973) model of capital structure which also has been referred to 
as the contingent claims analysis. Smith and Warner (1979) and Black and Cox (1976) both used a 
contingent claims analysis to prove that unsubordinated or senior debt should be priced higher and have 
a lower yield spread than subordinated debt. This theory is supported on both investment and high-yield 
debt by the observed correlation structure of returns. To date there is not an equity index available for 
firms that have non-investment grade debt outstanding. Most academic research comprises a correlation 
analysis performed on a number of stock indices to determine the best index to use in their research. I will 
extend this line of research by segregating the data by the market in which the issuing firm participates. 
Previous research has combined all indices as a mitigating factor no matter which market the firm is a 
participant. 
 
3.2.1.2 interest rate risk 
Interest rate risk has been shown to be the leading variable that affects the value of investment 
grade bonds. Consequently, when credit quality decreases, the default risk begins to dominate the 
interest rate risk with respect to bond valuation. The impact of the changes in the Treasury rates on the 
yield of non-investment grade bonds can be studied by evaluating yield as compared to yield spread. At 
the end of 2000, the CS First Boston Aggregate Index had an average maturity of 7.85 years and duration 
of 4.35 years. This perhaps may not be an accurate measure to use since most bonds have a call feature 
which effectively decreases the maturity and duration.  
 
Models developed to find yield premium and yield spread provide a framework to evaluate factors 
which affect the default risk associated with high-yield debt. However, Barnhill et al. (2000) found that 
neither model properly factored into account interest-rate risk. They believe when using a correlation and 
cointegration analysis, interest rate risk is not constant or is a simultaneous event in correlation or 
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cointegration models. Instead they believe a broader model should be developed that would allow interest 
rate and default risk to vary over time. Systems and single-equation models find varying adjustments to 
disequilibrium. Although long-term equilibrium exists, short-term dynamics can significantly impact the 
short-run relationship. Lower rated indices exhibit slower reversion toward equilibrium and larger short-run 
dynamic changes in yield. Also observed in a long-run equilibrium, short-run dynamic factors affected the 
monthly yields.  
 
 It is also necessary to understand the determinants of risk and spread for high-yield debt issues 
on an individual basis. While much academic work has been done in this area, banks and financial 
institutions are concerned with macro movements in the credit markets. The risks created by these 
movements can have important consequences pricing the firm’s assets and derivatives as well as pricing 
the issue for the developing markets for credit derivatives. Understanding the factors that influence yields 
on corporate bonds is not new. Joutz and Maxwell (2002) define variations in Treasury yields, Moody’s 
default rates, and mutual fund volume will continue to affect the high-yield debt market in the short-run. It 
is also found that external shocks have a greater impact on high-yield debt when compared to its 
investment grade counterparts.  
 
3.2.1.3 liquidity risk 
Firms issuing high-yield debt instruments are extremely sensitive to liquidity in the high-yield 
marketplace. Firms using this type of debt have limited themselves to not having the ability to access the 
more stable bank financing which in turn means they face greater problems when trying to raise capital. 
High-yield debt issuing firms performance and investment spending relies greatly on cash flow, the ability 
to leverage, and other balance sheet factors. This implies they are susceptible to current and future 
expectations toward the business cycle and any changes in monetary policy by the Federal Reserve 
Board.  
 
Warther (1995) finds the level of mutual fund investment activity influences stock and bond 
returns. In today’s market, mutual funds make up a large segment of the market. The volume of mutual 
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fund trading and the liquidity position of the mutual funds can have a sizeable effect on the market yield. 
Fridson and Jonsson (1995) find that increased fund flow into high-yield debt, as a percentage, is 
associated with the narrowing of the yield spread and an increase in the price of non-investment grade 
securities. Barnhill et al. (2000) finds an increase in the amount of assets held as liquid securities, as 
percentage of high-yield assets, was associated with an increase in yield spread and a decrease in the 
price of non-investment grade securities. 
 
 A second factor with respect to liquidity, or perhaps the loss of liquidity occurred when Drexel 
Burnham Lambert went into distress themselves. At the time, Drexel Burnham Lambert was the largest 
underwriter and market maker in the high-yield bond market when it filed for bankruptcy protection in 
February 1990. Cornell (1992) found the Drexel Burnham Lambert bankruptcy had an effect on the 
overall marketability of high-yield bonds. This lack of marketability impacted the high-yield debt market for 
several years. While Drexel Burnham Lambert is still the top primary issuer of high-yield debt some 10 
years after filing bankruptcy, many firms have a significant interest in this market. For the period 1983-
2001, there are 475 different investment houses having an interest in at least 1 high-yield issue. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert still leads the list, but there has not been a lack of interest in replacing Drexel Burnham 
Lambert in being the top issuer of high-yield debt. The second through sixth largest issuers are Merrill 
Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Donald Lufkin and Jenrette, Solomon Brothers and Bear Sterns. They have risen 
to become major players in the marketplace for non-investment grade debt and are a part of 2245 issues 
of a total 7083 issues or 31.70%. When adding Drexel Burnham Lambert to the number of issues the top 
5 issuing companies are a part of increases to 2938 or 41.48% of the issues listed in the SDC database 
with lead underwriter identified. 
 
3.2.2 Pricing Models 
 
 It has been shown in the previous research that non-investment yields change along with 
changes in the risk-free rate similar to their investment grade counterparts. While this addresses 
movements in the spread, academic research provides various theories to explain why a spread exists. 
Currently there are three generations of yield premium and yield spread models used to explain the 
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spread. The first generation highlighted the market yield premium for holding risky debt. That is, the 
average yield spread between a risk-free security such as a Treasury note and a risky debt securities 
issue. This approach is referred to as a break-even approach that analyzes the long run. It calculates if 
there is a net return (yield premium minus default rate) by holding risky bonds in the long-run. The second 
generation model incorporates the first-generation model by the inclusion of default risk in the long run, 
and processes information with the second-generation framework of yield premium models by focusing 
on short-run dynamics. A third generation model focuses on yield spread in the short-run. This model 
features variables that take into account various measures of liquidity and default risk. 
 
Fons (1987) presented the first effort to define a relationship between the risk premium required 
by investors of high-yield bonds and the actual risk of default. A model of low-rated bond pricing using a 
risk-neutral investor is developed to estimate anticipated default rates on these issues. The series is then 
compared to the actual default of high-yield debt issues. Fons (1987) concluded that the default rates 
suspected in corporate bond returns exceed those actual occurrences in recent years. This implies that 
holders of well diversified portfolios that are comprised of high-yield debt will be rewarded for bearing 
default risk. Fons (1987) further believes there is a systematic mis-pricing of high-yield bonds by the 
investment community, or the risk neutral model used does not capture all the probability of default.  
 
 Altman and Bencivenga (1995) showed that a bond yield should compensate the investor for 
several factors of risk including; expected risk, the timing of default, and the severity. The severity refers 
to the recovery rate; this is whether the issue will default and the bond will either sold immediately, or be 
held until the company emerges from Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The overall loss from default increases by 
the opportunity loss since the defaulting bonds will exhibit a non-payment of its semiannual coupon.  
 
A second type of model introduced to predict yield premium and yield spread is by cointegration. 
Two different methodologies have been developed using cointegration for testing. The first approach 
used a single-equation approach pioneered by Engle and Granger (1987) methodically named the Engle–
Granger Methodology. This approach is favored in bivariate analysis, but it is inadequate in a multivariate 
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framework or a systems approach. Johassen developed a better and more robust methodology in 1988 
and 1991. This became to known as the Johansen’s maximum likelihood procedure for  finite-order vector 
autoregressions (VARs). These yield premium models and yield spread models provide a framework to 
evaluate factors which affect the risks surrounding high-yield debt. However, Barnhill et al. (2002) find 
that neither model properly factored into account interest-rate risk. They believe when using a correlation 
and cointegration analysis, interest rate risk is not constant, or is a simultaneous event in both models. 
Instead a broader model should be developed that would allow interest rate and default risk to vary over 
time. This would provide a better framework to define the long-term relationship between default rates, 
Treasury yields, and the yields on high-yield debt. The systems and single-equation models found varying 
adjustments to disequilibrium. Although long-term equilibrium exists, short-term dynamics can significantly 
impact the short-run relationship. Lower rated indices exhibit slower reversion toward equilibrium and 
larger short-run dynamic changes in yield. Also observed in a long-run equilibrium, short-run dynamic 
factors affected the monthly yields. 
 
Fridson and Jonsson (1995) showed that evaluating the high-yield spread in comparison to the 
prevailing long-term Treasuries spread would not serve as an adequate market predictor when evaluating 
the model when applying historical data. At the time of publication, the editor of the Journal of Fixed 
Income made the following comment, “While we understand that it is conceptually possible, the almost 
total absence of usefulness of the yield spread is striking, and perhaps disturbing from traders and 
researchers.” This lead to Fridson and Jonsson (1995) developing the second generation of high-yield 
spread models which focus on measuring the prevailing market risk. Their main argument is that the 
spread over and above the Treasury spread should be treated as a risk premium and this should vary as 
the level of risk changes. They proceed to measure the prevailing risk in the marketplace and use this in a 
regression setting using yield-spread methodology developed by Fisher (1959). Ma, Rao and Peterson 
(1989) adapted this methodology to measure the new-issue spreads on high-yield bonds and agree the 
spread should be treated as a risk premium. 
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 Fridson and Jonsson (1995) identify a series of explanatory variables in an attempt to measure 
default risk and market liquidity. They identify broker loan rate, monthly count of news articles over high-
yield bonds and new issuances as liquidity indicators for default risk. They also identify several variables 
to explain the variance in the spread. These variables include the Moody’s Trailing-Twelve-Month Default 
Rate, an Index of Lagging Economic Indicators30, Mutual Fund Flows as a Percentage of Fund Assets, 
Cash as a Percentage of High-Yield Mutual Fund Assets, and the Three-Month Moving Average Price of 
the Merrill Lynch High-Yield Master Index. The rationale is that business conditions may have an 
influence over amount of default risk. In turn, investors may anticipate changes in default risk by 
evaluating leading economic indicators.  
 
Fridson and Jonsson (1995) used the five variables that are identified in the previous paragraph 
in a general log regression framework to test for statistical significance when comparing high-yield spread 
to Treasury spread. Using 108 observation periods (monthly data between December 1984 and 
December 1993) they find that mutual fund flows, cash as a percentage of high-yield mutual fund assets, 
default, price, and various lagged economic indicators developed into an index are all statistically 
significant with a t-statistic above 2. In addition, Fridson and Jonsson (1995) also find that the regression 
framework generally underestimates the high-yield spread. However, when the Treasury spread is above 
its historical average, this does not mean the high-yield spread is undervalued, and in fact a trading 
strategy based on this will not provide excess or abnormal returns. Fridson and Jonsson (1995) further 
showed the spread does not vary for non-fundamental reasons to an extent that is exploitable. Rather the 
risk premium changes as systemwide risk changes. The marketplace appears to reflect these changes 
with sufficient price to preclude profiting without forecasting the relevant risk factors accurately and well in 
advance. 
  
It is also necessary to understand the determinants of risk and spread for high-yield debt issues 
on an individual basis. While much academic work has not been done in this area, banks and financial  
 
                                                 
30 The Index of Lagged Indicators comprised the prevailing unemployment rate, the GDP and the inflation rate. 
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institutions are concerned with macro movements in the credit markets. The risks created by these 
movements can have important consequences over pricing the firm’s assets and derivatives as well 
pricing the issue for the developing markets for credit derivatives. Fridson and Garman (1998) use a 
multiple regression model in an attempt to identify company specific and environmental variables that are 
significant in determining the spread for a new issuance of high-yield debt compared to the prevailing 
Treasury rate. Choosing a window between 1995-1996 for the sample period, they use 428 issues as the 
sample with complete information to match their hypothesis with a series of company specific variables.31 
Their results show nine variables are statistically significant at the 97% confidence level and explain 56% 
of the variance in the regression equation. The significant variables include; rating, zero-coupon status, 
BB-B spread32, seniority, callability, term, first-time issuer, underwriter type and interest rate changes. 
This equates to seven of the nine variables that are statistically significant are of company specification. It 
is here the opportunity for further research is present. Further research needs to be completed to isolate 
which company specific and environmental variables impact the spread of a new issue as well as 
exploring all rating classes of high-yield debt. Extending the research of Fridson and Garman (1998) 
through the use of a database that encompasses more observations, a longer time horizon and more 
environmental and company specific variables, a better understanding of the determinants of the yield 
spread for new issuance of high-yield debt between the spread at issuance and the prevailing Treasury 
rate can be determined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Company specific variables include rating, seniority, term and callability of the issue, coupon status, amount of the issue, 144a 
status, first time issue and underwriter type (investment of commercial bank). 
Environmental variables include spread versus Treasury, BB-B spread, yield curve, default rate, IBO volume, number of 
uncompleted issuances, mutual fund flows, interest rate change and high-yield return.  
32 BB-B spread is believed that new issues may not only be sensitive to changes in the risk premium on high-yield debt as a group 
but subject to changes in the intra-market spread. 
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
The data used in this chapter comes from the same two sources as the previous essay. New 
issuances of high-yield debt issued are examined for the period 1983-2003 and are extracted from the 
SDC database.  Data unique to each bond issuance observation taken from the SDC database includes: 
spread, rating, exchange of issuer, the use of proceeds, coupon amount, callability of the issuance, length 
of the issue, amount issued, and identifying first-time issuers. The sample includes 4,217 issuances of 
high-yield debt by public firms. I omitted 1,827 observations from the dataset for not having complete 
information over the variables above.  This leaves 2,390 issuances of high-yield debt to be observed. 
Fridson and Garman (1998) completed research with respect to pricing high-yield debt by observing the 
variance in the prices as functions of quantitative factors. Next, I seek out firm specific variables in order 
to complete a series of cross-sectional regressions to explain the spread at issuance. Financial 
statements from Compustat are used to gain an understanding of the position of a firm at a given point in 
time, and can be used as a predictor of future earning and dividends. It is along these lines that I have 
selected firm specific ratios to explain the spread at issuance against the prevailing Treasury rate that 
surrounds an issuance of high-yield debt. I will test firm performance ratios of liquidity, asset 
management, debt management and profitability to complete the cross sectional analysis. Information 
pulled from the Compustat database to compute these ratios includes; total current assets, current 
assets, total current liabilities, current liabilities, earnings before interest and taxes and sales. Other 
information extracted from the Compustat database includes the SIC code of the firm and market 
conditions at issuance. The Compustat database was used to match the 2,390 observations with full 
information in the SDC database with complete information in respect to financial information. After 
eliminating observations in the database for incomplete information the end result netted 703 
observations. Figure 2 shows each of the variables selected and its origin. 
 
Fridson and Garman (1998) completed research with respect to pricing high-yield debt by 
observing the variance in the prices as functions of quantitative factors. Their intent was to measure how 
the new issue market reflects objective considerations. They further investigated the value added, if any,  
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Figure 2 - Variable Used and Data Sources   
        
Figure 2 shows the data used and provides a brief description of the data and list the source of the data. 
        
Title   Description 
Data 
Source 
Bond Specific       
        
Spread   Spread above prevailing Treasury Rate SDC 
S&P rating   Dummy variables: BBB, BB, B, CCC, NR SDC 
Exchange   Dummy variables: NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, Over the Counter SDC 
Use of Proceeds   Dummy variables: acquisition, general purpose, pmt on borrowings SDC 
    refinancing activity, other uses SDC 
Coupon Amount   Actual coupon amount expressed in percentage of the par value SDC 
Callable   Dummy variables: callable or non-callable bond SDC 
Yrs to Maturity   Actual number of years for the bond to reach maturity SDC 
Amount Issued   Amount of each individual issuance SDC 
High-Yield Bond 
IBO   Dummy variable: First Time Issuer SDC 
        
Company 
Specific       
        
Total Current 
Assets   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
Total Assets   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
Total Current Liabilities earned the year of the issuance  ($millions) Compustat 
Total Liabilities   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
EBIT    earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
Sales   earned the year of the issuance ($millions) Compustat 
SIC Code   Firm industry identification variable Compustat 
        
Market Specific       
        
Market Conditions   Dummy Variable: Bull or Bear Market Compustat 
 
 
by the underwriting process through the effectiveness in presenting the issue to analysts and portfolio 
managers. The research revealed that the pricing of newly issued high-yield debt is sensitive to various 
characteristics of the issuance and the market environment. They find that the yield spread against the 
prevailing long-term Treasury rate will be greater when the high-yield issuance is low in seniority with the 
firms existing debt, has a long maturity time span, whether the bond is callable, if it is a zero coupon 
bond, the firm is a first time high-yield issuer, and whether the issue is underwritten by a commercial 
bank.  
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Fridson and Garman (1998) provide support that company specific variables impact the spread of 
an issuance. They use a database of 428 observations that encompasses issuances of high-yield debt for 
the years 1995 – 1996.  I expand this line of research by using ordinary least squares33 regression to 
regress the bond and firms specific variables extracted from the SDC and Compustat databases identified 
previously against the spread at issuance. This will capture any bond idiosyncrasies that impact the 
spread similar to Fridson and Garman (1998).  By using a larger database, a longer evaluation period 
from 1983-2003 and employing more variables of performance and liquidity, a better understanding of 
what impacts the spread of a high-yield bond at issuance will be achieved. 
 
I will regress the bond and firm specific variables against the spread at issuance to gain an 
understanding how these variables may impact the spread.  The cross-sectional regressions feature 
ordinary least squares regression using the bond characteristics of the issue. The general form of the 
equation is: 
 
,)var( iii wiablessprecificbondfspread +−−=     i =1,……,n.                               (10) 
where iw is the disturbance term 
The dependent variable in the regression will be the spread at issuance above the prevailing Treasury 
rate (in basis point form), while the independent variables will be the bond characteristics.  This series of 
regression will determine whether the characteristics of the issuance are a determinant of the spread of 
new issues. The importance of each bond specific variable includes: 
    
• Coupon Amount – Similar to their investment grade counterparts, high-yield debt issues generally 
offer an investor coupon payments. These coupon payments are listed at the time of issuance and are 
stated in a fixed value and generally range between 5%-11% of the face value of the bond. All 
observations in the dataset used are of this nature. No bonds of floating or variable coupon rates were 
used in this analysis. The coupon amount is used in the regression analysis to determine whether it is an  
                                                 
33 The general form of the equation is presented in Equation 10. 
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explanatory variable over the spread. While it is widely shown in academic research investors require 
higher yield for assuming more risk, the role of the coupon payment with respect to high-yield bonds has 
been overlooked.  The anticipated the sign of the coefficient generated from the regression is positive. 
This will increase the amount of the spread over the prevailing treasury rate. High-yield bonds offer higher 
coupon payments to investors compared to their investment grade counterparts. This excess coupon 
amount paid by issuing firms is used to lure investors to invest in bonds of higher risk. However, higher 
required interest payments will place an excess burden on the firm and will reflect upon its financial 
performance. I hypothesize the higher the coupon rate, the larger the spread will be. Impact: positive 
variable, positive coefficient. This will increase the amount of the spread at issuance.  
 
• Years to Maturity – The years to which the bond matures is being evaluated to get a general idea 
if the pricing decision is reflective over the length of an issue and is properly priced as reflected by the 
spread at issuance. Bonds with a greater maturity are expected to have a higher default risk and maturity 
premiums built into the pricing decision. It is this rationale that is being tested in the regression to capture 
if this relationship holds true in the high-yield marketplace.   I expect to find that years to maturity will have 
a negative impact on the spread at issuance. Academic literature reveals investment grade bonds of 
longer term have high default and maturity risk premiums as a part of the pricing decision. I expect to find 
that years to maturity will have a negative impact over the spread at issuance, i.e. the longer the years to 
maturity of an issue, the more impact on the pricing decision. For example, a high-yield debt instrument 
issued for 1-5 years will have lower default and maturity risk premiums built into the spread than a bond 
issued for 16-20 years. Academic literature reveals investment grade bonds of longer term have high 
default and maturity risk premiums as a part of the pricing decision. Furthermore, an announcement of 
issuance will signal financial weakness to the marketplace. A longer term note can be construed as a 
signal of a long financial recovery and little expectation for profits in the short run. I hypothesize the longer 
the term to maturity, the larger the spread will be. Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will 
reduce the amount of the spread at issuance. 
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• Issue Amount – The amount of the issue creates a direct impact on the capital structure of the 
firm. The smaller the issue, the less of an impact or unbalance of the firms’ existing capital structure. 
Firms offering additional debt may run the risk of deviating from the industry norm capital structure and 
therefore limit their ability to compete in a competitive marketplace for their goods and services. I test the 
impact of the amount of the issuance by including this variable in the regression equation. I expect to find 
that issues of low value will impact the spread less than issues of greater value. In general, an issue 
amount of $200 million will have less of an impact on the firm’s capital structure than an issue amount of 
$800 million. It is along this lines that I expect to find a positive sign in the regression equation from the 
impact of the issue amount and the effect it will have on the firms’ capital structure. I hypothesize the 
higher the issue amount, the larger the spread will be. Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This 
will increase the amount of the spread at issuance. 
 
• Callable – Fridson and Garman (1998) and Kalotay (1997) showed that the callability of a bond, 
or to retire the bond before its prescribed maturity adds value to the issue.  The issuer can benefit from 
changes in the economic climate and take advantage of improved interest rate conditions by calling in 
existing bonds and reissuing new bonds at a lower rate. Similarly, a company may improve its credit 
standing which qualifies the firm to issue a higher rated bond which can reduce its interest payments, 
therefore calling higher yielding bonds. Previous academic research has shown that callable bonds is an 
option investors are willing to pay a premium for. I expect to find bonds that are callable will produce a 
positive sign in the regression equation. This is attributed to the likeliness of the issue being called 
reduces the risk of the issue by having a chance of the call provision being exercised. Additionally, when 
a bond is called, the offering price will be greater than its face value due to a premium being added by 
issuers to encourage investor sellback. I hypothesize that callable bonds will have a larger spread than 
non-callable bonds. Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will increase the amount of the 
spread at issuance.  
 
• Use of Proceeds – Tests whether the use of proceeds regressed on the company specific 
variables impacts the pricing of the bond are completed. Fridson and Jonsson (1995) show the intended 
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use of proceeds by floating a new issue of high-yield debt has an impact on the yield-spread of the issue.  
Companies are required at the time of registration of a new issue to report to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission the intend use of proceeds from the issue. I categorize each bond rating 
classification into dummy variables grouping at the respective use of proceeds as reported by the issuing 
firm. I believe this variable will create a negative sign in the regression equation due to the fact that firms’ 
issuing this type of debt do not have access to traditional capital markets and may be in a distressed 
position.  These classifications include bonds issued for; acquisition, general purposes, payments on 
borrowings, refinancing activity and other uses. Of these classifications, only the first four classifications 
will have results as the other uses classification will be lost in the regression. However, I expect to find 
that firms raising capital for the purposes of acquisitions to experience a less of a negative reaction than 
firms raising capital for general purposes, payments on borrowing and refinancing activity. The pricing of 
the issue will have to compensate the investor less for firms that raise capital for expansion and new 
projects in comparison to firms that are facing a distressed position and issue high-yield debt to solve 
internal capital problems. I hypothesize the more debt issued for general purposes, payments and 
refinancing activity rather than mergers and acquisitions, the larger the spread will be. Impact: positive 
variable, negative coefficient. This will decrease the amount of the spread at issuance. 
 
• Rating – The regression analysis features the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rating over the Moody’s 
rating in the analysis. However, both provide virtually the same end results. The rating agencies are given 
the responsibility of providing a rating for a new issuance in correlation to the risk of the bond. A bond 
with a high rating is expected to have a relatively lower spread above the prevailing treasury rate in 
comparison to a bond with a low rating. The bonds used in this chapter are of S&P ratings BBB, BB and 
B, CCC and not listed. Bonds with a rating of “CC” or lower were not evaluated due incomplete 
information in the databases selected. I categorize each bond rating classification into dummy variables, 
grouping at the respective rating letter, but ignoring pluses and minuses.34 In general, the spread at 
issuance is expected to compensate investors with higher risk premiums for bonds of lower credit rating.  
 
                                                 
34 The dummy variable categories for all variables categorized as dummy variables are featured in Figure 2. 
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However, bonds of lower rating have a higher risk of default than their higher rated counterparts. I expect 
to find mixed results as to the sign of the intercept. Bonds near investment grade (BBB and BB) will 
exhibit a negative coefficient value lowers the spread which in turn lowers the value. Given this rationale, 
bonds of BBB credit grade will exhibit a more negative coefficient than bonds of BB rating. Bonds with a 
rating of B and CCC will display a positive coefficient which will increase the spread. Following the above 
logic, bonds of B rating will have a less negative coefficient value than bonds of CCC rating. I hypothesize 
the lower the rating, the larger the spread will be. Impact (Bonds of BBB and BB rating): positive variable, 
negative coefficient. This will reduce the amount of the spread at issuance. Impact (Bonds of B and CCC 
rating): positive variable, positive coefficient. This will increase the amount of the spread at issuance.   
 
• Exchange – The primary exchange in which each bond issuing firm is selected for classification. 
The four markets used are the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the NASDAQ exchange and the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. Prior academic research has 
shown that older and more established companies participate in the AMEX and NYSE exchanges while 
newer and high-technology companies participate in the NASDAQ market.  Small, young, struggling, or 
falling firms are generally traded in the OTC market. Gilson and Warner (1995) show that bond issuing 
firms that participate in the NASDAQ exchange experience higher costs of issuance. I categorize each 
market into dummy variables in the regression to capture whether the marketplace in where the issuer’s 
equity trades is a factor over the spread of the issue. I categorize each bond rating classification into 
dummy variables grouping at the respective exchange where the firms’ equity is issued. These 
classifications include the AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE, the over-the counter market and bond of no rating35. 
Of these classifications, only the first four classifications will have results as the bonds of no rating 
classification will be lost in the regression. I expect to see a negative impact on the spread of the issue by 
the exchange variable for firms participating in the AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ. This is attributed to the 
accessibility of the markets and the ease of information of firms that participate in these marketplaces. In 
contrast, I expect to find a positive or increased spread for firms trading in the OTC marketplace, due to 
the limited volume of trading of it shares and limited information. I also expect to find firms whose equity 
                                                 
35 Bonds of no rating are bond originally issued by a firm that had outstanding equity but now have been delisted. 
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trades in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets to impact the spread less than AMEX firms given that the 
NYSE and AMEX is generally comprised of more established firms. Investors adding high-yield debt to 
their portfolios purchase this type of security with the intention of the firm performing at minimum level 
consistent with the industry or above. A firm performing below industry level in a competitive market will 
not have the desired profitability level which will reflect in poor performance of it outstanding equity. Firms 
performing above their industry standard will create a sense of optimism in the investment community.  
This will reflect as such in their equity prices in the marketplace. (I believe the pricing decision will reflect 
the liquidity of the firm’s other debt and equity offerings and the pricing decision is partly based on this 
rationale.) I hypothesize the more inferior the exchange, the larger the spread will be.  Impact (Equity 
traded on the AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ): positive variable, negative coefficient. This will reduce the 
amount of the spread at issuance. Impact (Equity traded on the OTC market): positive variable, positive 
coefficient. This will increase the amount of the spread at issuance.   
 
• Market Conditions - Historically investors prefer equity investments when the stock markets are 
increasing in value and prefer debt instruments when the market takes a downturn.  Fridson and Garman 
(1998) show high-yield debt has characteristics that resemble an equity security where both are sensitive 
to market conditions. A positive economic climate (bull market) will lead to increased corporate profits, 
rising equity prices and growing cash flows. These three factors will generally decrease default risk, which 
in turn will create investor demand and spark price appreciation creating a higher return. During 
recessionary periods (markets), these relationships are the opposite.  I use a dummy variable in the 
regression equation to represent market conditions. Market conditions are categorized by evaluating the 
closing price of the NYSE and NASDAQ to capture whether a given year provided a gain or loss in value. 
high-yield debt issuances are categorized by the year of issuance. Following the prior research of Fridson 
and Garman (1998), I expect to find high-yield bonds issued in years of increasing stock market returns 
(bull markets) will have a negative coefficient in the regression equation. This will cause the spread to 
decrease in value. I hypothesize bonds issued in declining (bear) markets will have a larger spread than 
bonds issued in increasing (bull) markets. Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will 
decrease the amount of the spread at issuance.  
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• Age at Issuance – The age of the firm at issuance is tested for any significant effects over the 
spread at issuance. Older, more established firms should present a more stable investment opportunity 
than younger firms. Firms that are established over the long-term will have better information as to 
business trends and their respective place within their industry, and the overall marketplace compared to 
younger firms. Investors also have more historical information to evaluate the firm and better knowledge 
of firm performance given a longer history of operations for the older firms. I separate the data into two 
dummy variables. One identifies firms that are less than 5 years old and the other firms that are older 
than 5 years old. I expect to firms that are 5 years old or younger will exhibit a positive coefficient in the 
regression equation. This will increase the spread at issuance compensating bond investors for the 
additional risk of investing in a young firm. I hypothesize the younger the issuing firm at issuance, the 
larger the spread will be. Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will increase the amount of 
the spread at issuance.  
 
• First-Time Issuers – A firm’s announcement of an issuance of high-yield debt has historically 
been viewed as a negative signal from management. A firms’ initial announcement of a high-yield bond 
IBO has had a negative impact over the price of the announcing firms’ equity. In the case of bond pricing, 
I expect to find a firm issuing a high-yield debt instrument for the first time will actually have a lower or 
negative impact on the spread at issuance. Investors are wishing to be compensated greater for firms that 
have several or subsequent offerings and will accept lower spreads on high-yield debt IBO’s. I use a 
dummy variable to represent first-time issuers in the regression. I expect to find the coefficient of the 
variable to have a negative sign in the regression equation therefore lowering the amount of the spread at 
issuance. I hypothesize that when the issuing firm is not a first-time issuer, the larger the spread will be. 
Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will reduce the amount of the spread at issuance. 
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The regression equation after accounting for the impact of the bond characteristics is represented below: 
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where 0α is the intercept and iw is the disturbance term. The sign above the intercept terms represents the sign of the intercept as 
a result of the regression. The sign above the variable represents the sign of the variable in the database 
 
 
Each new issuance identified in the SDC database with complete information is matched in the 
Compustat database to select variables of firm performance. These financial statements from Compustat 
are used to grasp the position of a firm at a given point in time and can be used as a predictor of future 
earnings and dividends. It is along these lines I have selected firm specific ratios to explain the spread at 
issuance against the prevailing Treasury rate that surrounds an issuance of high-yield debt. I test ratios of 
liquidity, asset management, debt management and profitability to complete a series of cross sectional 
analysis. These ratios will also be normalized36 at the industry level to account for any industry effects. 
The following ratios will be used in the regression equation: 
 
• Ratio of Liquidity - the current ratio will be used to capture the firms’ liquid assets or how easily 
the assets of the firm can be converted to cash at fair market value. This measures whether a firm can 
meet its current obligations. The current ratio is calculated by dividing the firms’ current assets by it 
current liabilities. Current assets include cash, marketable securities, accounts receivables, inventories 
and marketable securities. Current liabilities include accounts payable, accrued income taxes, short-term 
notes payable, current maturity of long-term debt and various accrued expenses such as wages and 
salaries due. Previous literature reveals that firms which issue high-yield debt are cash strapped, or have  
no access to traditional financing methods. In the regression equation I expect to find the normalized 
current ratio will reveal a positive sign. Firms issuing high-yield debt are increasing their current liabilities; 
                                                 
36 Normalization will take place by identifying the issuances of high-yield debt by SIC code at the 1000 level.  Each ratio in the 
analysis will be grouped by SIC code then divided by the industry average for the given ratio in the year of the issuance. After 
normalization, the new ratio will be employed in the cross-sectional regressions. 
 71
however, issuing firms will increase their current assets greater than the increase to current liabilities. 
Current assets will increase from the infusion of cash from the sale of the debt instruments, while the 
current liabilities will only increase by the amount of the interest payments until the year of maturity. This 
will result in an improved current ratio.  Consequently, the current ratio used in the analysis is the current 
ratio at the time of issuance normalized against the industry average. However, an improved current ratio 
will take place after the issuance and the ability of the firm to repay the bond is based on it future outlook. 
Firms with a high normalized current ratio at the time issuance signals a firm may not need the excess 
cash generated by the issuance. I hypothesize the higher the firms’ current ratio, the smaller the spread 
will be. Sign of the normalized ratio: positive; Impact: positive variable, negative coefficient. This will 
decrease the amount of the spread at issuance. 
 
• Ratio of Asset Management – an asset management ratio is selected to capture how effectively 
management is managing the assets of the firm. Poor asset management proves to be unproductive 
since excess inventory represents inefficient investment, albeit with tangible goods, accounting for low or 
even zero rates of return. The total asset turnover ratio captures how effectively management oversees 
its assets and is derived by dividing sales by total assets. The sign of both the total asset turnover and the 
normalized total asset turnover ratios is positive since sales and total assets do not have negative values. 
Firms issuing high-yield debt should be cash strapped in part due to poor asset management. The 
regression results will show the normalized total assets turnover ratio will have a negative coefficient 
value thus lowering the spread at issuance. I hypothesize the lower the firms’ total asset turnover ratio, 
the larger the spread will be. Sign of the normalized ratio: positive; Impact: positive variable, negative 
coefficient. This will decrease the amount of the spread at issuance. 
 
• Ratio of Profitability – a ratio representing profitability or the profit margin will be used to capture 
the end result of management’s policies and decisions. The basic earnings power ratio will be used to 
capture the profitability of the firm. This ratio is calculated by dividing the firms’ EBIT by its total assets. 
Using EBIT will capture the earnings of the firm before the effects of interest and taxes. The expected 
sign of the normalized ratio is positive because many firms issue high-yield debt to ward off a distress 
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event. That will present a negative or a slightly positive basic earning power ratio. I expect this will have a 
positive impact on the determination of the spread above the prevailing Treasury rate. Investors purchase 
high-yield debt on the likelihood of future profitability. Bond investors take into account the potential 
earnings of the firm and will reflect a sense of optimism that the earnings of the firm are expected to 
increase after the issuance. However, the effect of the capital infusion to the firm is unknown at the 
announcement of an issuance; investor optimism will be overshadowed by potential profitability loss, and 
create a punishing effect on the firms equity. I hypothesize the lower the firms’ basic earnings power ratio, 
the larger the spread will be. Sign of the normalized ratio: positive; Impact: positive variable, negative 
coefficient. This will decrease the amount of the spread at issuance. 
 
• Ratio of Debt Management – a debt management ratio will be used to determine to which extent 
firms are using debt financing. The debt management ratio is derivated by dividing the total debt of the 
firm by their total assets. Total assets are measured by the summation of the firms’ current and fixed 
assets while total debt includes both current liabilities and total long-term debt. The expected sign of the 
normalized ratio is positive albeit lower than firms that use investment grade debt in its capital structure. I 
expect to find lower total assets and higher total liabilities for firms that issue high-yield debt due to the 
lack of cash for investment opportunities or issuances for operating capital. These are two main reasons 
a firm will pursue issuances of non-investment grade debt. In addition, high-yield debt is more expensive 
than investment grade debt; this will also have impact on the debt management ratio. An increase in the 
firms’ debt management ratio will also provide a positive variable in determining the spread. Reducing the 
liquidity of the firm, potential changes in capital structure and possible hampering of the ability of the firm 
to compete in a competitive marketplace causes this variable to be of a positive nature. I hypothesize the 
higher the firms’ debt management ratio, the larger the spread will be. Sign of the normalized ratio: 
positive; Impact: positive variable, positive coefficient. This will increase the amount of the spread at 
issuance. 
 
This series of cross-sectional regressions features an ordinary least squares regression 
technique and will be conducted using the normalized accounting ratios identified above. The dependent 
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variable in the regression will be the spread at issuance, while the independent variables will be the bond 
characteristics, as well as the normalized ratios of financial performance.  All variables of firm 
performance are extracted from the Compustat database and are representative of the year the high-yield 
debt issuance is announced. The regression equation37 will be: 
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where 0α is the intercept and iw is the disturbance term. The sign above the intercept terms represents the sign of the intercept as 
a result of the regression. The sign above the variable represents the sign of the variable in the database 
 
 
The intent to this line of testing is to determine whether high-yield debt is being issued by firms of poor or 
declining performance surrounding an announcement of an issuance. Investors and analysts rely on 
financial ratios to help predict future earnings and dividends. Similarly, these ratios will prove to be useful 
in determining the spread that surrounds an issuance of high-yield debt. The ratios used will be 
normalized at the general industry level (1000 SIC code level) to capture any industry effects across the 
data. 
 
  The final regression test will include categorizing the bonds by their respective industry 
classification to capture any industry effects that may be prevalent with issuing debt. Current trends in  
debt issuances reveal that small, young firms and firms that are technology based rely on debt more  
heavily than older and more established firms. Analysis into this trend will reveal whether various high-
yield debt issuers grouped by industry enjoy the same pricing decision with respect to spread against the 
prevailing Treasury rate. Tests of cross sectionality will reveal whether bond or firm characteristics are 
                                                 
37  The expected sign of the intercept is represented in the equation. The sign above the variables represents the expected sign of 
the variable. 
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indicators in the pricing decision at issuance. Cross-sectional analysis will be conducted at the industry 
level (1000 SIC Code level) in the same manner as the previous section with one exception. The ratios 
used to measure liquidity, asset management, debt management and profitability will not be normalized 
due to the issuing firms being categorized at the 1000 SIC code level. The contribution factor is to 
determine whether one industry compensates bond investors more for a new issuance of high-yield debt 
and whether the industry the firm participates in is a contributing factor. I hypothesize that younger, less 
established the industry is at issuance, the larger the spread will be. Impact: positive variable, negative 
coefficient. This will decrease the amount of the spread at issuance. 
 
The regression equation is as such: 
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where 0α is the intercept and iw is the disturbance term. The sign above the intercept terms represents the sign of the intercept as 
a result of the regression. The sign above the variable represents the sign of the variable in the database 
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3.4 Evaluation and Testing 
 
This chapter analyzes data from 1985-2003 as the observation period and employs both the 
Securities and Data Corporation (SDC) database to identify high-yield issuances and bond 
characteristics, while the Compustat database is used to obtain company specific variables for firms that 
issued high-yield debt over the observation period. In order for an observation to be included in the 
analysis, each issuance needed complete information for the variables identified in Figure 2. By 
identifying the characteristics that make-up the spread over the prevailing treasury rate at issuance for a 
high-yield debt offering, it can be better understood how the pricing decisions are completed. Section 5 
will provide the descriptive statistics for the sample used and provide results of the regression equations 
listed in the previous section.  
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first table in this series (table 10) shows the distribution of the sample with respect to the year 
of issuance, the number of high-yield bonds issued in a particular year, the average amount of an 
issuance, the aggregate amount for the year issued and the equity exchange the issuing firms 
participates in. The overall sample is comprised of 703 issues that had complete information over the 
variables tested. The number of issues per year in the database varies from 101 in 1986 to 1 issuance in 
2000 with a sample average 37 issues per year. The average amount of the issuances varied from a low 
of $69.1 million in 1985 to a high of $446.6 million in 2003.38 The overall average for issuance per year 
equals $218.9 million with an aggregate dollar amount of the sample just over $192.5 billion. Along with 
the monetary distribution of the sample, Table 10 separates the data into the exchange where the firms’ 
equity trades. Firms participating the NYSE account for 45.52% of the sample or 320 observations. The 
NASDAQ is the second most prevalent marketplace represented in the sample with 22.62% share or 159 
issuances. The exchange not listed category, which generally represents firms that are now delisted, has 
147 observations in the sample or 20.91%. The final two exchanges noted are the AMEX and the OTC 
                                                 
38 The year 2000 is excluded from this statement due to only one issuance used in the dataset. 
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markets. These two combined represent 8.68% and 2.28% of the sample or 61 and 16 issuances 
respectfully.  
 
Table 10 
Market Distribution of High-Yield Debt Issues 1985-2003 
                  
This table presents the market distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period between 1985-2003. 
 The sample is categorized by the year of the issuance, the number of issuances pre year, the total 
amount issued in the bond market and the equity market in which the issuing firm participates.  
                  
    Average Total         Exchange 
Year Number per Issuance Proceeds NYSE NASDAQ OTC Amex Not Listed 
                  
1985 34 $69.1 $2,348.6 10 11 1 7 5 
1986 101 $73.9 $7,466.0 43 28 4 19 7 
1987 71 $126.9 $9,008.2 20 23 4 6 18 
1988 19 $203.2 $3,861.7 4 3 0 2 10 
1989 26 $211.4 $5,496.1 6 0 0 6 14 
1990 2 $224.5 $449.0 2 0 0 0 0 
1991 11 $236.5 $2,601.3 10 0 0 0 1 
1992 63 $160.8 $10,127.9 42 4 2 1 14 
1993 90 $144.6 $13,014.2 33 14 0 5 38 
1994 45 $185.4 $84,166.6 20 9 0 4 12 
1995 50 $183.2 $9,161.6 23 12 3 2 10 
1996 70 $174.3 $12,198.4 35 20 2 5 8 
1997 37 $272.4 $10,079.1 15 14 0 2 6 
1998 32 $225.8 $7,224.6 19 10 0 0 3 
1999 11 $270.5 $2,976.0 7 4 0 0 0 
2000 1 $500.0 $500.0 0 1 0 0 0 
2001 12 $324.9 $3,898.4 11 0 0 1 0 
2002 14 $234.6 $3,284.7 10 3 0 0 1 
2003 14 $336.6 $4,712.0 10 3 0 1 0 
Totals 703 $218.9 $192,574.4 320 159 16 61 147 
% of Issue   (millions) (millions) 45.52% 22.62% 2.28% 8.68% 20.91% 
 
 
Table 11 lists the distribution of the sample by the intended use of proceeds. When filing with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for registration of an issuance, each firm is required to list the 
intended use of the proceeds from the issuance. The use of proceeds will be tested in the regression 
equation to reveal whether the use of proceeds is a dependent variable in determining the spread at 
issuance. All issuances are categorized in the dataset by their intended use. Table 11 shows that of the 
703 issuance that make up the dataset, 386 or 54.91% were issued to retire or refinance prior debt. 
Second in this list are bonds issued for general purposes. This classification does not reveal how the 
firms intend to use the proceeds and provides little insight into the rationale for the issuance. This group is 
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represented with 169 issuances or 24.04% of the dataset. The third most popular use of proceeds in the 
dataset is for other purposes, being represented with 88 instances or 12.52%.39 The last two categories 
include bonds issued for Acquisition Financing and Payments on Borrowings.40 The two classifications 
have 44 and 20 issuances or 6.26% and 2.84% of the sample respectively.  
 
Table 11 
Distribution of High-Yield Debt Issues by Use of Proceeds 
              
This table presents the market distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period  
between 1985-2003. The sample is categorized by the specified or intended use of the  
issuance as reported to the SEC. The sample is highlighted by year of the issuance and 
the reported use of proceeds. 
              
         Retire of     
  Acq General   Payment on Refinance   Total 
Year Financing Purposes Borrowings Debt Other* Issue 
              
1985 2 12 0 20 0 34 
1986 8 22 0 62 9 101 
1987 4 18 0 33 16 71 
1988 0 1 0 15 3 19 
1989 4 0 0 18 4 26 
1990 0 0 0 2 0 2 
1991 0 1 0 9 1 11 
1992 2 9 0 49 3 63 
1993 3 24 0 54 9 90 
1994 2 5 0 33 5 45 
1995 2 12 1 25 10 50 
1996 10 20 0 38 2 70 
1997 1 14 4 5 13 37 
1998 3 8 6 8 7 32 
1999 2 4 1 3 1 11 
2000 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2001 1 8 0 2 1 12 
2002 0 10 1 3 0 14 
2003 0 0 7 7 0 14 
              
Totals 44 169 20 386 88 703 
% of Issue 6.26% 24.04% 2.84% 54.91% 12.52%   
*Other Includes: Stock Repurchases, Securities Acquisition, Investment in Affiliates, Project Financing, Capital  
Expenditures, Capital Investment Funds, Working Capital, Capital Acquisition, Investment in Other Companies. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Other uses of proceeds includes: Stock Repurchases, Securities Acquisition, Investment in Affiliates, Project Financing, Capital 
Expenditures, Capital Investment Funds, Working Capital, Capital Acquisition, and Investment in Other Companies.  
40 Payments on borrowing are generally short-term notes and do not include debt issuance or bank financing issued for more than 
one year.   
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The credit grade or rating of the issue has been proven to be a determinant of the spread for debt 
issuance. This is based upon the premise that the higher the rating of the issue, the lower the spread.  
Bonds of higher credit grade do not have to compensate their investors as much as lower credit grade 
issues given the rating is a direct reflection upon the riskiness of the issue.  Table 12 shows the S&P 
rating of the issues used in the dataset with bonds of BBB being closest to becoming investment grade 
followed by bonds of BB, B and CCC rating. The table also lists bonds that have no rating. Bonds of no 
rating do not any information as to the riskiness of the issue, nor the anticipated spread41. Bonds of a B 
rating are most representative in the dataset with 382 issues or 54.47%. The second most prevalent 
rating is bonds of BB 
 
Table 12 
S&P Rating of the Issuance 
              
This table presents the distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period  
1985-2003 identifying the issuances by their Standard & Poor's rating as well 
as the year of issuance. Panel A represents the number of issues in a given     
year categorized by the rating of the issue. Value represents the amount of  
the issuance categorized by aggregate amounts. 
              
\Number of Issues           
Year BBB BB B CCC NR Total 
              
1985 0 6 21 1 6 34 
1986 4 8 58 11 20 101 
1987 2 16 38 7 8 71 
1988 0 2 11 6 0 19 
1989 1 3 21 1 0 26 
1990 0 1 1 0 0 2 
1991 4 5 2 0 0 11 
1992 6 13 44 0 0 63 
1993 5 28 54 1 2 90 
1994 4 10 29 1 1 45 
1995 9 16 21 1 3 50 
1996 4 28 33 0 5 70 
1997 5 15 13 0 4 37 
1998 3 11 17 0 1 32 
1999 2 4 5 0 0 11 
2000 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2001 2 9 1 0 0 12 
2002 4 4 6 0 0 14 
2003 4 3 6 0 1 14 
Total 59 182 382 29 51 703 
% of Issue 8.43% 26.00% 54.57% 4.14% 7.29%   
 
                                                 
41 The SDC database has an identification variable for bonds of high-yield. 
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rating with 182 instances in the sample or 26.00%. The final three classifications each have less are the 
three least represented in the dataset with 59, 51 and 29 issuances or 8.43%, 7.29% and 4.14% 
respectively.  
 
Understanding how the spread at issuance is determined is the motivation for this line of 
research. Table 13 lists the average spread over the sample period as well as the average coupon 
amounts, and the length of issue for the sample set. Over the observation period 1985-2003, the average 
spread is 344.45 basis points. However this number reaches its peak in the sample in 1989 at an average 
of 520.38 basis points and an average low of 227.76 basis points in 1997 for years with at least 10 bonds  
 
Table 13 
Average Bond Characteristics 
          
This table presents the average distribution of the entire sample for the coupon  
amount, spread over the prevailing treasury rate at time of issuance and the years to  
maturity of the issuance for the sample period 1985-2003. 
          
    Coupon   Years to  
  Number of  Amount Spread Maturity 
Year Issuances (percentage) (basis points) (years) 
          
1985 34 11.00 303.35 15.41 
1986 101 9.21 290.07 16.67 
1987 71 9.77 299.75 16.55 
1988 19 13.36 457.74 10.21 
1989 26 13.33 520.38 10.15 
1990 2 10.19 197.50 5.50 
1991 11 10.54 312.27 10.73 
1992 63 10.06 341.35 10.00 
1993 90 9.41 383.79 10.93 
1994 45 10.21 360.53 9.89 
1995 50 9.35 327.96 8.08 
1996 70 9.16 296.50 9.89 
1997 37 7.98 227.76 9.68 
1998 32 7.67 295.69 10.53 
1999 11 8.79 324.73 5.18 
2000 1 10.75 467.00 11.00 
2001 12 8.37 380.17 6.83 
2002 14 8.31 380.93 9.43 
2003 14 7.28 377.14 9.36 
Averages 37 9.72 344.45 10.32 
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issued. The average coupon amount over the sample is also featured in Table 13 and reveals an average 
coupon amount of 9.72% of par value, or $92.72 per year for a $1000 par bond. The year of the highest 
average coupon payment is 1988 at 13.36% with the lowest average coupon payment year being 2003 
with a rate of 7.28%. The last column in the table reveals the average years to maturity. The average 
years to maturity for bonds used in the sample is 10.21 years with 1986 being the year with the longest 
average of 16.67 years, while bonds issued in 1999 have the shortest average length to maturity at 5.18 
years.   
 
Identifying callable bonds, age of the firm and the first-time issuers at issuance is done in Table 
14. One trait associated with bonds of less than investment grade rating is their high-yields and coupons 
compared to their investment grade counterparts. Bond ratings can very over the life of the issuance 
dependent upon the actions of the firm. Firms anticipating improvements in their credit ratings to 
investment grade status should issue debt that is callable. This will allow the issuing firm to take 
advantage of any improvement in their credit rating which will lower coupon payments From the sample of 
703, over 79% or 558 issuances are callable leaving a little less than 21% or 1435 issues as non-callable. 
It is believed issuing firms will pay a premium when issuing callable bonds. This rationale will be tested in 
the cross-sectional regression tests. A second variable highlighted in Table 14 is the age of the firm at 
issuance. I have split this characteristic into two categories; firm less than 5 years old at issuance and 
firms over 5 years old. The database has 298 firms that are less than 5 years old and 405 firms older than 
5 years old at issuance. This breaks down to 42.39% of issuing firm being young and 57.61% being more 
mature. The final variable featured in table 14 is whether the firm is a first-time issuer. The sample is 
compiled of 366 issuances (52.06%) by firms issuing for the first time with the other 337 issuances being 
issued by firms that have previously issued high-yield debt.42  
   
 The final table highlighting the descriptive statistics is Table 15. This table features the distribution 
of the sample, highlighting the SIC code of the industry in which the firm participates. Firms in the dataset 
are identified by their SIC code at the 1000 level. Appendix A provides a complete list of SIC Codes as  
                                                 
42 A firm is classified as a first-time issuer only when issuing a high-yield bond for the first time. Subsequent offerings by firm are 
classified as not a first time issuer. 
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Table 14 
Various Firm and Bond Specific Characteristics 
  
This table presents the distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period between 
1985-2003 identifying the issuing firms if they are a first time issuer of high-yield debt,  
the ages of the firm at issuance and whether the bond is callable or non-callable in nature 
  
  Callable  Age at Issuance   First-Time Issuer 
  Non     Less than  Greater than       
SIC Callable Callable   5 years 5 years   Yes No  
        less 5         
1985 12 22   17 17   23 11 
1986 51 50   48 53   67 34 
1987 32 39   37 34   54 17 
1988 0 19   8 11   11 8 
1989 0 26   11 15   15 11 
1990 0 2   0 2   1 1 
1991 0 11   5 6   2 9 
1992 0 63   18 45   20 43 
1993 0 90   20 70   34 56 
1994 0 45   16 29   25 20 
1995 1 49   24 26   27 23 
1996 10 60   35 35   37 33 
1997 10 27   24 13   17 20 
1998 7 25   19 13   14 18 
1999 1 10   5 6   4 7 
2000 0 1   1 0   1 0 
2001 10 2   5 7   4 8 
2002 6 8   3 11   6 8 
2003 5 9   2 12   4 10 
Totals 145 558   298 405   366 337 
% of Issue 20.63% 79.37%   42.39% 57.61%   52.06% 47.94% 
 
 
listed by the United States Occupation and Health Safety Administration. The dataset is dominated by 
issuance by firms in 4 industry classifications. Firms in the 2000, 3000, 4000 and 5000 SIC codes 
represent 75.38% of the database. Firms with an SIC code of 3000 and 4000 each have 162 
observations (23.04% share each) in the sample while 2000 and 5000 SIC code firms each have 103 
observations (14.65% share each) in the database. Firms with an SIC code of 2000 and 3000 represent  
the various types of manufacturing firms. 4000 SIC code firms include the transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services sectors while firms of 5000 SIC code include the 
retail trade industry. The lesser represented include firms with an SIC codes of 1000, 7000, 8000 and 
6000 with 66 (9.39%), 50 (7.11%), 44 (6.26%) and 13 (1.85%) respectively. Firms in the 1000 SIC code 
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classification include Mining and Construction companies. Firms designated with a 7000 or 8000 SIC 
code participate in the service industry while the 6000 SIC code companies include firms that primarily 
deal in finance, insurance and real estate activity. 
 
Table 15 
SIC Distribution of High-Yield Debt Issuances 
  
This table presents the market distribution of the entire sample for the issuing period between 
1985-2003 identifying the issuing firms by their Standard Industry Classification as well as the 
year of issuance. Panel A represents the number of issues in a given year with respect to the    
SIC code of the issuing firm. Panel B list the aggregate amount of the issue taking into account the 
year of issuance and the SIC code. 
  
                  Total 
SIC 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 Issue 
                    
1985 0 4 13 9 2 3 0 3 34 
1986 4 14 30 9 20 5 12 7 101 
1987 3 12 26 13 12 0 5 0 71 
1988 2 0 6 3 6 1 1 0 19 
1989 3 8 5 5 5 0 0 0 26 
1990 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
1991 4 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 11 
1992 5 11 18 10 15 1 0 3 63 
1993 4 17 13 26 16 2 4 8 90 
1994 6 9 11 11 4 0 3 1 45 
1995 9 7 7 14 4 0 5 4 50 
1996 8 8 10 26 5 0 8 5 70 
1997 7 1 5 14 3 0 2 5 37 
1998 5 2 7 9 3 1 5 0 32 
1999 2 2 1 4 1 0 1 0 11 
2000 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2001 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 2 12 
2002 2 2 1 2 3 0 2 2 14 
2003 0 0 4 4 1 0 1 4 14 
Totals 66 103 162 162 103 13 50 44 703 
  9.39% 14.65% 23.04% 23.04% 14.65% 1.85% 7.11% 6.26%   
 
 
3.4.2 Regression Results – General Sample 
 
The first in the series of regressions features the spread above the prevailing treasury rate at 
issuance as the dependent variable and tests several explanatory variables which include:  
the coupon amount, the years to maturity of the issuance, the amount of the issuance, whether the 
issuance is callable or not, the intended use of the proceeds from the issue, the S&P rating of the issue, 
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the exchange where the issuing firms’ equity trades, whether the equity market is in a bull or bear state at 
the time of issuance, the age of the firm at issuance and whether the firm is a first time issuer of high-yield 
debt. Panel A of Table 16 reveals the results of the regression featuring Equation 11 from page 68. The 
regression test shows that the coupon amount is statistically significant in determining the spread and has 
a positive coefficient value (20.4981). This will cause the coupon to add value to the spread.  Higher 
coupon amounts will have more of an impact on the spread than lower coupon amounts. This evidence 
supports the hypothesis the higher the coupon amount, the larger the spread will be. The length of the 
issue also is found to be statistically significant in spread determination. The length of the issue has a 
negative coefficient value (-3.1310). This means the longer a bond is issued, the more negative impact 
(reduce) it will have on the spread. This evidence supports the hypothesis stating the longer the term to 
maturity, the larger the spread. It has been noted throughout academic research that firms should be 
willing to compensate investors for bonds that are issued with a call feature. I find this relationship to hold 
true as bonds with a call feature do have statistical significance over the spread. The impact of callable 
bonds is positive which in turn will increase the spread of a new issuance. This evidence supports the 
hypothesis that callable bonds will have a greater spread than non-callable bonds. The rating of the issue 
is also documented to be a determinant of the spread, i.e. the lower the rating of the issue, the higher the 
compensation investors expect to hold it. All four bond categories tested are found to be a statistically 
significant determinate over the spread. The impact of each rating follows the rationale of investors a 
higher return to hold a bond of lower rating. Bonds of BBB and BB have a negative coefficient in the 
regression results which will lower the value of the spread. Bonds of BBB have an intercept value of -
80.7854 while bonds of BB have an intercept value of -19.7182, meaning bonds of BBB rating have more 
an impact over the spread than bonds of BB. Bonds with a rating of B and CCC are found to be significant 
and have a positive coefficient value (67.8019 and 89.3606). These bonds will increase the value of the 
spread with bonds of CCC have the most impact. This evidence supports the hypothesis the lower the 
credit rating, the larger the spread will be. 
 
 The exchange in which the issuing firm’s equity trades is tested for significance over the spread 
and found to have mixed results. Significance is found in the NYSE and the NASDAQ market. Both the 
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NYSE and the NASDAQ have a significant negative coefficient value (-49.4152 and -31.4580) which in 
turn will lower the amount of the spread at issuance. The AMEX also experiences a negative coefficient 
value, but is found not to be of significance. The OTC market is found to have a positive impact over the 
spread but like the AMEX market it is not found to be significant. The mixed results and the changing 
relationships within the values of the intercept do not support the hypothesis the more inferior the market, 
the larger the spread. The final test variable found to be significant in this series of test is whether the 
market is in a bull or bear state. The results of the regression shows that bull markets are significant in 
determining the spread. It is found that bull markets will lower the spread with a coefficient value of -
129.8820. The test results support the hypothesis stating that bonds issued in bear markets will have a 
larger spread than bonds issued in bull markets. 
 
The amount of the issue is found to have a positive impact on the spread however it is not 
statistically significant. This is consistent with the hypothesis the higher the issue amount, the larger the 
spread. The use of the proceeds variables have a negative impact over the spread, but only found to 
have significance for refinancing activity. However, the evidence does support the hypothesis the more 
debt issued for general purposes, payments and refinancing activities rather than mergers\acquisitions, 
the greater the spread will be. It is also found that the age of the firm and whether the firm is a first time 
issuer of high-yield debt are not of significance in determining the spread. The hypotheses stating that 
younger firms and non first-time issuers will experience higher spreads than older, more established and 
first-time issuers is supported in the test results. However, the issue amount, use of proceeds, age of the 
firm and first-time issuer variables are found not to be significant determinants of the spread. The 2R  
value of the regression is 50.10% with an adjusted 2R of 48.71.  
 
 Panel B of Table 16 shows the results of the regression with the inclusion of ratios of firm 
performance (Equation #12). Analysts and investors rely on accounting information and financial ratios to 
help predict future earnings and dividends for publicly traded firms. It is along these lines to test various 
ratios of performance to determine whether they are significant in determining the spread. The second 
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regression reveals the same relationships over the variables identified in the previous section43 with one 
inclusion. Firms issuing high-yield debt for refinancing purposes under the use of proceeds category is 
found to be a significant variable at the 95% level. This variable has a negative coefficient value which in 
turn will lower the value of the spread. In the previous test, refinancing was not found to be significant 
variable, however, it would hold at the 94% level.  
  
Four ratios of firm performance are tested for significance in determining the spread. This series 
of tests feature normalized ratios of performance to eliminate any industry effects in the data. The current 
and the debt management ratio are both found to have a positive coefficient value (increase the spread), 
but are not found to be significant variables. The positive value of the intercept does support the 
hypotheses stating the higher the value of the debt management ratio, the larger the spread. However, 
the positive value of the intercept does not support the hypotheses the higher the value of the current 
ratio, the smaller the spread. One possible explanation for this may be stockholders do not anticipate a 
firm with good current ratio to be issuing high-yield bonds. Further tests will have to be completed to fully 
understand this relationship. The total assets turnover and the basic earning power ratios both have a 
negative coefficient value (reduce the spread) and also are found not to be significant in determining the 
spread at issuance. The negative value of the intercept does support the hypotheses stating the lower the 
value of the total asset turnover and basic earnings power ratios, the larger the spread.  Although none of 
the ratios of firm performance are found to reveal significance at the 95% level, both the current and the 
total asset turnover ratios are significant at the 91% confidence level. The 2R  value or the explanatory 
power of the regression is 50.72% with an adjusted 2R of 49.06.  
 
The last regression uses Equation #13 which includes identifying the issuing firms by their 
industry classification or SIC code. In this test, the actual or non-normalized ratio of firm performance is 
used in the regression. Any industry effects will be identified by the grouping similar firms. Panel 3 of 
Table 16 shows the results of the tests and finds similar relationships as the other two regression  
                                                 
43 The coupon amount, callable issues and two categories of the rating of the issue (BBB and BB) are found to have significance 
and positively (increase) the effect amount of the spread at issuance. The years to maturity, rating of the issue (B and CCC), NYSE 
and NASDAQ markets and Bear markets present a significantly negative on the spread lower its value.  
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Table 16 
Regression Reflecting the Spread Above the Prevailing Treasury Rate of a  
 High-Yield Bond Issuance using  Bond and Firm Specific Characteristics 
  
The ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression of the spread at issuance is tested against 
 a variety of bond and firm characteristics. The coupon amount used is the actual coupon amount  
expressed as a percentage of the par value of the bond. The years to maturity of the issuance 
is the actual number of years the bond will be in circulation. A dummy variable is used to distinguish 
callable bonds. The use of proceeds is represented with dummy variables noting the issuing firms 
self reported use of the proceeds from the issue. The rating of the issue take dummy variable format 
and takes into account the issues S&P rating. The exchange in which the issuing firms equity trades 
at the time of issuance is also represented using dummy variables. Dummy variable are also used to  
identify whether the market is in a bear state, firms younger than 5 years old at issuance and 1st  
time issuers. Normalized ratios of firm performance are used in panel b to remove any industry 
effects. Non-normalized ratios of firm performance are used in panel c given the data is categorized 
by the firms respective industry classification. Dummy variables also represent the issuing firms SIC  
code. The number in parenthesis are the p-value associated with the variable results. 
              
  Panel A   Panel B   Panel C  
Test Regression #1   Regression #2   Regression #3   
Variable             
Intercept 222.2920   228.8230   264.2110   
  [.000]   [.000]   [.000]   
Coupon Amount             
Coupon Amount 20.4981   20.8949   20.7645   
  [.000]   [.000]   [.000]   
Length of Issue             
Years to Maturity -3.1310   -3.2690   -3.3882   
  [.000]   [.000]   [.000]   
Issue Amount             
Amount of Issue 0.0113   0.0092   0.0099   
  [.753]   [.797]   [.783]   
Callability of the Issuance             
Callable Bond 115.8270   115.6410   111.7910   
  [.000]   [.000]   [.000]   
Use of Proceeds             
Acquisition -2.0516   -1.9918   -2.3462  
  [.932]   [.934]   [.922]  
General Purposes -17.8047   -19.1901   -20.3422  
  [.303]   [.268]   [.241]  
Payment on Loans -17.3032   -21.5464   -19.6211  
  [.653]   [.575]   [.610]  
Refinancing -29.7157   -30.4003   -30.6222  
  [.054]   [.049]   [.047]  
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Table 16  continued             
Standard and Poor's' Rating of the Issue           
BBB -80.7854   -78.8736   -79.9898   
  [.002]   [.003]   [.003]   
BB -19.7182   -17.4874   -21.5578   
  [.005]   [.001]   [.000]   
B 67.8019   68.5074   68.9112   
  [.001]   [.001]   [.001]   
CCC 89.3606   88.5955   90.2116   
  [.004]   [.004]   [.003]   
Exchange where Firms' Equity Trades           
NYSE -49.4152   -47.9466   -40.6485   
  [.000]   [.001]   [.005]   
NASDAQ -31.4580   -34.3891   -30.2886   
  [.046]   [.030]   [.057]   
AMEX -29.6088   -36.9040   -32.1209   
  [.384]   [.279]   [.347]   
OTC 8.4088   3.9029   7.9020   
  [.676]   [.846]   [.697]   
Market Conditions             
Bull Market -129.8820   -127.2530   -129.9440   
  [.000]   [.000]   [.000]   
Age             
Firm Age at Issue 5.8240   4.5815   7.6581   
  [.576]   [.661]   [.471]   
Number of Issuances             
First-time Issuer -9.2806   -8.3141   -6.5847   
  [.380]   [.432]   [.534]   
Ratios of Firm Performance     normalized   unnormalized   
Current     4.0747   3.8102   
      [.087]   [.113]   
Total Asset Turnover      -9.7351   -12.8891   
      [.085]   [.097]   
Basic Earnings Power     -14.7965   -19.6083   
      [.407]   [.278]   
Debt      44.5738   41.8420   
      [.236]   [.271]   
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Table 16  continued             
SIC Code             
1000         -40.7803   
          [.305]   
2000         2.5158   
          [.948]   
3000         -39.9846   
          [.282]   
4000         -18.1220   
          [.626]   
5000         -19.5693   
          [.622]   
7000         -26.5891   
          [.510]   
8000         -62.1878   
          [.127]   
R-squared 0.501014   0.507293   0.516077   
Adjusted 0.487133   0.490604   0.494474   
observations 703   703   703   
Ratios of firm performance are normalized in the second regression and are reflect the actual ratio reported in the firms 
financial statements. The last regression unnormalizes the ratios of firm performance to eliminate industry effects. 
The SIC code of the firm is used in this test to capture any industry effects. 
 
 
equations. Here it is also found the coupon amount, callable issues, and two categories of the rating of 
the issue (BBB and BB) are found to have significance and positively (increase) effect the amount of the 
spread at issuance. The years to maturity, two classifications of the rating of the issue (B and CCC), 
bonds issued for refinancing purposes, and the NYSE and bear markets present a significantly negative 
impact on the spread which lowers its value. The one exception in this regression is firms that trade 
equities in the NASDAQ market are no longer significant at the 95% confidence level.44 A dummy variable 
is used to group each individual firm with firms with similar SIC codes. Firms are identified at the 1000 
SIC code level. 
  
 Equation 13 features the regression equation with the inclusion of a dummy variable to represent 
a firms industry classification by it’s SIC code. The regression results show that firms classified in the 
2000 SIC code have a positive coefficient value, however, it is not significant in determining the spread.  
                                                 
44 The NASDAQ issuing firms are significant at the 94% confidence interval. 
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Firms with an SIC code of 1000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 7000, and 8000 all are found to have a negative 
coefficient value, but again do not reveal significance. Firms classified in the 6000 SIC code (13 
instances) are lost in the regression analysis. These results would suggest that the industry in which the 
firm participates does not have an impact over the spread above the prevailing treasury rate at issuance. 
The industry results also do not support the hypothesis that younger, less established the industry is at 
issuance, the greater the spread will be. The only industry that shown to increase the spread is firms in 
the 2000 SIC code which is comprised on manufacturing firms. However, this test has the strongest 
measure of variation explained in the regression equation with an 2R  value of 51.60% and an adjusted 
2R of 49.44.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
 The intent of this chapter is to explain whether the spread at issuance of a high-yield bond can be 
explained by examining various bond and firm characteristics. Using a database of 703 observations over 
the period 1985-2003, I show that coupon payments, callable bonds and bonds with a rating of B and 
CCC are significant in determining the spread. I also show the length of the issue, bonds with a BBB and 
BB rating, firms whose equity trades in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets, bonds issued for refinancing 
purposes and bull market conditions have a significantly negative impact on the spread which lowers its 
value. Just as important as what impacts the spread is what does not. I find that amount of the issue, 
bonds issued for acquisition, general purposes and payments on borrowings, firms whose equity trades 
on the AMEX or OTC markets, the age of the firm at issuance, and first-time issuers have no significant 
impact over the spread. Furthermore, it is learned that a firms performance, which is measured by testing 
the current, total asset turnover, basic earnings power and their ratio of debt management also have no 
significant impact ever the spread. The final regression equation includes adding a dummy variable to 
identify the firm by the industry in which it participates. The variable also shows no significance in 
determining the spread. While this chapter provides insight into the composure of the spread, with only 
50% of the variance explained by the regression equation, further work in this area must be completed to 
grasp a complete understanding of the pricing decision of a high-yield debt issuance.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DEFINING THE LEVEL OF ABNORMAL RETURN UNDERPERFORMANCE THAT EXISTS FOR 
ISSUERS OF HIGH-YIELD BONDS COMPARED TO ITS BOND ISSUING INVESTMENT GRADE 
COUNTERPARTS AND NON-ISSUING FIRMS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 Choices over capital structure decisions have long intrigued academics, and have been a driving 
force for financial research. Early research looked at defining the use of debt and equity, and determining 
the optimal capital structure. Latter research has branched out to explore the impact of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO’s) and signaling theory, while research in debt issuances has focused on the various 
features within a debt security and how agency costs can be relaxed. Firms issuing bonds for the first 
time (bond IBO’s) will significantly change their capital structure and effectively change the ownership and 
the debt maturity length of the firm. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2000) find that announcements of 
a bond IBO will trigger negative stock returns. These negative stock returns are caused by the changes in 
the debt maturity and ownership structure. Along with changes to debt maturity and ownership are 
changes to the private issued/public issued debt ratio. Changes to the private/public debt use ratio 
include changes to the agency costs, and the additional costs of managing public debt.  
 
Datta et al. (2000) document that firms issuing bond IBO’s are generally small, little known 
companies, with a short history and are subject to a high amount information asymmetries. This will cause 
the firm to experience a higher level of agency costs than firms issuing seasoned bond offerings. A higher 
level of information asymmetry among public debt and equity holders will increase the firm’s contracting 
costs. These higher contacting costs will lead to adverse incentive effects including asset-substitution 
problems and underinvestment. These increased costs are more prevalent in firms with high growth 
opportunities and are a result of anticipated agency differences between bond holders and equity holders. 
Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramanian (1999) find firms with low contracting costs generally have high 
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proportions of debt in their capital structure. They further find that firms with high growth potential are 
better monitored by issuing private placements of debt.  
   
A great deal of research has tried to derive the long term effects of a firm issuing new capital. 
Several models have been developed to capture the impact on a firm’s stock price and whether 
underperformance is present surrounding an issue. Much of the literature focusing on how an issuance of 
debt will effect firm value is based on the previous research that focuses on the impact of equity 
issuances. Along with measuring the true impact of an issuance, several different methodologies have 
been developed to capture an underperformance. Depending on the model selected, the results of the 
various tests show little to no significance surrounding an issue to years of underperformance.   
 
Datta et al. (2000) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) both examine the levels of 
underperformance that surround investment-grade bond IBO’s, and find long-run stock underperformance 
does exist. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) look at the level of underperformance that surrounds 
investment-grade bonds for firms issuing both straight45 and convertible bonds. They also find long-run 
stock underperformance does exist for both types of issuances, and is greater for firms that are young, 
small in size and listed on the NASDAQ exchange. It is along these lines that provides the motivation for 
this chapter. Research has recently documented that long-run underperformance surrounds investment 
grade bond IBO’s.  
 
This chapter will attempt to fill the void in the research and examine the level of 
underperformance that surrounds high-yield bond IBO’s, and whether high-yield bond IBO’s have a 
greater level of underperformance than their investment grade counterparts. Section 2 surveys the 
various academic research that defines underperformance. Section 3 defines the generation of the data 
and the descriptive statistics. Section 4 shows the methodologies used over the dataset while Section 5 
presents the results of the tests performed. The final section or Section 6 is the conclusion. 
 
                                                 
45 Issuances of straight bonds are defined as not being callable nor have a convertible feature. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
 Loughran (1993) and Ritter (1991) both show firms that engage in equity IBO’s will significantly 
underperform the market for a period up to five years after the initial placement of equity compared to 
non-issuing firms. Loughran (1993) compares NASDAQ stock IBO’s to similar sized NASDAQ firms that 
have been listed on the exchange for 5 years or more. He finds the average 5-year holding return is 
17.29% for the IBO firms compared to 76.23% for holding the NASDAQ index over the same period. 
Ritter (1991) uses a sample of 1,526 stocks for the period 1975-84. Using cumulative abnormal returns to 
measure underperformance, he finds IBO’s will underperform matched firms by industry and market value 
by 16.90% over the three year period beginning with the IBO date. Loughran and Ritter (1995) evaluate 
companies that issue either IBO’s or SBO’s between 1970 and 1990. Computing buy-and-hold returns 
and a Three-Factor regression model, they find both significantly underperform non-issuing firms. Using a 
period of 5 years after the issuance, investors of IBO’s only received a 5% return per year over the 
period, while investors in SBO’s received 7% return per year. On average, bond investors would have to 
invest 44% more in issuing firms than non-issuers of the same size to have an equal return at the end of 
5 years.  
 
 Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) use holding period returns between issuing firms and 
benchmark firms to determine the level of underperformance after an SBO. They compute average 
monthly adjusted returns as documented by Fama and French (1992) and determine the cumulative 
average return being the sum of the monthly average return. Cumulative average returns are then 
compared between the equity issuing firm and benchmark firms that do not issue equity over the 3 and 5 
year test periods. The results yielded an underperformance of 14.60% over the immediate 3-year period 
after the SBO to 21.40% underperformance for the immediate 5-year period compared to its benchmark 
firms, matched based on size and market to book value. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) 
evaluate firms that complete share repurchases in the open market between 1980-1990.  They find the 
average buy-and-hold return is a positive 12% per year for a period up to four years after the repurchase. 
Their research shows value firms experience a positive return of 45.30%. 
 94
 Long-run studies such as these can provide evidence as to the information content of equity, and 
can provide a framework to understand the information content of newly issued bonds. Datta et al. (2000) 
use methods first proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997) featuring buy-and-hold returns to determine 
whether stock return underperformance exists surrounding bond IBO’s. Datta et al. (2000) shows 
underperformance surrounds bond IBO’s as much as 33.39% and 55.99% over the 3 and 5 year period 
after the issue. This level of underperformance is greater than the amount of underperformance 
associated with seasoned bond offerings, which Affleck-Graves and Miller (2003) report to be between 
11% and 22% over a five-year period. Consequently, Jewell and Livingston (1997) provide evidence that 
there are no abnormal returns surrounding an issuance of straight bonds. 
 
 Dichev and Piotroski (1999), Spiess and Graves-Affleck (1999) and Lee and Loughran (1998) 
studied the effects of callable bonds, and documented that greater underperformance is observed when 
firms issue callable bonds as opposed to straight bonds. Kish and Livingston (1992) present five theories 
as to why firms issue bonds that are callable. These theories include: agency costs, interest rates, 
managerial flexibility, maturity substitution and taxes. King and Mauer (2000) believe there are three 
distinct reasons why firms will call a bond including: issuing new bonds at a lower interest rate, to release 
the firm from restrictive covenants in existing bank debt, and adjust the capital structure of the firm to the 
industry average. Affleck-Graves and Miller (2003) find abnormal returns exist in the 5 year period after a 
firm calls straight bonds. This can range anywhere from 0.16% to 0.34% per month which equals 11%-
22% over the 5 year period tested.  
 
4.2.1 Bond IBO’s, Callable or Convertible Issues 
 
 There is plenty of academic literature that researches the long-term stock price effects derived 
from events such as equity issuances, mergers and acquisitions, and investment grade bonds. However, 
research into the long-term impact of firms that issue high-yield bonds is scarce at best. Most of the 
research conducted in this area has focused on distress events, or is included in studies that do not 
differentiate between investment and non-investment grade bonds.  
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Datta et al. (2000) examine long-run implications of debt structure changes using U.S. bond 
issuances from 1971 to 1994 through 233 bond IBO’s. They find that issuances of bonds resulted in 
simultaneous and pronounced changes in maturity and ownership structure. Using size and book-to-
market matched control firms as benchmarks as proposed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Barber 
and Lyon (1997), they find firms that bond IBO’s will substantially underperform size and book-to-market 
benchmarked firms. The level of underperformance is 33.39% over a 3-year post issue period, and 
55.99% over a 5-year post-issue period. The results are similar to those of equity offerings, but contrasts 
are observed for seasoned bond offerings. Datta et al. (2000) also find evidence that bond issuances are 
timed to coincide with the market expectations concerning firms' prospects. They find that post-issue 
underperformance will be greater given longer maturity issues and provide direct evidence revealing that 
firms that issue bonds will experience a significant reduction in growth opportunities following the offering. 
The reduction in growth opportunities is one possible explanation for the underperformance of the issuing 
firms. Tests assessing long-run performance by bond issuing firms fail to use a dataset strictly of firms’ 
that issue high-yield bonds.  Bond investors generally require higher compensation for investing in non-
investment grade bonds. Research needs to be conducted to understand the level of stock return 
underperformance for non-investment grade bond issuing firms.   
 
 Convertible bonds allow the holder of the note to convert the debt instrument into stock at a pre-
specified price at the will of the holder. Investors have long believed this is an attractive feature which will 
allow them to convert their bonds into stocks if and when the stock of the company performs better than 
anticipated.  Dichev and Piotroski (1999) evaluate convertible bonds IBO’s and find new issuances will 
underperform the market by as much as 50%-70% in the 5 years following the issue; suggesting that 
convertible bonds are a signal of eroding future profitability. The data presented in this case does not 
distinguish whether it was a firm’s first issue of debt. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) present research 
of a similar nature and find results similar to those of Dichev and Piotroski (1999) but explain the 
underperformance to be more severe for young, small companies that are listed on the NASDAQ 
exchange. In addition, the underperformance is limited to periods where high volumes of debt issuances 
occur. Both papers feature the Barber and Lyon (1997) methodology using matched firms and buy-and-
 96
hold returns to determine whether long-term cumulative abnormal returns exist for convertible bonds. The 
gap to fill in the current research is to determine whether stock return underperformance exists 
surrounding high-yield bond IBO’s with a convertible feature and whether this underperformance is at a 
level similar to their investment grade counterparts. 
 
 Affleck-Graves and Miller (2003) extend the work of Dichev and Piotroski (1999) and Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) by evaluating long-run performance of common stock for firms that exercised a call 
option for both straight and convertible bonds. Instead of using the Fama French (1993) Three-Factor 
regression model to derive their results as Dichev and Piotroski (1999) used, Affleck-Graves and Miller 
(2003) use the buy–and-hold returns methodology for evaluating abnormal returns. Both models provide 
the same general conclusions however the Fama French Three-Factor model provides stronger tests of 
significance. The results reveal firms that call an issue of straight bonds will have an average abnormal 
return of +0.16% per month while firms that exercise their call option over convertible bonds will enjoy a 
+0.34% abnormal return per month, equating to an +11% to +22% abnormal return over a five year 
period.  These results do not support the claim that callable, convertible bonds provide negative signals to 
the investment community. While the evidence provided does not support the claim that callable, 
convertible bonds sends negative signals to the investment community, only a database of investment 
grade bonds was used. Therefore, how the investment community reacts to a high-yield bond IBO’s with 
a callable feature is unknown and presents an opportunity for future research.  
 
4.2.2  Contribution to the Existing Literature 
 
 
I will complete a long-run analysis featuring buy-and-hold return methodology using size and 
book-to-market-matched control firms as benchmarks to high-yield bond IBO issuing firms for the period 
January 1995 to December 1998. Analysis over long-run performance will cover the immediate 5-year 
observation period after the issuance. A second set will be comprised, for comparison purposes, of 
investment grade bond IBO issuers and benchmark firms over the same period. After identifying whether 
long-term underperformance is present among non-investment grade issuers versus its benchmark firms, 
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as well as investment grade issuers versus its benchmark firms, the test results will show what level of 
underperformance is prevalent in both tests. I will also use the Fama French Four-Factor model as a 
method of evaluation over the same period. It will then be determined whether non-investment grade 
issuing firms have abnormal stock returns that underperform in the long run more than their counterpart 
investment grade issuing firms. Underperformance will be measured at the 3 and 5 year intervals 
following the previous research of Datta et al (2000) and Spiess-Affleck-Graves (1999). I expect to find 
firms issuing high-yield debt instruments (bond IBO’s) will exhibit underperformance in their outstanding 
equity, and this level of underperformance will be greater than their investment grade counterparts given 
the additional riskiness of the issuance, their position in the capital structure (generally subordinate), and 
the higher default rates associated with high-yield debt. I hypothesize that firms issuing high-yield bond 
IBOs’ will exhibit stock price underperformance compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms. I also 
hypothesize that firms issuing high-yield bond IBOs’ will exhibit greater stock price underperformance 
than their investment grade bond IBO issuing counterparts. 
 
 Dichev and Piotroski (2001) found new issuances (IBO’s) of investment-grade convertible 
bonds will under-perform in the equity market by as much as 50%-70% in the 5 year period after the 
issue. The gap that exists in the current academic literature is determining if underperformance exists for 
convertible high-yield bond IBO’s, and to what extent. I fill this gap by identifying high-yield bond IBO’s 
with a convertible feature and measure the level of stock price underperformance over the 3 and 5 year 
periods following the issuance. Furthermore, I will complete the same tests over an investment-grade 
dataset for comparison purposes to the high-yield issuances. I expect to find that high-yield issuance will 
have a greater level of underperformance for the same reasons present in the previous paragraph. I 
hypothesize that firms issuing high-yield convertible bond IBOs’ will exhibit stock price underperformance 
compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms. I also hypothesize that firms issuing high-yield 
convertible bond IBOs’ will exhibit greater stock price underperformance than their investment grade 
convertible bond IBO issuing counterparts. 
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Affleck-Graves and Miller (2003) use the buy–and-hold returns methodology for evaluating 
abnormal returns and find firms that call an issue of debt before maturity will have an average abnormal 
return of +0.16% per month, while firms that exercise their call option over convertible bonds will enjoy a 
+0.34% abnormal return per month. Equating to a +11% to +22% abnormal return over a five year period. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find the equity of firms that issue investment-grade callable bond (IBO’s) will 
underperform the market by as much as 55%-75% in the 5 year period prior to the issue.  Current 
academic research has not identified if the equity of the firm will underperform when issuing non-
investment grade callable bond IBO’s. This research will identify bond IBO’s that are issued callable, and 
measure the level of equity underperformance for a period of 5-years after the issuance for both 
investment and non-investment grade bonds. It can be learned whether equity underperformance exists 
for high-yield issues and to what extent the under-performance exists when compared to its investment 
grade counterparts. I expect to find equity underperformance does exist for high-yield issuances, and the 
level of underperformance is greater for these issuances compared to investment grade bonds. I expect 
high-yield bond IBO’s will reveal greater underperformance given the additional riskiness of the issuance, 
their subordinate position in the capital structure, and the higher associated default rates. I hypothesize 
that firms issuing high-yield callable bond IBOs’ will exhibit stock price underperformance compared to 
non-issuing stock and\or bond firms. I also hypothesize that firms issuing high-yield callable bond IBOs’ 
will exhibit greater stock price underperformance than their investment grade callable bond IBO issuing 
counterparts. 
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4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 I start by building a database of U.S. initial public debt offerings differentiating between high-yield 
or investment grade debt, convertible or callable bonds, first-time issuers and the issue date for the period 
1995-1998 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. Other variables of interest extracted from 
the SDC database include: rating of the issue, SIC code, issue and maturity dates, ticker, exchange of the 
issuing firms equity, amount issued, coupon amount, callable status and whether there is a convertible 
feature.  The SDC database is also used to note any rating changes of the debt issuances for the 
immediate 5-year period after the announcement date. The data is then sorted between investment-grade 
issues and non-investment grade issues, noting whether the issue is of straight, callable or convertible. I 
then match the identified firms to gather return information using the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database for the 5-year period following the announcement of an issuance. CRSP is also 
used to identify if any issuances (IPO’s, SEO’s or splits) of equity have been issued over the sample 
period by bond issuing firms. Firms issuing either stocks or bonds during the 5-year period of the bond 
issuance are excluded from the sample. Financial information used for matching the firms over size and 
book-to-market value is then obtained from the Compustat database.   
 
Both the CRSP and the Compustat databases are used in generating the pool of matched firms. 
The pool of matched firm consists of firms that have not issued bonds or equity over the observation 
period. The SDC database shows any bond issuances, while the Compustat database is used to identify 
any equity issuances (IPO’s or SEO’s) over the sample periods and any stock splits that may have 
occurred. Firms issuing bonds or equity over the sample period are then not eligible to be included in the 
matched firm pool. Once all the non-issuers are established, financial information over return, size and 
book-to-market value is then matched with the firm using the Compustat database.   
 
 The investment grade bond data obtained from the SDC database revealed 1382 issuances of 
investment grade bonds over the 1995-1998 observation period. This chapter will test the long-run 
reaction for bond IBO’s, callable bond IBO’s, and convertible bonds IBO’s. Three different databases will 
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have to be constructed using each of the variables as the primary constraint.  Filtering the database for 
bond IBO’s over the sample period and matching them with return information from the Compustat 
database netted 95 observations. Completing this process for callable bonds46 as well as convertible 
bond yielded 165 observations of callable bond IBO’s and 43 convertible bond IBO issuances.   
 
 Similar to the investment grade databases, the non-investment grade issuers are also sorted by 
first-time issuers (bond IBO’s), and whether the issuance is callable or convertible. The initial extraction of 
data from the SDC database netted 1986 observations over the 1995-1998 period. Identifying first-time 
issuers with complete financial information resulted in 196 observations. Callable IBO and convertible IBO 
issues of high-yield bonds with complete financial information yield 216 callable bonds and 59 convertible 
bonds.  
 
 Table 17 provides the descriptive statistics for the database. Panel A of Table 17 shows there are 
95 bond IBO’s of investment grade with an average coupon amount of 6.98% and an average issuance 
amount of $173.14, and 196 bonds of non-investment grade in the sample with an average coupon 
amount of 8.66% and an average issue amount of $203.58 million. The investment grade set is 
comprised of 3 AAA bonds with an average coupon amount of 6.53% and an average issuance amount of 
$200 million, 17 AA bonds with an average coupon amount of 6.46% and an average issuance amount of 
$238.71 million, and 75 A bonds with a 7.14% average coupon amount and an $157.2 million average 
issuance amount.  The non-investment grade bonds are represented with 27 BBB bonds having an 
average coupon of 6.59% and an average issue amount of $256.86, 51 BB bonds with an average 
coupon amount of 8.69% and an average issuance amount of $230.81 million, 106 B-rated bonds with an 
average coupon amount of 9.20% and a $180.35 million average issuance, and 12 CCC-rated with a 
8.07% average coupon amount and a $173.22 million average issuance amount. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 A bond issuance can be represented in the bond IBO category as well as being callable or convertible. 
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Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics  
                
This table shows the number of issuance in each bond classification as well as the average coupon and issue 
amounts. Panel A show the descriptive statistics for straight Bond IBO's for the 1995-1998 period. Panel B  
shows the descriptive statistics for callable bond IBO's while Panel C list the descriptive statistics for bond IBO's  
issued that are convertible. One side of the table shows the aggregate amounts of the issuances while the  
other side divides the data into bond ratings. 
                
Panel A - Straight Bonds IBO's           
Investment Grade 
Total  Average  Average    Bond   Average  Average 
Number Coupon Issue Amount   Rating Number Coupon Issue Amount 
    (millions)       (percentage) (millions) 
95 6.985% $173.14   AAA 3 6.533% $200.00 
        AA  17 6.467% $238.71 
        A 75 7.148% $157.20 
Non-Investment Grade             
Total  Average  Average   Bond   Average  Average 
Number Coupon Issue Amount   Rating Number Coupon Issue Amount 
    (millions)       (percentage) (millions) 
196 8.644% $203.58   BBB 27 6.594% $256.86 
        BB  51 8.691% $230.81 
        B 106 9.209% $180.35 
        CCC 12 8.073% $173.22 
Panel B - Callable Bonds              
Investment Grade 
Total  Average  Average   Bond   Average  Average 
Number Coupon Issue Amount   Rating Number Coupon Issue Amount 
    (millions)       (percentage) (millions) 
165 6.702% $221.02   AAA 4 6.586% $450.00 
        AA  31 6.454% $228.67 
        A 130 6.765% $212.15 
Non-Investment Grade             
Total  Average  Average   Bond   Average  Average 
Number Coupon Issue Amount   Rating Number Coupon Issue Amount 
    (millions)       (percentage) (millions) 
216 7.137% $225.83   BBB 173 7.080% $214.65 
        BB  40 7.456% $307.75 
        B 3 8.042% $150.00 
        CCC 0 0.000% $0.00 
Panel C - Convertible              
Investment Grade 
Total  Average  Average   Bond   Average  Average 
Number Coupon Issue Amount   Rating Number Coupon Issue Amount 
    (millions)       (percentage) (millions) 
43 6.155% $339.75   AAA 12 6.397% $284.73 
        AA  1 3.250% $1,000.00 
        A 0 0.000% $0.00 
Non-Investment Grade             
Total  Average  Average   Bond   Average  Average 
Number Coupon Issue Amount   Rating Number Coupon Issue Amount 
    (millions)       (percentage) (millions) 
59 5.783% $215.66   BBB 18 5.279% $314.50 
        BB  8 5.500% $236.31 
        B 27 6.111% $143.00 
        CCC 6 5.833% $231.27 
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Panel B of Table 17 shows there are 165 callable bond IBO’s of investment grade with an 
average coupon amount of 6.70% and an average issuance amount of $221.02, and 216 bond IBO’s of 
non-investment grade in the sample with an average coupon amount of 7.13% and an average issue 
amount of $225.83 million. This investment grade set is comprised of 4 AAA bonds with an average 
coupon amount of 6.58% and an average issuance amount of $450 million, 31 AA bonds with an average 
coupon amount of 6.45% and an average issuance amount of $228.67 million, and 130 A bonds with a 
6.76% average coupon amount and an $212.15 million average issuance amount.  The non-investment 
grade bonds are represented by 173 BBB bonds having an average coupon of 7.08% and an average 
issue amount of $214.65, 40 BB bonds with an average coupon amount of 7.45% and an average 
issuance amount of $307.75 million, 3 B-rated bonds with an average coupon amount of 8.04% and a 
$150 million average issuance. No CCC bonds are used that are callable due to incomplete information. 
 
Panel C of Table 17 reveals 43 convertible bond IBO’s of investment grade with an average 
coupon amount of 6.15% and an average issuance amount of $339.75, and 59 bond IBO’s of non-
investment grade in the sample with an average coupon amount of 5.78% and an average issue amount 
of $215.66 million. This investment grade set is comprised of 12 AAA bonds with an average coupon 
amount of 6.39% and an average issuance amount of $28.73 million, 1 AA bond with a coupon amount of 
3.25% and an issue amount of $1 billion. No A-rated bonds were found to be of complete information.  
The non-investment grade bonds are represented with 18 BBB bonds having an average coupon of 
5.27% and an average issue amount of $314.50, 8 BB bonds with an average coupon amount of 5.50% 
and an average issuance amount of $236.31 million, 27 B-rated bonds with an average coupon amount of 
6.11% and a $143 million average issuance and 6 CCC-rated with a 5.83% average coupon amount and 
a $231.27 million average issuance amount. 
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4.4 Methodology 
 
The intention for this line of research is to identify firms that issue high-yield bonds for the period 
1995-1998 and whether the firms’ equity will underperform compared to firms that issue investment grade 
bonds and non-issuers of stocks or bonds. Firms issuing a high-yield bond are matched by size and 
book-to-market value to firms that do not issue stocks or bonds over the 5-year period after the event 
date. An issuance of a high-yield bond is identified by having a credit rating of BBB or below when issued 
and maintain non-investment grade status over the observation period. Similarly, firms issuing investment 
grade bonds will also be matched by size and book-to-market value to firms that do not issue stocks or 
bonds over the 5-year period after the event date. An issuance of an investment grade bond is identified 
by having a credit rating of A or above at issuance, and maintaining investment grade status over the 
observation period. Long-run stock performance after an issuance of high-yield debt will be evaluated in 
the following three bond classifications: straight bonds, convertible bonds and callable bonds. The dataset 
of investment grade issuing firms will also be sorted by the same three classifications.  
 
All publicly traded firms listed on CRSP which do not issue stocks or bonds during the 5-year post 
issue period will be used to create a pool of matched firms47. Issuing firms can be eligible to be included 
in the pool of matched firms if continuing to operate over the complete 5 year period after the issuance of 
the event firm. Firms will be ranked at each month-end by market capitalization (size)48 and book-to-
market ratio49. The book-to-market ratio for the issuing firm will be computed the month preceding the 
calendar month of the public debt announcement while the market capitalization will be of the month prior 
to the announcement date. 
 
Following Datta et al (2000), I will match the sample firm with a control firm using the pool of firms 
when the sum of the absolute percentage difference between the size and book-to-market ratio of the  
                                                 
47 Firms will be matched with firms of the same exchange where its equity is traded. 
48 the market capitalization is calculated by share price times number of shares outstanding 
49 The BM ratio is calculated by dividing the book equity value by the market capitalization 
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sample firm and the matched firm is minimized. I will attempt to follow Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) 
where the pool of potential matching firms is constrained. The sample is constrained to matched firms 
that are no more than 10% smaller than their sample firms. In cases where no match firms are available 
in the same industry, the sample firms will be matched using only size and exchange. 
 
4.4.1 Models of Long-Run Return 
 
In order to properly measure a return, it is crucial to understand what a return is. Academic 
research has developed several methods in an effort to define a return. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969) first used event study methodology to show how the market reacts to company events over short 
periods. Whether using a market model (standard or adjusted) or the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
in identifying an abnormal return, all these models provide relatively the same results. Consequently, 
applying event study methodology to long-run returns does not provide accurate results.  
 
Long-run return methodologies have developed into two different approaches in academic 
literature. These can be classified as the time-series approach and the cross-sectional approach. The two 
most common models of time-series used feature the market model or the CAPM model. These models 
all are based on the premise that the sample parameters are estimated using a non-sample period, 
making this the time-series approach. A three-factor regression model pioneered by Fama and French 
(1993) takes a cross-sectional approach and uses reference portfolios through matching, to define an 
expected return. The underlying assumption of this model is the matched portfolios have like 
characteristics of the firms of the reference portfolios, but do not experience an event like the firms in the 
reference portfolios.  
 
 Barber and Lyon (1997) provide evidence that previous research measuring abnormal returns 
through reference and matched portfolios are flawed using the market index model. They show prior 
research is mis-specified and experiences rebalancing and skewness bias as well as new listing bias 
when using the reference portfolio as a benchmark. These biases can lead to unsubstantiated rejecting of 
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the hypothesis tested. Barber and Lyon (1997) show that to adequately correct for the biasness, research 
should be conducted by using a control firm approach. The control firm approach pairs event firms with 
non-event firms based on size and their book-to-market ratio. Fama (1998) concludes that various criteria 
such as size and book-to-market ratios can produce different returns based on the criterion selected. 
Additionally, he shows building portfolios based on size and book-to-market value may not properly 
equate the average return since it may not accurately predict cross-firm variation.  
 
In the short run, calculating an abnormal return is finding the difference between the actual and 
the expected return. Calculating long-run returns in this manner would introduce biasness into the 
sample. To correct for this biasness, two methods have been identified: the cumulative approach and 
using buy-and-hold returns. The cumulative approach is done by adding together the abnormal returns for 
each month of the sample period. Calculating the average of the observed monthly abnormal returns is 
another way the cumulative approach can be done. The buy-and-hold return approach simply compounds 
an abnormal return monthly for each month of the sample period. 
 
4.4.2 Buy-and-hold Returns Model 
 
Barber and Lyon (1997) showed how the cumulative approach and the buy-and-hold approach 
tackle different problems. Their example compares using a 12-month cumulative return with an annual 
buy-and-hold return. By dividing a 12-month cumulative return by 12 provides an average monthly return. 
Testing a null hypothesis where the 12-month cumulative return is equal to zero would be the same as 
testing the null of the mean of the monthly abnormal return would also have to be equal to zero. Finding 
an annual mean abnormal return equal to zero is not testing the null hypothesis. Effective tests of the null 
would be to use a buy-and-hold return methodology.  Fama (1998) came out in favor of the cumulative 
approach over the buy-and-hold return approach. He suggests most asset pricing models have normally 
distributed returns. Normality will be a better estimator for short horizons compared to longer horizons. He 
also states that most tests using asset pricing models traditionally use monthly returns, not yearly or even 
3-5 year returns.  
 106
Buy-and-hold returns are used to measure the abnormal stock returns associated with issuances 
of high-yield bonds. Barber and Lyon (1997) show buy-and-hold returns are calculated by subtracting the 
return of the match firm from the return of the event firm during the same observation period: 
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where day t =1 is the first trading day following the offer, itR  is the return on stock i on day t, and, T is the 5-year anniversary date 
of the offer, or the offering firm’s CRSP delisting date, whichever is earlier. 
 
Most academic research dealing with returns is focused on the return of the event firm. Two 
approaches are commonplace to find the average performance in the sample; equally-weighted returns, 
and value weighted returns. Fama (1998) believes value weighted returns are the better predictor of 
average returns for small stocks since all asset pricing models show systematic problems and better 
reflect total wealth of the investor. Loughran and Ritter (2000) believe value weighted returns 
underestimate an abnormal return when the event is triggered by a management decision. They show 
this using both simulation and security analysis, and find returns should be equally weighted.  
 
4.4.3  Fama French Regression Model 
 
A second method used to determine long-run return is using a time-series regression model. This 
method uses the event firm and regresses post event excess returns for the event month with a series of 
risk factors. The Fama French Three-Factor model is the most commonly used and regresses the post-
event abnormal return with a market, size, and book-to-market factors. The intercept of the regression 
represents the average abnormal return over the post-event time period. Negative intercepts imply that 
the event firm has underperformed the market. The market factor is derived by taking the return over the 
value weighted market index, less the risk free rate. The one-month T-bill rate is generally used to 
represent the risk free rate. The size variable is calculated by subtracting the value of the smaller stocks 
weighted portfolio, minus the return of the bigger stocks value weighted portfolio. The book-to-market 
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variable is computed taking the return of the value-weighted portfolio for higher book-to-market stocks 
and subtracting the return of the value-weighted portfolio for lower book-to-market stocks50. Brav, Geczy 
and Gompers (2000) suggest adding a fourth factor to the model in instances when prior changes to 
underlying stock price have taken place. A momentum factor is added to capture significant price 
changes and is derived by taking the average return on two lower prior-return portfolios, and subtracting 
them from the average return on two high prior-return portfolios. The equation for representing the Four-
Factor model is:   
 
(15) 
 
 
where ptR  is the return on the portfolio interest in month t; )( ftmt rr −  is the market premium factor, constructed by subtracting 
the Treasury bill (T-bill) return from the return on a value-weighted index; SMB is a size factor constructed by subtracting the return 
on the portfolio of large capitalization stocks; HML is a book-to-market factor and UMD is a momentum factor computed by the 
average return on two high-prior-return portfolios minus the average return on two low-prior-return portfolios. 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Model Selection 
 
Lyon et al. (1999) support the use of benchmark portfolios free of new listings and rebalancing 
biasness when calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns over biasness reference portfolios. However, 
they also show mis-specified test statistics can arise when testing non-random samples or samples where 
all observations have the same event taking place. The misspecification is related to the inability of the 
size and book-to-market ratios capturing all the misspecification of the CAPM.  Lyon, et al. (1999) 
recommend adding other variables such as long-run return performance into the long-run tests and 
comparing sample (event) firms to benchmark (non-event) firms to develop performance benchmarks.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 The factors are available for download at Kenneth French’s website; 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
pttftmtftpt eUMDbHMLbSMBbrrbarR ++++−+=− )()()()( 4321
 108
They suggest using holding period returns where: 
 
∏
=
−+=
b
at
itbai RHPR 1))1(),,(                                                           (16)  
where the ),,( baiHPR  is the holding period for company i during the period a to b; itR  is the daily return on the common share of 
company i in day t 
 
 
The excess return for an individual stock is calculated by subtracting the return of the matching firm from 
the event-firm. This excess return is represented by: 
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where ),,( baiER  equals the return for firm i from the time period a to b; itR  is the daily return on the common share of company i 
in day t; mtR  is the return on the common share of the matching firm in day t 
 
 
The same holding periods will be used to calculate the buy-and-hold returns of sample firms and their 
corresponding benchmarks. In cases where a firm delisting takes place before the end of the 5-year 
period, the CRSP value-weighted returns will be inserted into the calculation of the buy-and-hold return by 
the removal date. Lyon et al. (1999) show that replacing a delisted firm with the CRSP value-weighted 
index does not create a significant change in the buy-and hold return for the benchmark firm. The 
average holding period return would be calculated as:  
 
∑
=
=
N
i
iERHPAR
1
/1                                                                     (18) 
where the HPAR is the average holding period return with N being the number of firms 
 
Although buy-and-hold returns can provide mis-specified results due to new listing, skewness and re-
listing biasness, they show a conventional t-statistic is accurate to measure statistical significance of the 
average returns when using matching firms over reference portfolios. T-statistics are calculated using the 
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cross-sectional standard deviation over the abnormal return for the relevant period. I will use this holding 
period approach to determine whether stock return underperformance of the issuing firms’ equity is 
present over straight, callable and convertible bond IBO’s of both investment and non-investment grade.  
 
Fama (1998) argues that holding period returns do not take into consideration any cross-sectional 
dependence for the event firms’ abnormal returns.  This overlap in calendar time tends to overstate the 
test statistics. In addition, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) state that holding period return methods are likely 
to result in overstated statistics. To control for this, I will also use the Fama French model using portfolio 
methods. In each calendar month a portfolio is made during the prior period ),( ji cc  where c represents 
the calendar month and i and j represent the integers that range from month 1 to 60. For example, if i = 
36 and j =25, we are analyzing the abnormal return in the post announcement period years 2 and 3. Tests 
of significance over the abnormal return will feature the Fama French four-factor model. The Four-Factor 
model regresses the post event monthly excess returns for the firm on a market factor and a book-to-
market factor: 
 
(19)  
where ptR  is the return on the portfolio interest in month t; )( ftmt rr −  is the market premium factor, constructed by subtracting 
the Treasury bill (T-bill) return from the return on a value-weighted index; SMB is a size factor constructed by subtracting the return 
on the portfolio of large capitalization stocks; HML is a book-to-market factor and UMD is a momentum factor computed by the 
average return on two high-prior-return portfolios minus the average return on two low-prior-return portfolios. 
 
The value of the intercept using this methodology represents the mean cumulative monthly abnormal 
return for the event portfolio over the observation period. Negative intercepts imply the event firm has 
underperformed in the equity markets compared to their benchmark firms. Positive intercepts implies the 
event firm has overperformed in the equity markets compared to their benchmark firms. The regression 
equation will be estimated using ordinary least-squares and weighted least-squares.  Affleck-Graves and 
Miller (2003) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) use weighted least-squares to weight each month by the 
number of firms that had an issuance of bonds over the observation period given, this is due to each 
month having a different number of observations.  This has the same effect as equally weighting each 
firm in the regression equation. 
pttftmtftpt eUMDbHMLbSMBbrrbarR ++++−+=− )()()()( 4321
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4.5 Testing and Results 
  
 The first series of tests feature the buy-and-hold returns methodology as suggested by Lyon et al. 
(1999) to determine whether stock return underperformance exists and to what extent. The second series 
of tests use the Fama French Four-Factor regression model using both ordinary and weighted least-
squares techniques. The weighted least-squares technique is used to account for the different number of 
observations in the database each month. Over the 3-year bond IBO observation window and the 
subsequent 5-year performance of the issuing firms’ equity period, the number of observations changes 
as new bonds are being issued each month over the first three years. The same thing will happen in the 
last three years of the equity performance window as each bond will reach the end of the 5-year testing 
period and will no longer be evaluated.   
  
4.5.1 Buy-and-Hold Return Results 
 
 Table 18 reports the holding period returns for the subsequent 3 and 5-year periods after a bond 
IBO during the period 1995-1998. Panel A of Table 18 shows both bond IBO’s of investment grade and 
non-investment grade experience a significant level of stock return underperformance. It is found that 
bond IBO’s of investment grade will underperform their matching firm counterparts by 32.69%. The level 
of underperformance is increased to 54.32% over a 5-year period. Both of these results reveal 
significance at the 99% confidence level with t-statistics of -7.36 and -8.93 respectively. These results are 
similar to those of Lyon et al. (1999). High-yield bond IBO’s also exhibited a significant level of 
underperformance (t-statistics of -7.23 and -7.93) at the 99% confidence level. Bonds evaluated for 3-
years after issuance underperform their match firms by 38.86%. This number increases to 61.38% over 
the immediate 5-year period after issuance. These results suggest that high-yield bond IBO’s have a 
greater level of stock return underperformance than their investment grade counterparts in both the initial 
3 and 5 year periods after the issuance.  
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Table 18: Long-Run Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
              
The  table  shows  the  average  long-term  (buy-and-hold)  abnormal   stock  returns  for  holding  periods  that extend  
from 3 and 5 years following the announcement a debt issuance. The abnormal return calculated is shown in equation 
 #4. Matching firms are selected using the following matching criteria: size - which is measured by the market value of  
the event firm as of one month before the announcement date and obtained from the CRSP database; and the ratio  
of book to market value – this is measured as of the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date using the  
COMPUSTAT database. The matching firms did not issue debt or equity including stock splits during the period five  
years after the event firm announcement date. ***, **, and * denote significance  at the 1,  5 and  10  percent levels. 
                
Panel A: Straight Bond IBO             
                
Type of         Buy and Hold Return 
Issuer     Statistic   3-years   5 years 
                
Investment Grade Bond IBO Issuer Abnormal Return -32.69%   -54.32% 
      t-statistic   -7.36***   -8.93*** 
                
High-Yield Bond IBO Issuer Abnormal Return -38.86%   -61.38% 
      t-statistic   -7.23***   -7.93*** 
                
Panel B: Callable Bonds IBO             
                
Type of Number of        Buy and Hold Return 
Issuer Observations Statistic   3-years   5 years 
                
Investment Grade Bond Issuer Abnormal Return -37.23%   -55.47% 
      t-statistic   -4.91***   -5.88*** 
                
High-Yield Bond Issuer   Abnormal Return -41.28%   -63.32% 
      t-statistic   -3.57***   -4.28*** 
                
Panel C: Convertible Bond IBO             
                
Type of Number of        Buy and Hold Return 
Issuer Observations Statistic   3-years   5 years 
                
Investment Grade Bond Issuer Abnormal Return -27.56%   -47.81% 
      t-statistic   -3.89***   -6.02*** 
                
High-Yield Bond Issuer   Abnormal Return -33.87%   53.21% 
      t-statistic   -3.39***   -4.02*** 
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 Panel B of Table 18 shows the test results for callable bond IBO’s of both investment and non-
investment grade. Callable bonds allow the firm to retire bonds before the maturity date. This allows the 
firm to take advantage of lowering interest rates, and issue bonds of a lower rate and retire bonds of a 
higher rate. It is found that investment grade callable bond IBO’s underperform their match firm 
counterparts by 37.23% in the immediate 3 years after the issue and 55.47% over the 5 year post issue 
period. This level of stock return underperformance is generally the same level as Dichev and Piotroski 
(1999) find. Similar to straight bond IBO’s, high-yield callable bond IBO’s show a greater level of 
underperformance than their investment grade counterparts. High-yield callable bond IBO’s underperform 
their matched firms by 41.28% in the 3-year post-issue period. This level of underperformance is 
increased to 63.32% in the 5-year post period. Both the investment and non-investment grade callable 
bond IBO’s are found to be of significance at the 99% confidence level.  
 
The last panel in presented in Table 2 (Panel C) features the buy-and-hold return results for firms 
issuing bond IBO’s with a convertible feature. Investment-grade convertible bonds reveal the lowest level 
of underperformance compared to their matched counterparts. Stock return underperformance of 27.56% 
and 47.81% are observed over the 3 and 5-year post issue periods. These results are similar to what 
previous academic literature has found. High-yield convertible bonds also underperform the match 
sample firms by 33.87% in the 3-year post issue period and 53.21% in the 5-year post issue period. All 
convertible bond results are significant at the 99% confidence level using a two-tailed test (t-statistics). 
Just as with straight bond and callable bond IBO’s, high-yield bonds underperform at a greater level than 
their investment-grade counterparts. Investment grade bonds with a call feature are shown to 
underperform less than straight bonds and callable bonds. Callable bond IBO’s exhibit the greatest level 
of underperformance. Non-investment grade bonds show the same relationship with convertible bonds 
having the lowest level of underperformance followed by straight bonds and callable bonds.  
 
 
 
 
 113
4.5.2 Fama French Four-Factor Model Returns 
 
Fama (1998) argues using criterion such as size and book-to-market ratios can produce different 
returns based on the criteria selected. He also believes building portfolios based on size and book-to-
market value may not properly equate the average return since it may not accurately assess cross-firm 
variation. Fama (1998) believes a calendar-time cumulative regression approach will accurately 
determine long-run abnormal returns better than the buy-and-hold method. The chapter continues using 
the same bond IBO characteristics and issuances used in the buy-and-hold return section now using the 
Fama French Four-Factor Model as the method of evaluation. I will use both an ordinary least-squares 
technique and a weighted least-squares technique. Affleck-Grave and Miller (2003) and Loughran and 
Ritter (2000) both use weighted least-squares to weight each month by the number of firms that had an 
issuance of bonds over the observation period given. Each month in the dataset has a different number of 
observations due to bond IBO’s occurring randomly. Weighted least-squares has the same effect as 
equally weighting each firm in the regression equation. Fama (1998) shows the intercept of the regression 
represents the average abnormal return over the post-event time period. This is represented by the 
character α (alpha) in the regression results. Emphasis will be placed on weighted least squares results 
due to the varying number of IBO’s in each month. 
 
Table 19 shows the various tests of significance over the dataset for the 3-year post offering 
period. The table shows the value of the coefficients for each of the four factors, and the intercept of the 
equation evaluating investment and non-investment grade straight bond IBO’s. Panel A of Table 19 
shows the level of stock return underperformance for investment grade issuers is 0.88% per month. Over 
a 3-year period this compounds to 31.68%.51 Non-investment grade bonds issuers underperform a bit 
more than their investment grade counterparts at 0.93% per month or 33.48% over the 3-year period. 
Panel A of Table 20 lists the results for investment and non-investment grade issuers over 5-year window 
after issuance. Investment grade bonds exhibit 0.85% underperformance per month or 51.00% over the 
5-year period. The non-investment grade results show a 0.97 underperformance per month or 58.20%  
                                                 
51 This is calculated by multiplying the level of underperformance times 36 months. 
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Table 19: Fama-French Four-Factor Regression Estimates - 3 Year Returns 
  
Table 3 shows the post-announcement average monthly abnormal stock returns for event firms. These are estimated  
using the Fama-French calendar time portfolio regressions. Fama (1998) argues this method will overcome any  
statistical problems using long-term buy-and-hold returns. This is represented by equation below.  
 
   
The four independent variables are estimated in each month. The market variable is the  return on a value-weighted  
market index minus the risk free rate. The size variable is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks minus  
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of big stocks. The book to market variable is the return on a value-weighted  
portfolio of  high  book-to-market  stocks  less  the  return  on  a  value-weighted  portfolio  of  low  book-to-market   
stocks. The UMD is a momentum factor computed by the average return on two high-prior-return portfolios minus the  
average return on two low-prior-return portfolios. The intercept is then interpreted as the average monthly abnormal  
return of the event portfolio across the 36 month observation period. Both ordinary least squares and  
weighted least squares will be used to evaluate the four-factor regression equation. The weights used in the WLS  
are equal to the of event firms in the monthly portfolio. The statistical significance for each monthly average stock  
return is tested using a parametric t-test using the White (1980) method. Each ***, **, and * denote significance at the  
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.  
                  
Panel A: Estimates of the Coefficients - Straight Bond IBO's       
               r-sq 
Intercept   α b1 b2 b3 b4 adj r-sq 
Investment Grade IBO's             
Weighted Least Squares   -0.88 0.14 -22.48 -4.56 0.07 0.8235 
t-statistic     -3.55*** 9.33*** -7.34*** -1.45* 2.05** 0.7992 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.79 0.22 -15.49 -5.32 1.92 0.7823 
t-statistic     -2.19** 8.74*** -11.02*** -2.01** 4.85*** 0.7682 
                  
Non-Investment Grade IBO's             
Weighted Least Squares   -0.93 0.17 -23.65 -4.64 1.93 0.7620 
t-statistic     -2.68*** 9.01*** -10.92*** -1.93*** 6.02*** 0.7327 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.86 0.24 -19.45 -7.01 0.92 0.7402 
t-statistic     -3.10*** 7.83*** -9.82*** -1.59* 5.21*** 0.7221 
                  
Panel B: Estimates of the Coefficients - Callable Bond IBO's       
               r-sq 
Intercept   α b1 b2 b3 b4 adj r-sq 
Investment Grade Callable Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.94 -0.14 -19.35 4.93 0.07 0.7540 
t-statistic     -3.72*** -10.71*** -11.91*** 2.29** 5.35*** 0.7321 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.88 -0.23 -18.05 5.76 1.97 0.8168 
t-statistic     -2.02** -9.52*** -15.31*** 2.38*** 5.76*** 0.7941 
                 
Non-Investment Grade Callable Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -1.00 -0.17 -29.09 5.02 1.98 0.7889 
t-statistic     -4.21*** -8.31*** -8.71*** 1.29* 2.84*** 0.7624 
                 
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.92 -0.25 -23.92 7.59 0.94 0.7692 
t-statistic     -3.37*** -10.88*** -8.73*** 2.21** 5.67*** 0.7482 
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Table 19 - continued               
Panel C: Estimates of the Coefficients - Convertible Bond IBO's       
               r-sq 
Intercept   α b1 b2 b3 b4 adj r-sq 
Investment Grade Convertible Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.59 0.14 -14.23 -4.10 0.06 0.8423 
t-statistic     -3.87*** 10.46*** -11.11*** -2.24** 5.57*** 0.8174 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.52 0.21 -11.95 -5.16 1.98 0.8001 
t-statistic     -2.37*** 9.90*** -14.97*** -2.23** 6.74*** 0.7856 
                  
Non-Investment Grade Convertible Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.73 0.17 -24.20 -4.78 1.98 0.7818 
t-statistic     -3.93*** 9.72*** -9.06*** -1.51* 2.66*** 0.7618 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.64 0.25 -18.87 -7.17 0.89 0.7595 
t-statistic     -3.30*** 10.15*** -10.22*** -2.29** 5.54*** 0.7408 
 
 
Over the 5-year period after issuance. These results are significant at the 99% confidence interval. In 
both the 3 and 5-year post issuance windows the level of underperformance is greater for the non-
investment grade bond issuing firms than their investment grade counterparts. The results also suggest 
while the level of underperformance is lessening for investment grade issuers (0.88% at 3-years and 
0.85% at 5-years), the level of underperformance is extending for the non-investment grade issuers 
(0.85% at 3-years and 0.97% at 5 years).  
 
The next series of results looks at bond issues that are callable. Panel B of Table 19 lists the 
results of callable bond IBO’s for both investment and non-investment grade bond issuers. Over the 3-
year post issuance window, the stock of investment grade issuers underperforms the matching firms by 
0.94% per month or 33.84%. The level of stock underperformance is slightly higher for the non-
investment grade issuers at 1.00% per month or 36.00% over the period. Over the 5-year period, the 
investment grade firms have a slightly lower level on a monthly basis than they had in the 3 year window. 
Panel B of Table 20 shows the level of underperformance to be 0.87% per month or 52.20% overall. The 
non-investment grade issuers also have a decreased level of underperformance on a monthly basis in the  
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Table 20: Fama-French Four-Factor Regression Estimates - 5 Year Returns 
  
Table 4 shows the post-announcement average monthly abnormal stock returns for event firms. These are estimated  
using the Fama-French calendar time portfolio regressions. Fama (1998) argues this method will overcome any  
statistical problems using long-term buy-and-hold returns. This is represented by equation below.  
 
   
The four independent variables are estimated in each month. The market variable is the  return on a value-weighted  
market index minus the risk free rate. The size variable is the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks minus  
the return on a value-weighted portfolio of big stocks. The book to market variable is the return on a value-weighted  
portfolio of  high  book-to-market  stocks  less  the  return  on  a  value-weighted  portfolio  of  low  book-to-market   
stocks. The UMD is a momentum factor computed by the average return on two high-prior-return portfolios minus the  
average return on two low-prior-return portfolios. The intercept is then interpreted as the average monthly abnormal  
return of the event portfolio across the  60 month observation period. Both ordinary least squares and  
weighted least squares will be used to evaluate the four-factor regression equation. The weights used in the WLS  
are equal to the of event firms in the monthly portfolio. The statistical significance for each monthly average stock  
return is tested using a parametric t-test using the White (1980) method. Each ***, **, and * denote significance at the  
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.  
                  
Panel A: Estimates of the Coefficients - Straight Bond IBO's       
               r-sq 
Intercept   α b1 b2 b3 b4 adj r-sq 
Investment Grade IBO's             
Weighted Least Squares   -0.85 0.12 -13.61 -4.70 0.06 0.7522 
t-statistic     -3.23*** 7.93*** -6.53*** -1.34* 1.82** 0.7403 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.70 0.20 -11.17 -4.79 1.79 0.7846 
t-statistic     -2.19** 8.47*** -10.02*** -3.62*** 4.51*** 0.7715 
                  
Non-Investment Grade 
IBO's             
Weighted Least Squares   -0.98 0.16 -22.94 -4.22 1.64 0.7587 
t-statistic     -2.41*** 8.19*** -10.15*** -1.87** 5.47*** 0.7414 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.93 0.21 -18.87 -6.38 0.78 0.7884 
t-statistic     -2.88*** 7.59*** -8.93*** -1.35* 4.84*** 0.7736 
                  
Panel B: Estimates of the Coefficients - Callable Bond IBO's       
               r-sq 
Intercept   α b1 b2 b3 b4 adj r-sq 
Investment Grade Callable Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.87 -0.13 -16.89 4.59 0.06 0.7780 
t-statistic     -3.46*** -9.09*** -10.83*** 2.22** 4.76*** 0.7616 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.83 -0.20 -14.19 5.24 1.91 0.6746 
t-statistic     -2.25** -8.47*** -13.78*** 2.02** 5.24*** 0.7263 
                  
Non-Investment Grade Callable Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.97 -0.16 -28.22 4.57 1.68 0.7610 
t-statistic     -3.79*** -8.05*** -7.93*** 1.29* 2.65*** 0.7482 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.80 -0.22 -20.33 7.36 0.81 0.7937 
t-statistic     -3.07*** -9.25*** -8.12*** 1.98** 5.50*** 0.7785 
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Table 19 - continued               
Panel C: Estimates of the Coefficients - Convertible Bond IBO's       
               r-sq 
Intercept   α b1 b2 b3 b4 adj r-sq 
Investment Grade Convertible Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.67 0.36 -16.51 -8.72 3.36 0.7844 
t-statistic     -2.45*** 10.01*** -14.56*** -2.25** 6.56*** 0.7674 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.71 0.24 -11.36 -4.25 0.11 0.7505 
t-statistic     -6.54*** 10.17*** -11.22*** -2.26** 5.41*** 0.7283 
                  
Non-Investment Grade Convertible Bonds           
Weighted Least Squares   -0.74 0.30 -24.47 -4.95 3.34 0.7905 
t-statistic     -4.07*** 9.82*** -8.81*** -2.56*** 2.68*** 0.7778 
                  
Ordinary Least Squares   -0.81 0.25 -19.52 -7.25 0.87 0.7593 
t-statistic     -3.41*** 10.26*** -9.95*** -3.90*** 5.60*** 0.7591 
 
 
5-year window than in the 3-year window. The level of underperformance decreases to 0.97% or 58.20% 
for the 5-year period. It is of note that the level of stock return underperformance is lessening for both 
Investment-grade issuers in the 3-year to 5-year window and the non-investment grade issuers.  Similar 
to the straight bond IBO issuers, the non-investment grade bond issuers experience a higher level of 
underperformance when issuing non-investment grade bonds than investment grade bonds issuers. All 
period results are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
  
The last set of results in Tables 19 and 20 list the results of convertible bond IBO issuers.  
The intercept estimate of abnormal return for investment grade convertible bond IBO issuers is 0.59% per 
month or 21.24% over the 3–year period as shown in Panel C of Table 19. Panel C of Table 20 shows the 
5-year level of stock return underperformance is slightly higher at 0.73% per month or 43.80% overall. 
Similar to the previous tests in this section, issuers of non-investment grade convertible IBO’s experience 
a greater level of underperformance than their investment grade counterparts in both post issue periods. 
The average monthly abnormal return is 0.67% or 24.12% in the 3-year post issuance period as shown in 
Panel C of Table 19. The monthly number increases to 0.74% per month or a 44.40% level of stock 
underperformance in the 5-year post issue period.52 Unlike straight and callable bonds, the level of 
                                                 
52 All results presented are significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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underperformance is increased in the 5-year post period compared to the 3-year post period. These 
results are consistent to those of Affleck-Graves and Miller (2003) who provide an explanation for the  
deteriorating monthly abnormal return. They explain the level of underperformance is increasing because 
the performance of the firm is lacking behind its industry peers. They further believe this lack of 
performance is diminishing the stock price of the firm and the convertible feature is not presenting value 
to the bondholders.   
 
4.5.3 Comparing the Results 
 
The long-run wealth effect of newly issued debt has long been subject of academic literature. The 
accurate way to capture the long-run impact has been the subject of much debate. Several models have 
evolved to capture the long-run abnormal return, although two have risen to the forefront of the literature. 
Buy-and-hold returns methodology measures the level of stock return underperformance through a series 
of event firms being matched with firms of equal size and book-to-market value. By comparing the returns 
of both firms over an observation window, the level of underperformance can be determined. The Fama 
French Four-Factor Model is a regression featuring the T-bill return, a market premium factor, a size 
factor, a book-to-market factor and a momentum factor. Fama and French (1996) argue that buy-and-hold 
returns can provide mis-specified results due to new listing, skewness and re-listing biasness, while 
Barber and Lyon (1997) provide evidence to effectively test for abnormal returns (the mean return is 
different than zero) would be to use buy-and-hold return methodology. Both series of tests are conducted 
and the results are presented previously in this section. 
 
Both models used provide the same general results, finding that bond IBO’s issuing firms’ stock 
will significantly underperform firms that do not issue stocks or bonds up to a 5-year period. This 
relationship holds true for both issuers of investment and non-investment grade bonds. Straight bond 
issuers are found to underperform matched firms by 32.69% and 54.32% in the 3 and 5-year post period 
after issuance using buy-and-hold return methodology. The Fama French Four-Factor model finds slightly 
less underperformance over the 3 and 5-year post issue periods at 31.69% and 51.00% respectively. 
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High-yield bond issuers of straight bond experience 38.86% and 61.38% underperformance using buy-
and-hold techniques and 33.48% and 58.20% using the Fama French method over the same periods. 
Both models used also support the hypotheses that firms issuing high-yield bond IBOs’ will exhibit stock 
price underperformance compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms and high-yield bond IBO firms 
will exhibit greater stock price underperformance than their investment grade bond IBO issuing 
counterparts. 
 
Both methods further revealed similar results for callable IBO bond issuances as with straight 
bond IBO issuers. The buy-and-hold method revealed stock return underperformance for investment-
grade issuing firms to be 37.23% and 55.47% over the 3 and 5-year post issue periods while the French-
Fama Four-Factor model has results of 33.84% and 52.20% over the 3 and 5-year post issue periods. 
These numbers increase to 41.28% and 63.32% using buy-and-hold methods to 36.00% and 58.20% 
using the four-factor model for non-investment grade issuers over the 3 and 5-year windows. Both models 
used also support the hypotheses that firms issuing high-yield callable bond IBOs’ will exhibit stock price 
underperformance compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms and firms issuing high-yield callable 
bond IBOs’ will exhibit greater stock price underperformance than their investment grade callable bond 
IBO issuing counterparts. 
 
Bonds issued with a conversion feature are the last classification of bonds evaluated. A 27.56% 
stock return underperformance is noted in the 3-year post issue period while 47.81% is noticed in the 5-
year post issue period using buy-and-hold methodology over investment grade issuers. Using the Fama 
French Four-Factor model for the same period finds underperformance of 21.24% and 43.80% for 
investment grade, convertible bond IBO’s. Non-investment grade convertible IBO’s exhibit 33.87% 
underperformance in the 3-year post issue period and 53.21% in the 5-year post issue period using buy-
and-hold returns. The Fama French Four-Factor model finds underperformance of 21.24% in the 3-year 
post issue period and 43.8 in the 5-year post issue period while non-investment grade issuer experienced 
a stock underperformance of 24.12% and 44.40% over the same periods. Similar to the previous results, 
both models used also support the hypothesis that firms issuing high-yield convertible bond IBOs’ will 
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exhibit stock price underperformance compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms. The results 
further support the hypothesis that firms issuing high-yield convertible bond IBOs’ will exhibit greater 
stock price underperformance than their investment grade callable bond IBO issuing counterparts. All the 
results of underperformance are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines bond IBO’s of straight, callable and convertible bonds, and the level of 
stock underperformance that is associated with the issuing firms. The basis of this research is to show 
stock return underperformance does exist surrounding bond IBO’s, and firms issuing high-yield debt will 
show a greater level of underperformance than their investment-grade counterparts. The results show 
stock return underperformance does occur for bond IBO issuing firms for a period up to five years after 
issuance. The results further show that issuers of convertible bond IBO’s will exhibit less stock return 
underperformance than issuers of straight or callable bonds. This relationship also holds true for issuers 
of high-yield bonds. The main intent of this research was to show firms issuing high-yield bond IBO’s will 
have a greater level of underperformance than their investment grade issuing counterparts. This 
relationship is proven using both buy-and-hold returns methodology and the Fama French Four-Factor 
model.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Dissertation Conclusion 
  
 The intent for this line of research is to fill various voids in the current academic research with 
respect to high-yield debt. High-yield debt is often overlooked or is treated as a restriction in a database 
mixing both investment and non-investment grade issues. This study looks at high-yield bonds issued for 
the period 1985 to 2003 and provides an insight into the level of investor reaction though abnormal 
returns and the pricing decisions for new issuances. Chapter 2 finds statistically significant negative 
abnormal stock returns surround the announcement of an issuance of a HYB in the short-run and 
attempts to explain the significant return through a series of cross-sectional regressions. Several of the 
variables tested were found to be significant determinants of a CAR and support the stated hypotheses. 
In this chapter, I hypothesized the better the rating, the less negative the CAR. The rating of the issue is 
found to be of significance and supports the hypothesis. Additionally, I hypothesize the lower the issue 
amount, the less negative the CAR and the lower the debt ratio, the less negative the negative CAR. Both 
the issue amount and the debt ratio reveal significance and support their respective hypotheses. The 
length of the issue, first-time issuers and the age of the firm at issuance all are found to be significant 
variables of CARs and support their hypotheses which state; the longer the length, the less negative the 
CAR, bond IBO issuers will have a less negative CAR than SBO issuers and the older the firm at 
issuance, the less negative the CAR. Several other variables were found to be significant determinants of 
the CAR but did not support their stated hypotheses. These variables include the rating of the issue, 
bonds issued with a variable coupon rate and the current and total asset turnover ratios. Hypothesis not 
supported by significant variables in chapter 2 include hypotheses over market conditions, callable 
issues, coupon amount, exchange, use of proceeds, current ratio, total assets turnover ratio, basic 
earnings power ratio and the industry classification. 
 
 Chapter 3 examines whether the spread at issuance of a high-yield bond can be explained by 
examining various bond and firm characteristics. The results show that the coupon amount is statistically 
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significant in determining the spread. This evidence supports the hypothesis the higher the coupon 
amount, the larger the spread will be. The length of the issue is found to be statistically significant in 
spread determination and supports the hypothesis stating the longer the term to maturity, the larger the 
spread. I also find bonds with a call feature to have a statistical significance over the spread and support 
the hypothesis that callable bonds will have a greater spread than non-callable bonds.  
 
It is further hypothesized the lower the credit rating, the larger the spread will be. The rating of the 
issue is found to be of significance and supports this statement. The final variable found to be significant 
in determining the spread is whether the market is in a bull or bear state. The test results support the 
hypothesis stating that bonds issued in bear markets will have a larger spread than bonds issued in bull 
markets. Several variables were found to support their hypothesis, but did reveal any statistical 
significance in determining the spread. These variables include: use of proceeds, issue amount, first-time 
issuers, age at issuance and the firm’s total asset turnover, basic earning power and debt management 
ratios. Variables representing exchange, industry classification and the current ratio are found not be 
significant determinants and do not support their hypotheses.  
 
 Chapter 4 uses bond IBO’s of straight, callable and convertible bonds to determine the level of 
stock underperformance that is associated with the issuing firms. The basis of this research is to show 
stock return underperformance does exist surrounding bond IBO’s, and firms issuing high-yield bonds will 
show a greater level of underperformance than their investment-grade counterparts. Two different 
methods are used in academic research to measure long-run abnormal returns; Buy-and-Hold Return 
methodology and the Fama-French Four Factor model. I employ both techniques and find similar results 
using both. Both the Buy-and Hold Return methodology and the Fama-French Four-Factor model support 
the hypotheses that firms issuing high-yield bond IBOs’ will exhibit stock price underperformance 
compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms and high-yield bond IBO firms will exhibit greater stock 
price underperformance than their investment grade bond IBO issuing counterparts. It is also found that 
both test models used also support the hypotheses that firms issuing high-yield callable bond IBOs’ will 
exhibit stock price underperformance compared to non-issuing stock and\or bond firms and firms issuing 
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high-yield callable bond IBOs’ will exhibit greater stock price underperformance than their investment 
grade callable bond IBO issuing counterparts. Additionally, both test models used support the hypothesis 
that firms issuing high-yield convertible bond IBOs’ will exhibit stock price underperformance compared to 
non-issuing stock and\or bond firms and will have greater stock price underperformance than their 
investment grade callable bond IBO issuing counterparts.  
 
 These results presented in this research provide an insight into how high-yield debt offerings 
impact the issuing firm. The research is not without limitations. The databases selected are assumed to 
have true and correct information. In cases of incomplete or inaccurate information, the observation was 
excluded from the dataset. In general, ordinary least squares regression models can suffer from a variety 
of problems. Multicollinearity can be introduced into the results by having a perfectly linear relation among 
the variables. Regression models are said to be robust and have low noise when multicollinearity is 
minimized. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more variable measure the same thing. The issue is as 
the level of multicollinearity increases, the estimates of the coefficients are unstable and the standard 
errors of the coefficients will become inflated. Tests of correlation were used to assess the variables 
chosen and were found to be within normal tolerances. However, this does not mean a minimal amount of 
multicollinearity may be present in the test results. Another issue in regression models is the assumption 
that the error term to be of a constant variance. When heteroskedasticity is introduced into the model, it 
causes the estimated variance to be a biased estimator of the true variance. This will cause a violation of 
the assumption. Heteroskedasticity often occurs when there are large differences between the size of 
observations. Size of the abnormal retruns and the spread vary across each observation in the datasets. 
Lagrange Multiplier tests for hetereoskedasticity were conducted for each test and were found to be 
within acceptable limits. However, this does not mean a minimal amount of heteroskedasticity may not 
exist in the test results. 
 
Measuring long-run abnormal returns has been the subject of much academic research and 
debate. Chapter 4 presents the argument over which method for long-run abnormal returns is more 
accurate. Both Buy-and-Hold Returns and the Fama-French Four-Factor models have their supporters 
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and critics. I employ both methods over the dataset and can draw the same general conclusions using 
either methodology. As long as academic researchers debate which methodology is superior, further 
research into these methods should be conducted. 
 
Further research is still necessary to fully understand how high-yield bond issuances impact the 
financial structure of the firm. It has been learned and reconfirmed that the stock price of high-yield bond 
issuing firms is negatively impacted by an issuance in both the short-run and the long-run. The evidence 
of significant explanatory variables in this research provides a partial explanation for contributing factors 
of an abnormal return. Continuation of research into the pricing decision of high-yield bonds as measured 
by the offering spread is necessary to fully understand the pricing decision over new issues. I provide a 
partial explanation of the pricing decision by identifying determinants that make up the spread. 
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Appendix A – Standardized Industry Classification List  
Source: http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html 
 
A. Division A: Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 
     Major Group 01: Agricultural Production Crops 
     Major Group 02: Agriculture production livestock and animal specialties 
     Major Group 07: Agricultural Services 
     Major Group 08: Forestry 
     Major Group 09: Fishing, hunting, and trapping 
B. Division B: Mining  
     Major Group 10: Metal Mining  
     Major Group 12: Coal Mining 
     Major Group 13: Oil And Gas Extraction 
     Major Group 14: Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 
C. Division C: Construction  
     Major Group 15: Building Construction General Contractors And Operative Builders 
     Major Group 16: Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 
     Major Group 17: Construction Special Trade Contractors 
D. Division D: Manufacturing  
     Major Group 20: Food And Kindred Products 
     Major Group 21: Tobacco Products 
     Major Group 22: Textile Mill Products 
     Major Group 23: Apparel And Other Finished Products Made From Fabrics And Similar Materials 
     Major Group 24: Lumber And Wood Products, Except Furniture 
     Major Group 25: Furniture And Fixtures 
     Major Group 26: Paper And Allied Products 
     Major Group 27: Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 
     Major Group 28: Chemicals And Allied Products 
     Major Group 29: Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 
     Major Group 30: Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 
     Major Group 31: Leather And Leather Products 
     Major Group 32: Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 
     Major Group 33: Primary Metal Industries 
     Major Group 34: Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Transportation Equipment 
     Major Group 35: Industrial And Commercial Machinery And Computer Equipment 
     Major Group 36: Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer  Equipment 
     Major Group 37: Transportation Equipment 
     Major Group 38: Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And  Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks 
     
Major Group 39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
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E. Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services   
     Major Group 40: Railroad Transportation 
     Major Group 41: Local And Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger Transportation 
     Major Group 42: Motor Freight Transportation And Warehousing 
     Major Group 43: United States Postal Service 
     Major Group 44: Water Transportation 
     Major Group 45: Transportation By Air 
     Major Group 46: Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 
     Major Group 47: Transportation Services 
     Major Group 48: Communications 
     Major Group 49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 
F. Division F: Wholesale Trade  
     Major Group 50: Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 
     Major Group 51: Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 
G. Division G: Retail Trade  
     Major Group 52: Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, And Mobile Home Dealers 
     Major Group 53: General Merchandise Stores 
     Major Group 54: Food Stores 
     Major Group 55: Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service Stations 
     Major Group 56: Apparel And Accessory Stores 
     Major Group 57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment Stores 
     Major Group 58: Eating And Drinking Places 
     Major Group 59: Miscellaneous Retail 
H. Division H: Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate   
     Major Group 60: Depository Institutions 
     Major Group 61: Non-depository Credit Institutions 
     Major Group 62: Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, And Services 
     Major Group 63: Insurance Carriers 
     Major Group 64: Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service 
     Major Group 65: Real Estate 
     Major Group 67: Holding And Other Investment Offices 
I. Division I: Services  
     Major Group 70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And Other Lodging Places 
     Major Group 72: Personal Services 
     Major Group 73: Business Services 
     Major Group 75: Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 
     Major Group 76: Miscellaneous Repair Services 
     Major Group 78: Motion Pictures 
     Major Group 79: Amusement And Recreation Services 
     Major Group 80: Health Services 
     Major Group 81: Legal Services 
     Major Group 82: Educational Services 
     Major Group 83: Social Services 
     Major Group 84: Museums, Art Galleries, And Botanical And Zoological Gardens 
     Major Group 86: Membership Organizations 
     Major Group 87: Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, And Related Services 
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     Major Group 88: Private Households 
     Major Group 89: Miscellaneous Services 
J. Division J: Public Administration   
     Major Group 91: Executive, Legislative, And General Government, Except Finance 
     Major Group 92: Justice, Public Order, And Safety 
     Major Group 93: Public Finance, Taxation, And Monetary Policy 
     Major Group 94: Administration Of Human Resource Programs 
     Major Group 95: Administration Of Environmental Quality And Housing Programs 
     Major Group 96: Administration Of Economic Programs 
     Major Group 97: National Security And International Affairs 
     Major Group 99: Nonclassifiable Establishments 
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